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Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-116
Friday
14 June 1996

Daily Report
East Europe

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NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

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Balkans: Bosnia Elections Dominate Opening of Florence Conference

AU1306173296 Paris AFP in English
1721 GMT 13 Jun 96

[by Jon Boyle]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Florence, Italy, June 13 (AFP)—Bosnia's first post-war elections dominated the opening day of a mid-term Dayton review conference Thursday, with a UN official calling for war crimes suspects to be arrested before polling day.

Antonio Cassese, president of the UN war crimes tribunal, said hardline Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic should be arrested before the mid-September deadline for the proposed elections.

"Without wishing to be a prophet of doom, I am duty bound emphatically to ask this question: Is it not better to arrest those leaders now than to refrain from any action and then next year face the possibility of an outbreak of armed violence and more bloodshed and more crimes?" he asked

Tribunal spokesman Christian Chartier had earlier told reporters that "their arrest is a precondition for the elections."

Cassese said "some selective economic sanctions and such measures as a sports boycott might turn out to be workable and effective" in forcing the Serbs to comply with tribunal, based in The Hague.

"It is imperative to take prompt and drastic action to make sure that real peace returns to the former Yugoslavia, once and for all," he said in a speech to delegates from 60 countries and international organizations.

A copy of the speech was issued in advance to journalists.

International officials accept the elections will not meet western standards, but argue that they are a political must, as key shared institutions—the presidency, national parliament and government—can only be created after the vote.

Swiss Foreign Minister Flavio Cotti, head of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is supervising the polls, has come under heavy pressure to certify that minimum conditions for the polls exist. He is expected to announce an election date later this month.

Earlier, Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini opened the conference by urging Bosnia's warring parties to "make every possible effort to give impetus to the peace process."

He paid tribute to the NATO-led military operation which, he said, had successfully ensured an end to fighting which left 150,000 dead in Bosnia, but said "extraordinary efforts" were needed to ensure elections happen on time.

Top civilian peace coordinator Carl Bildt said Karadzic continued to poison the political atmosphere in Bosnia—but he side-stepped the call for sanctions, whose reimposition he can order within five days.

Bildt added that any delay in holding the elections could lead to permanent division of Bosnia, whose four-year war ended with the signature of the Dayton peace accords last December 14.

"To delay elections means accepting partition of Bosnia for longer that necessary. This should not be the policy of the peace implementation council," he said.

He slammed Bosnian Serb cooperation with the UN war crimes tribunal as "grossly deficient" and "a direct provocation" against the international community which was "poisoning the political atmopshere of the entire country."

And he severely criticised all sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina for human rights breaches, saying that "without a fundamental improvement in respect for...basic rights, the peace process runs the risk of failure."

Harassment and intimidation of ethnic minorities continued unabated, said Bildt, warning that "Bosnia is still—six months after the peace agreement—a country coming apart not a country coming together."

Separately, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata said her agency had slashed to 165,000 the number of refugees it hoped to see return this year, down from 500,000 announced in May.

But she appealed for more "political will" to speed up reconstruction to facilitate the refugees' return home.

In a press conference later Thursday, Bildt reaffirmed his position that Karadzic's arrest should happen "irrespective of the elections."

"If the elections were to be deferred one year...I would not say that we should defer the arrest one year," he said.

"The tribunal position must be, and I would support that, that they (war crimes suspects) should be arrested any second, and be brought any second to The Hague," he added.

"The conditions that are in the peace accords are absolute, not related to any time lines. I think we should be careful not to relate it to any time lines either," he said.

Albania: Press Views 'Current Serbian Options' on Kosovo

AU1306183696 Tirana RILINDJA in Albanian 13 Jun 96 p 1

[Commentary by Xh. Rexhepi: "Serbia Puts Kosova Up for Auction!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A serious polarization over the Kosova question has been evident on the Serbian political stage for the last week. This polarization began immediately after the formal opening of the U.S. Information Service in Prishtina, which in fact laid the foundations for an international presence in Kosova, embodying the longstanding international insistence that the issue of Kosova must be solved by peaceful means and through dialogue between the Albanians' legitimate representatives and the officials of Belgrade under the supervision of the international community. Greater Serbian nationalist and chauvinist circles have been even further disappointed by the repeated insistence of Europe and the United States that the Kosova question must be solved more quickly, and their disillusion sank even deeper after it was understood that the Serbian Academy of Sciences had opened the "Kosova file" last week.

Serbian extremist circles were extremely surprised and disappointed that the Serbian Academy of Science's discussion of Kosova used a new and more "realistic" vocabulary, in comparison with all previous discussions of this subject. According to them, concessions are being made to the Albanians and this means the loss of "Serbian Kosovo," the mythological farce that has been for one century the pretext for violence and genocide perpetrated by the state against the Albanians on their own territories in the area of the former Yugoslavia. The firm promises made by the Serbian president in his interview with the German magazine DER SPIEGEL that the question of Kosova will not become an international issue have also failed to reassure them.

However, other, more realistic circles in Serbia have not been indifferent to the broaching of this issue by the Serbian Academy of Sciences, which has always defined Serbia's national and political strategy. They have hastened to state their own political opinions in order to gain points with the Serbian electorate. Some of them have generously announced that Kosova must be given back its autonomy of 1974, others have said that dialogue with the Albanians must be started as soon as possible to find an adequate solution for the status of Kosova "within Yugoslavia," and others again have brought to life Cosic's old idea of "the partition of Kosovo."

Looking at all the current Serbian options for Kosova and remembering earlier ones, it becomes evident that both Serbian officials and the opposition have put Kosova up for auction! They talk, ruminate, and deliberate about Kosova as if the place were their private property. Why they behave in this way, "reckoning the bill without the innkeeper," as the old Albanian saying goes, is their affair.

Such Serbian ruminations about Kosova are not unknown to the Albanian and international public, nor are the clear positions of the legal Albanian representatives, as embodied in particular in the people's referendum of 1991, in which the people of Kosova declared their political will for a free and independent Kosova. The current attempts among Serbian circles to undermine the free will of the overwhelming majority of the population of Kosova by creating new options for the status of Kosova are nothing but perfidious maneuvers to delay a solution to the issue. They seem also be attempting to reduce the international pressure for a faster solution of the Kosova issue.

It remains to be seen how far they will succeed. It is now known that the contact group of countries for solving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia will discuss Kosova next month. This was declared at last week's meeting between French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and the news came on the day that the U.S. Information Service was opened in Prishtina. It is in this context that one must also view yesterday's visit to Prishtina by Carl Bildt's deputy and the statement by German Foreign Minister Kinkel, drawing Serbia's attention to its responsibility for "making the situation in Kosova increasingly dangerous," and also underlining that Serbia might again face sanctions over this, because of its failure to cooperate properly to stabilize the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and because of its delay over the return of refugees.

Albania: Fairness of Norwegian OSCE Observers Doubted

AU1206172796 Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian 12 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by P. Skenderi: "The Scandal of the OSCE in the 26 May Elections in Albania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Almost 30 percent of the OSCE observers who followed the conducting of the 26 May elections in Albania turn out to have been invited by the Albanian Socialist Party [PS]. The PS invited as observers on 26 May a nine-person team from the Norwegian Working Youth, a left-wing political group that has nothing to do with the Norwegian Social Democratic Party. Their names were Marianne Oen, Bjorn Engesland, Borchgre Vink, Kare Vollan, Erlend Broli, Anne Marit Bjornflaten, Ulf Tore Isaksen, Oyvind Dahl, and Trond Jensrud. A letter from Karmine Radim, international secretary of the Norwegian Working Youth, informed the PS of the arrival of nine observers from Norway. So far everything seems normal. It is the political parties' right to ask for election observers among their friends and sister parties. The Socialist Party's preference for old and new Marxist-Leninist groups is no doubt its own business. Other parties, including the Democratic Party, also invited to the elections observers from among their supporters and from political parties.

However, the observers from Norway, invited by the PS, had a dual status when they monitored the elections in Albania. The OSCE fell into the trap of the Albanian communists. On 10 May the group of observers from Norway were attached to the Central Electoral Commission as observers invited by the PS. Ten days later, on 20 May, the OSCE coordinator, Mr. Mark Power Stevens, went to the Central Electoral Commission and asked to attach the nine Norwegians invited by the PS to the OSCE observation team. After the approval of their status as OSCE observers, the nine Norwegians possessed a dual status, first as observers invited by the PS and second as OSCE observers. Mr. Stevens also legalized the dual status of these observers with the signature of the Swiss ambassador in Albania (it is Switzerland's turn to hold the OSCE Presidency).

Why did Mr. Stevens give a dual status to the Marxist-Leninists from Norway? The easiest explanation testifying to the innocence of the OSCE coordinators and the Swiss ambassador (if the latter knew anything) is that the coordinator himself found it difficult to find a minimum number of people to come to Albania as observers. In order to make up the number, he innocently turned to the PS for the loan of a handful of "impartial" observers. However, there is another not so comfortable explanation for Mr. Stevens, and also perhaps for the Swiss ambassador, which involves the motives impelling them to so openly breach the OSCE's rules. This version, which would be a scandal for the OSCE, involves the question of whether other OSCE observers were obtained by the same means. This remains to be seen and judged calmly. What is indisputable is the fact that the group of Norwegian observers invited by the PS also managed to achieve the status of OSCE observers, and on this basis prepared the most critical and negative reports about the elections in Albania. As if this were not enough, the Norwegian Marxist-Leninists also turned to the world media, including the BBC, and called the elections, "not fair, not free, and rigged." It is clear that impartiality could not be expected from the solidarity of the Norwegian "comrades." Organizations such as the Norwegian Working Youth always hung around the Albanian Workers Party during the balmy days of the dictatorship, and it seems natural that they would stand by it in hard times, especially when their bed and board are guaranteed in such an unprecedented and suspicious way by a prestigious organization such as the OSCE.

The newspaper ALBANIA possesses full documentation of the falsification of the status of the Norwegian observers, which was made legal by coordinator Mark Power Stevens and the Swiss ambassador in Albania. The documents are worth making public, and are available to anybody who is interested.

Albania: OSCE Observer 'Close Friend' of Hoxha

AU1306144496 Tirana ATA in English 1309 GMT 13 Jun 96

["New Details on OSCE Observer Scandal in Albania"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 13 (ATA)—The status of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] observer in the May 26 elections in Albania was also granted to Tue Magnussen, from Denmark, who turns out to have been close friend and collaborator of dictator Enver Hoxha.

This data is provided by the newspaper ALBANIA on Thursday which explains that: "It turns out that Mr. Magnussen began to visit Albania since in the 70s."

In yesterday's issue, ALBANIA reports that nine from OSCE observers in May 26 elections in Albania, has been invited by Socialist Party [PS]. PS has chosen them from a Norwegian group of the extreme left (Norwegian Working Youth), that has nothing in common with the Social Democratic Party of Norwegian. This group of observers from Norwegian on May 10, was attached by the Central Election Commission, as observers called by PS and after ten days, on May 20, the OSCE observer Mark Power attached them by the Central Election Commission as OSCE observers.

ALBANIA writes that the name of Mr. Magnussen figures at the head of the Economic Commission of the former Foreign Relations Committee, an institution created during the dictatorship in Albania which had as a main duty the official propaganda of the communist administration outside the country as well as special duties of secret nature, covered with such economic names. Mr. Magnussen, according to documents of the former Foreign Relations Committee, has been for almost 20 years the most well known name among the political communist circles and had close relations with the dictator, Hoxha. At least, since 1976, the Danish Magnussen had the permission to pass the "armoured" Albanian border, ALBANIA underlines.

It was the time when foreigners that wanted to visit Albania passed carefully through the sieve of the secret police of the communist administration. During that time in Albania only terrorist groups, the so-called Marxist Leninist groups were welcomed. Documents have been already publicized which verify that these Marxist groups have been terrorist commandos financed with specialist funds of the Party of Labor of Albania (solidarity funds).

The newspaper writes that the fact that this gentleman from Denmark with such a past have been chosen from the PS to observe the May 26 elections in Albania, is something normal, but the problem is that Mr. Magnussen has enjoyed another status, that of OSCE observer. "In spite of irregularities observed during May 26 elections in Albania, the inclusion with a double status of more than 30 per cent of OSCE observers might be compromising for the OSCE office, likewise the final report of the Office of Democratic Institution for Human Rights, ODIHR, on elections in Albania," the newspaper writes.

The newspaper goes on that the OSCE and its office ODIHR, no doubt, have reflected a strict seriousness in monitoring elections in many countries of the world. "The problem might be the kind of manipulation and compromise made to ODIHR mission to Albania during May 26 elections by Albanian communists. The fact of inclusion of observers of the Socialist Party as OSCE observers is compromising," the newspaper writes.

Albania: Press Responds to OSCE Election Report

AU1306190096

[FBIS Report] The Albanian press on 13 June offer a varied response to the publication of the report by the OSCE observation team on the People's Assembly elections of 26 May.

The independent Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian carries on page 1 the headline "OSCE: 'The Law Was Broken During the Voting'" with the subhead "But Europe Has Still Not Asked for a Repetition of the Polls," referring to a 600-word report by Elio Elini on page 3 entitled "OSCE: 'Elections in Albania Not Honest.'" This headline also covers a 300-word report by "R.Xh." on U.S. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns's interview for the BBC entitled "The United States: 'The Rerun OK, but We Are Waiting for the OSCE.'"

Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian, an independent paper close to the Socialist Party and the parties of the Center Pole, carries the full text of the OSCE report on pages 4-6 under the headline "OSCE Observers: This Is How the Deception of 26 May Was Carried Out." A 300-word A. Bushati report under the same headline on page 1 states that the OSCE report is "one of the harshest election reports in the organization's history."

Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian, which represents the views of the Social-Democratic Party and the Democratic Alliance, carries on page 1 the headline, "Elections Practically Worthless," and promises the complete text of the OSCE report in its edition of 14 June. The paper also carries on page 3 a 600-word REUTER report, datelined Vienna on 12 June, under the headline "OSCE: 'Elections Also Violated Albanian Law.'"

The Socialist Party's paper Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian carries on page 1 the headline "Electoral Law Violated." A 200-word unattributed report states, "The OSCE observers' report has caused annoyance in the camp of the dictator Berisha, which was most clearly expressed yesterday in the pages of the newspaper ALBANIA." A subhead refers the reader to a summary of the report on page 4, which does not exist, and promises further coverage in the paper of 14 June.

The progovernment paper Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian does not mention the publication of the OSCE report, but carries an 800-word report by P. Skenderi on page 3 entitled "OSCE Manipulated by Albanian Communists?" This report, similar to the referent item, alleges that Danish OSCE observer Tue Magnussen was a "friend and close collaborator of the dictator Enver Hoxha."

The Democratic Party paper Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian carries on page 1 a 200-word report by S. Neza entitled "According to REUTER—OSCE Does Not Call For Repeat Elections in Albania." The report states, "The final report of the OSCE on the Albanian elections, announced yesterday by this organization, does not call for a repeat of the elections in Albania. REUTER confirmed this yesterday in a series of reports from the moment of the publication of the final report of the observers who followed the elections in Albania." The report concludes: "The conclusion reached by the OSCE fully justifies the result of the elections with their striking victory for the Democratic Party. The desire of the Red front to repeat the elections in Albania has found no support not only among the Albanians who banished communism from Albania with their free votes, but also among important international organizations such as the OSCE, the EU, and the U.S. State Department."

Albania: PS Boycotts Rerun Election To Avoid 'Civil War'

AU1306151996 Tirana ATA in English 1123 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Report by R. Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 12 (ATA)—The Socialist Party [PS] said on Wednesday it will not take part in the rerun of poll in 17 constituencies and will continue to call for fresh election.

"The PS and other forces have taken the decision to withdraw from the election process. This decision helps avoid conflict which would lead to a civil war. We isolated and inactivated the Berisha electoral farce," said Pellumbi, at a rally held on Wednesday in the "Asllan Rusi" Sports hall, on its fifth anniversary of its founding.

Pellumbi, one of the three socialist deputy chairmen, provided as an argument for this act of the socialists also criticised by their leader Nano, "the avoidance of civil war."

Precisely five years ago, when its name and programme was changed, the Party of Labour of Albania declared in its 10th Congress that it had also changed its mentality overnight.

Observers expected it to strongly denounce the past of the party-state of Albania so as to make credible its claim to be a new social-democratic force belonging to the European left. Unlike the other former-communist parties of Eastern Europe, like the Hungarian one for instance, it not only was not disintegrated, but preferred to avoid the question of its inheritance, leaving this analysis to the future.

"The Socialist Party, had a difficult but honest birth," said the PS chairman for Tirana, Musa Ulqini, in his opening address.

The PS continues to keep in its programme Karl Marx and in its lead many incriminated elements of the past.

"It is not shortsightedness, withdrawal from the race or political submission as ill-willingly interpreted by several people," said Pellumbi indefinitely but implying Nano's criticism, "but a responsible act not to allow deception of the electorate."

Pellumbi presented to the mainly old aged participants, who could hardly fill the hall, the three socialist options, which, according to him: "have a clear repercussion both in and outside the country. The first was a rigorous inquiry into the May 26 incident with the participation of all political forces and international observers, fresh elections, under really free, equal conditions and under the eyes of international observers; secondly, the recall of the 1992 parliament to carry out changes in the voting procedures and create the necessary conditions for free elections; thirdly, the formation of a government that would enjoy the consensus of all political parliamentary forces, and, as a task, the holding of fresh free elections within 1996."

OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], the EU, and the U.S. State Department have not expressed themselves in favour of annulling the elections, but of correcting them in several constituencies. In a final report on the general elections in Albania, OSCE criticised on Thursday, June 13, violations of legal standards, but did not call for fresh elections. Pellumbi did not elaborate these statements, but called on the electorate to boycott the "the vote bazaar of June 16."

"We have not given up, the Democratic Party and President Berisha should well be aware of this," shouted the PS deputy chairman, criticised for shortcomings in spreading PS political views over the world. "We cannot accept that Albania be treated sui generis by certain European circles," he said.

Albania: PS Head Not To Join Berisha's Parliament

AU1306155496 Tirana ATA in English 1717 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 12 (ATA)—The deputy chairman of Socialist Party [PS], Ilir Meta, doesn't exclude the possibility of negative consequences within the opposition, "caused by the political crisis which has included whole Albania." He adds that "potentially the possibility is not excluded for such effects within PS too," Meta says in an interview the daily KOHA JONE published on Wednesday [12 June].

Regarding the possibility to elect a new leader for PS, as the current chairman is imprisoned on charge of corruption and forging of documents, Meta says: "I don't think PS is suffering a leader crisis." The future congress will decide about the new leadership of the party, he adds.

The PS and the other left opposition parties, boycotted the parliamentary elections of June 26, three hours before polling procedures was over, claiming the elections were rigged by the ruling party, Democratic Party, who won the majority.

On the same claim PS boycotted the second round, the ballot of June 2, and declared this party will boycott the rerun of elections of June 16, in 17 constituencies. There have been irregularities in these constituencies, mainly in the suffrage counting, caused by the withdrawal of left parties representatives from voting commissions.

"I will not take part in the parliament set up by President Berisha," Meta declares.

Meta was the winner of the Constituency 91, in Corovode, south Albania, in the first round of parliamentary elections.

Albania: Pellumbi Speaks at PS 5th Anniversary Rally

AU1306191596 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 13 Jun 96 p 3

[Speech by Servet Pellumbi, PS deputy chairman, at a rally in the Asllan Rusi Sports Hall in Tirana on 12 June: "A Party of Modern and Optimistic Messages"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Members and supporters of the Socialist Party [PS], honored friends and guests, five years ago, on 12 June 1991, when Albanian society was involved in the progressive process of moving from dictatorship to democracy and from monism to pluralism, intellectuals, reformers, and honest people, inspired by the ideals of Western democratic socialism, announced the formation of a new political force, the PS.

This was a great historic act. With legitimate pride, we celebrate today the fifth anniversary of a party that was able to set aside the dictatorial past and to advance surely and progressively forward with a view to the future!

The intensive course of events and changes that have taken place in the country have given the last five years a special value in drawing out the basic characteristics of a political force such as the PS, which has not stood on the sidelines waiting for "better days," but has been and remains at the center of the changes, reforming and changing itself in response to the situation.

On its fifth anniversary, the PS sees itself as the largest political force in the country, richest in ideas and experience, and with a clear and specific alternative for the future of democracy and of the market economy reforms, for the rule of law and political pluralism, and for human rights and freedoms. It has solid and deserved support at home and abroad.

The PS, even though subjected to continual persecution and "political apartheid" and with its chairman imprisoned for political reasons, has successfully passed the test of becoming a constructive opposition and has increased the ranks of its membership to 110,000, with a nationwide organization. It has shown its ability to cooperate with other political forces, increased the prestige of its alternative, and proved its ability to govern. It has thus won the moral and political right to ask for the votes of the Albanian electorate, which, as we know, was generous with its votes both on 26 July 1992 [local elections] and on 6 November 1994 [referendum on draft constitution]. These tests, which are among the most fundamental ones, have been and remain a matter of pride and optimism for the PS, and are also a source of its stable, massive, and educated electorate's respect and loyalty. The PS has never cut itself off from people, and they have never cut themselves off from the PS. The electorate, with you as a part of it, is the source of our strength and our victories!

The PS is and will be a match for historic moments. We will not provide any satisfaction to those who are waiting for the division or dissolution of the PS! The PS is and will remain united on basic issues and in its standpoints and activities.

Comrades and honored guests, the elections of 26 May faced all the country's political forces with a great test. Events took such a course that different political tinges or program differences were relegated to the background while we were once again faced with the primary dilemma of a democracy or a dictatorship. This is now the litmus test for the political forces and for the Albanian electorate.

What happened on 26 May was neither accidental nor unexpected for the opposition. Berisha's clan, especially after the referendum of 6 November [1994], devised scenarios and launched "legislative initiatives" that daily restricted the scope for democracy in Albania.

Watching this trend with anxiety, we asked the president of the republic to publicly commit himself to free elections. Verbally, he did this more than once, while he secretly and deviously prepared his "presidential guard," supplemented by the armed phalangists who were to stage the electoral farce of 26 May with its clear characteristics of a coup d'etat, and the dangerous conflicts that were to accompany the counting of the votes and the rigging of the results.

When we saw on 26 May that only a few hours were left before this danger became a reality, the PS and the other opposition forces, on the basis of substantial material evidence, took the now-familiar decision to withdraw from the electoral process, a decision that made it possible to avert conflict that would have bordered on a civil war, and which isolated the Democratic Party and exposed Berisha's electoral farce. What happened two days later on 28 May on Skenderbeg Square, the "electoral bazaar" on 2 June, and the high-handed decision to hold "partial elections" on 16 June further clarified everything.

The electoral putsch, the farce, and the violence that still prevails throughout the country are a serious accusation against Berisha and the party he leads. We now tell these people who stole the votes of the people and continue to boast of this that your rule will never earn the confidence of the people. It will never be stable, and it has no future. You are frightened of democracy. You are terrified of the democratic expression of popular dissatisfaction. This fear has now excluded you from the peaceful contest for genuine democracy in Albania. You cannot conceal that your alternative is dictatorship.

The stand taken by the PS and the other opposition forces toward the 26 May elections is neither a withdrawal from the race or a political failure, as some maliciously interpret it, but is a general commitment not to give legitimacy to the deception of the electorate and to a monist parliament without a genuine opposition and without the trust of the people. Our proposals are clear and have met with a broad response both at home and abroad. Their aim is:

1) A strict investigation of what happened on 26 May with the participation of all the political forces and international observers, with a repeat of the elections on the basis of the results of the investigation and under genuinely free and equal conditions and with rigorous international monitoring.

2) A recall of the parliament that emerged from the elections of 22 March 1992, to which there is no legal obstacle, in order to make the relevant changes to the voting procedure and to create the other necessary conditions for free elections.

3) The formation of a government with the consensus of all the parliamentary parties whose basic task will be to prepare and conduct free elections before the end of 1996.

We also express our readiness for dialogue and to discuss an elected constitutional assembly and any other option that will pave the way for genuinely free elections, political stability, and the progress of democratic processes in Albania, and will combat an authoritative regime and personal rule.

The situation is critical and difficult, but not insoluble. A serious commitment to finding a reasonable solution within the terms of democracy also exists on the part of the OSCE, the U.S. State Department, the EU, the European Parliament, and authoritative world democratic institutions and associations, whom we thank. We express the conviction that they will not allow a European country that is a member of the Council of Europe to be ruled by a party-state, a monist parliament, and a dictatorial regime.

As for us Socialists, it is left to us to fight to the end for a genuine affirmation of the values and principles of democracy, among which free elections take first place. In the name of this democracy, we once again call on the Albanian electorate to boycott the "electoral bazaar" of 16 June. The 17 constituencies in which the electoral farce will be repeated are nothing but a "handful of dust" that Berisha is trying to throw in the electorate's eyes. But he is always in error. The Albanian electorate saw everything, and will judge and correct everything. This shows that democracy in Albania has a future. We will win!

Hurrah for the fifth anniversary of the PS!

Long live genuine democracy!

Long live the Albanian people!

Albania: Court To Consider 'First' Election Complaint

AU1306155396 Tirana ATA in English 1650 GMT 12 Jun 96

[Report by S. Spahiu]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 12 (ATA)—Albania's Constitutional Court, presided by Chairman Rustem Gjata, examined on Wednesday [12 June] the claim of Socialist Party [PS] deputy, Gafur Mazreku, on "the statement considering the result of the election May 26 in Constituency No 14 of Has district, where he has put his candidacy, as invalid."

Members of the Court told ATA that this is the first And the only claim presented to the Constitutional Court by candidates or other political subjects. The court examined the claim within three days.

Mazreku had before presented the same claim to the Central Electoral Commission [KQZ]. The lawyers of the commission present to the court room declared that "Mazreku's complaints didn't prove true during the verification conducted by KQZ and upheld the decision of the polling commission of No 14 Constituency."

Maxhun Peka, of Democratic Party [PD] was the winner of Constituency 14 with 53,4697 percent of suffrages during the elections of May 26. The PS candidate for deputy Gafur Mazreku did withdraw his candidacy, contrary to the decision of the electoral subject he represents, whom three hours before the closure of the voting process, announced the withdrawal of his candidacy and the commission members from the polling stations through a statement make public by the TV.

The panel of the Constitutional Court demanded from Mazreku to prove his claims with facts and deposits the materials presented by him.

PS members of the commissions in 16 constituencies of this zone and its observers has signed the process-verbaux and hadn't presented any complain or irregularity in these polling stations during the process of voting and suffrage counting.

The Constitutional Court decision on this issue will be announced after same days.

Only five candidates of PS won in the elections of May 26. PS stirred up a lot of noise (and other opposition left parties) on the irregularities and other grave violation in the election procedures. This is the first complaint that a member of this party (or other parties) submits to this court on such basis.

Albania: Meksi Meets Kore Voters, 'Sure' of PD Victory

AU1306151396 Tirana ATA in English 1039 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Report by B. Fejzullaj]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 13 (ATA)—The Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, in a meeting with Democratic Party [PD] members and sympathisers in Constituencies 92 and 94 in Korce (southeastern Albania) Wednesday [12 June], where elections are to be rerun Sunday [16 June] said: "You should be sure that even if elections were repeated all over Albania, the PD would have won a clearer victory than that of May 26."

Withdrawal of opposition only three hours before voting closed gave rise to complaints. Surely the irregularities have been small and formal and have not influenced the election result, but the responsibility to be correct towards the law is great. That's why the Central Electoral Commission decided to rerun elections in 17 constituencies, he added.

Meksi continued that the election campaign the socialists conducted was a campaign of insults and threatening and it resulted, according to Meksi, in a loss of credibility among the Albanian electorate.

He criticized the Socialist Party [PS] allies, Democratic Alliance and Social Democratic Party, which protested, voted, and threatened side by side with the PS.

"The Albanian electorate gave them only 1.7 per cent of the votes and left them out of parliament," Meksi finished.

Albania: PD Press Welcomes EU Presidency Statement

AU1306190896 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 13 Jun 96 p 1

[Editorial: "The United States and Europe Welcome Partial Elections in Albania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. State Department and the EU welcomed yesterday the decision of the Albanian authorities to repeat the elections in those constituencies where there had been many irregularities. The government's response to preliminary advice from the EU and the United States in their assessments of the elections of 26 May has been clearly welcomed by the statement of the EU Presidency [illegible] in an interview with U.S. State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns.

Institutions supporting and encouraging democratic developments throughout the world have welcomed the repetition of the elections in 17 constituencies as a good step forward in correcting the problems noticed by impartial observers.

The EU in its declaration did not hesitate to greet the Democratic Party [PD] and the other political forces that have responded positively to calls to reestablish conditions of fairness at such an important stage of Albania's democratic life.

At the same time, the European Presidency expressed its optimism that the self-restraint of the political forces will soon establish the necessary political dialogue. This would be a constructive contribution to the conduct of the electoral process in Albania, aiming to consolidate respect for European standards and the principles of international justice in Albania.

It is clear that the recent statements of important European political institutions pave the way for the recognition of the final results of the election, which are expected to be announced after the electoral round in constituencies in which repeat elections have been considered necessary. These institutions do not conceal their satisfaction at the response of the Albanian Government and its way of solving the problems, which leave no scope for the use of force and the other undemocratic methods that the left has systematically provoked. PD Chairman Tritan Shehu has praised the EU Presidency declaration as a statement of understanding whose purpose is, he claims, to overcome the obstacles raised by the leadership of the left in Albania. Despite the repeated invitations of the Democrats for dialogue, the leaders of the conservative left have been left wandering the streets of Europe, hurling insults as always against the development of democracy and opposing the successful reforms of the last four years in Albania.

The most recent statement by the EU Presidency is a further slap in the face for the conservative wing that is seeking to keep Albania under the sway of the left, following the blow delivered by the Albanian electorate on 26 May. Pellumbi, Ceka, Gjinushi, and the "right-wing" Kalakulla, who have returned from Brussels with blah-blah, are now totally exposed in the eyes even of their tiny electorate, who now have no difficulty in understanding the extent of their defeat and the political impotence of the incriminated people who insist on representing them.

Nothing new is expected from their foot-slogging through the capitals of Europe, except for further proof that it is vital for the Albanian political scene to dispose of the Left, if Albania is to be conclusively freed from the shadows of the past.

Albania: Austrian Chancellor Asked To Help Settle Crisis

*AU1306163096 Tirana ATA in English
1732 GMT 12 Jun 96*

[Report by Rafael Floqi]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 12 (ATA)—The two Albanian parties of opposition, the self-called Pole of the Center, the Social Democratic Party [PSD] and Democratic Alliance Party [AD], which boycotted in coalition with the Socialist Party [PS] the elections of May 26, had sent a letter to the Austrian Chancellor Franz Vranitzky, demanding an audience with him, in order to present their viewpoints and to ask his interference "for the settlement of the crisis."

"In the name of the main Albanian opposition parties... We have faith that under these extremely difficult circumstances, an European personality as Mr. Vranitzky should play a major role for the settlement of the crisis," a fax that the chairman of PSD, Skender Gjinushi, and the president of AD, Neritan Ceka, sent yesterday to Mr. Vranitzky says.

Both opposition parties, together with the Socialist Party, had refused to take part in the rerun of elections in 17 zones in June 16. From the preliminary information, it comes out that these two parties have not met the four percent quota necessary to have a seat in the parliament. These parties also have not reacted about the call made yesterday by EU, and the statement of the spokesman of the American State Department, Richard Burns, which made an appeal to them to take part in the rerun of elections.

"This crisis demands an impartial and immediate solution," the letter to Vranitzky says, where the reasons why this role may be played by the Austrian chancellor have been presented. PSD and AD addressed to Vranitzky not only as chancellor of Austria, but also as the vice chairman of the Socialist International and chairman of the PSD of Austria.

During the recent days, especially after the EU statement, an activity of the above mentioned parties is noticed in their efforts to find a support from outside about their viewpoints. Today, a delegation of three members of the Albanian opposition is paying a visit to Greece, where they are holding talks in order to promote the socialist Greek Government not to accept the results of elections in Albania.

A separate activity of these parties from the Socialist Party, which has not been accepted to the Socialist International, is noticed. The united front of opposition which is boycotting the elections, experienced a real shock last weekend, when the imprisoned leader of PS, Fatos Nano, declared that the decision to pull over elections was "hastily taken."

The leaders of PSD and AD referring to a letter where the chairman of PS, Nano criticized the withdrawal of the leaders from elections, underlined that Nano "does not have a clear image of the reality because of his isolation in prison."

"I hope," the Chairman of Democratic Party Tritan Shehu said to ATA last night, "that the opposition will respond to such statements. But it is true that our opposition is so paradoxal and so ill motivated in its stands and have only one purpose: to create a bad image on Albania, something it has made historically during the last three years."

There is no announcement yet if the demand has found a positive response.

Albania: KQZ Urges Voters To Attend 16 Jun Elections

*AU1306195296 Tirana TVSH Television Network
in Albanian 1800 GMT 13 Jun 96*

[Announcement by Central Election Commission issued in Tirana on 13 June]

[FBIS Translated Text] As has been announced before, on Sunday, 16 June 1996, elections for deputies to the People's Assembly will be held in 17 constituencies, in which the Central Election Commission [KQZ] has decided to rerun elections due to irregularities observed.

The KQZ informs all electoral subjects, the public, state bodies, and election commissions of constituencies and voting stations that the judicial procedures in these elections are the same as those in the 26 May elections. In this case, the elections of 26 May 1996 will be repeated. For these reasons, we stress that the same candidates and electoral subjects that were presented in these constituencies on 26 May 1996 will be registered in the voting slips. The voting slip that will be used on 16 June 1996 will change from the one used on 26 May 1996 only in color and the date written on it.

The KQZ calls on the electoral subjects that will, without delay, submit to the commissions of constituencies and voting stations their members, observers, and sympathizers to take part in the 16 June 1996 elections, which will be held in 17 constituencies. The commission expresses the hope that by taking part in these elections, both electoral subjects and voters will show their democratic culture and render their contribution to free and fair elections.

For the KQZ--Secretary Kreshnik Spahiu, Chairman Edmir Kapidani.

Albania: Berisha Views Election, Kosovo on Return From Istanbul

AU1406093496 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1800 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Report by Diana Kalaja]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Having participated in the plenary session of Habitat II alongside 11 other heads of state, President Berisha expressed pleasure that, after 50 years of isolation, Albania is taking part in this important world conference. [passage omitted]

Viewing the housing situation Albania inherited after 50 years of communism, President Berisha said that in Albania today housing for the families of former political persecutees and those who live in the properties of former owners is a serious problem that the government is trying to solve. We are also concerned about the problem of widespread migration of the population from rural areas to the cities. About 30 percent of the population need improved living conditions. Although the classic problem of homelessness does not exist in Albania, thousands of families live in overcrowded or inappropriate conditions. Albania today is in a stage of great economic development, and at the same time needs investments and technical assistance in drawing up its strategic development policies, Berisha said.

After the plenary session, Berisha had a 30-minute talk with UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali. Dr. Butrus-Ghali greeted President Berisha and wished him success in the consolidation of democracy and the country's prosperity.

In his speech, Berisha underlined that Albania is a stable country and that democracy will continue to be consolidated. The election campaign and 26 May elections proceeded normally. There may have been small irregularities but the election was completely within the standards of an election campaign, Berisha said. The boycotting of the elections only three hours before the elections were over is an act without precedent in the entire history of boycotting. However, this did not have any impact on voter turnout. The figure reached over 89 percent.

At the suggestion of the election commission, I decreed that elections be repeated in 17 constituencies. But, unfortunately, the communists are continuing their boycott. Through this boycott the boycotters, individuals or groups, are today trying to hold democracy and stability, and why not Albania's sovereignty, hostage, something that cannot happen. I would like to stress that the Albanians themselves are a guarantee for Albania's democracy, stability, and sovereignty. With their plebiscite-like vote, the Albanians have endorsed democracy and its achievements and have given their final response to communism.

The problem of Kosova was another important point of the Berisha-Ghali meeting. The situation in Kosova is grave, Berisha said, and a feeling of despair exists after Dayton and the recognition of Yugoslavia by the European Union. It is necessary that a dialogue be established between Prishtina [Pristina] and Belgrade in the presence of a third party, Berisha continued, but unfortunately there is no movement in this respect.

Yesterday [12 June], President Berisha held special meetings with Israeli President Weizman, whom Berisha invited to visit Albania. President Weizman accepted the invitation.

At this meeting and in the talks with Romanian President Iliescu and Bulgarian President Zhelev, Berisha discussed bilateral relations and how to develop and strengthen them, as well as the results of elections in Albania.

The final evening ended with a dinner that Turkish President Demirel hosted for the leaders of the states participating in Habitat II.

At a meeting Berisha held during the dinner with Polish President Kwasniewski, they spoke about strengthening bilateral relations and the situation in the region. President Kwasniewski accepted Berisha's invitation to visit Albania in the near future.

Today, under the headline "Berisha Says: Communists Have No Chance of Coming Back," the daily English TURKISH DAILY NEWS newspaper published an exclusive interview with President Berisha.

This morning, Berisha held a meeting with Turkish President Demirel. Berisha thanked his host for the very good organization of Habitat II conference and expressed satisfaction with the very good relations between our two countries in all fields. Berisha stressed Albania's interest in attracting investments from the Turkish private sector in Albania.

President Berisha returned home today.

Albania: Prospects for 'Second Act of the Electoral Farce'

AU1206183696 Tirana POLI I QENDRES in Albanian 12 Jun 96 p 3

[Commentary by A. Mai: "Berisha Divides the Stolen Cake"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The final act of the elections rigged by the Democratic Party [PD] will be played out on Sunday [16 Jun]. The elections of 26 May, which have been called an electoral farce, remain one of the most disgraceful episodes dogging the history of Berisha's party since July 1992. In this sense, what is called the repetition of the elections in 17 constituencies will further deepen the political crisis, which became especially acute after the barbarity of 28 May in Skenderbeg Square. The fate of 17 parliamentary seats is now in the balance—seats in a parliament in which Berisha's party will control at least 100 seats, even if it wins none of these 17.

According to all the statements issued during the last week, third-rate parties will take the lion's share of the 17 constituencies where the Albanian president has decided to hold new elections. However, the Central Electoral Commission has from the start generated fog around the fate of the future parliament, which in theory was to have met this Sunday. The Central Electoral Commission has not made public the results of the elections for the parties' proportional lists either in the official communique announcing the election results or in its statements to the media. Preliminary statements give contradictory data, but show that the gangs that manipulated the 26 elections forgot to give proper prominence to consistent support for Berisha. This means that the second act of the electoral farce will be played out in total cynicism, even though the international community has continually demanded a proper repeat of the rigged polls.

The recent statements by Tritan Shehu, the PD's de jure chairman, stating that his party will set aside constituencies if the real opposition parties do not take part in the elections, which is no doubt what will happen, more than compromises the policy that the PD is following. Such a step would add a touch of color to the bland parliament "appointed" by the PD, in other words the gift of a few seats to the lackeys of Godo and Laco, or to Melo himself, who, abandoned by his own party, dreams of gaining a temporary seat in the parliament stolen by his ally Berisha. The other factor forcing Berisha back to the polls is the fact that many of the parties that he was interested in seeing represented in the parliament did not reach the 4 percent threshold, but were kept out by the total of about 60 percent for the PD, 25 percent for the Socialist Party, more than 6 percent for the Center Pole, and 9 percent for the Human Rights Union and Republican Party. This leaves the National Front, the Legality Movement, the Christian Democrats, and Laco's Social-Democratic Union outside what will be called the parliament. In fact, the results given for this opposition, too, have been manipulated and rigged, and the opposition does not recognize them. Otherwise, Ermenji, Durollari, Laco, Godo, Melo, and Bushati would be the first to pick up the "bone" due to them for recognizing the results of the elections. This is a very small reward for the malice that these politicians without parties have introduced into Albania and its elections.

Albania: KOHA JONE Director Nikolle Lesi Resigns

AU1206173796

[FBIS Report] Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian on 12 June carries on page 1 a statement by Nikolle Lesi announcing his resignation as that newspaper's director. Lesi's behavior is then criticized in the same day's issue of Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian.

Lesi's declaration in KOHA JONE states: "On the basis of the statute of the newspaper KOHA JONE, which is the guideline of a serious newspaper and states that no journalist, and of course neither the director, can be a member of a political party, and because of my public commitment as a Social-Democratic Party candidate for deputy (without being a party member) in the elections of 26 May, I publicly announce my resignation from the post of director of KOHA JONE. Of course I am not happy at leaving, but the rules of democracy and my conscience will not permit me to break the rules that must be the lodestone of every person who calls himself an intellectual. I believe that my departure is also in the interest of KOHA JONE, because I can thereby contribute to its greater independence and the erasure of any poor image of the newspaper, as having allegedly fallen victim to its own directors, who are working for their political careers and not for the honor of their profession as journalists. It is painful to leave something that has been my personal creation, but it is better this way. I will continue to be an ordinary journalist, while, on the basis of Articles 8 and 14 of the Statute of KOHA JONE as a limited company (as its main proprietor), I will appoint a new director of the newspaper and president of the company, so that everything can continue normally."

ALBANIA carries on page 3 an unattributed 300-word report under the headline "The Puppet Play of KOHA JONE's Director," which states that "Lesi's decision conceals a clear attempt to hide from the public his responsibility for the total financial and professional ruin of the newspaper because of his political and financial maneuvers. Plunged into debt to the tune of $80,000, and ultimately stranded without a left-wing opposition to keep him afloat, Lesi is trying to depart from the stage while leaving behind a few puppets who will be held morally responsible for the newspaper's ruin. Lesi's move is another byzantine move to carry out a large-scale purge in the newspaper, especially of the section of the staff that has resisted his gangster politics."

Bulgaria: Zhelev Returns From Habitat II Conference

AU1306173996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On 13 June, President Zhelyu Zhelev returned from the Habitat II conference, which took place in Istanbul. I think that the Istanbul forum implemented its task, President Zhelev said upon his return. He also said that the reports read at the conference dealt with the problems of the developing, moderately developing, and developed countries and placed Bulgaria in the second category.

The Bulgarian president met Turkish President Demirel and outgoing Prime Minister Yilmaz and discussed with them bilateral cooperation and contacts within the framework of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and the common aspiration toward the European and euroatlantic structures.

President Zhelev also met his Albanian colleague, Sali Berisha, in Istanbul.

Bulgaria: Speculation About Zhelev, Demirel Meeting

AU1406111996 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 14 Jun 96 p 8

[Unattributed commentary: "Zhelev and Demirel Are Both Frightened"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the meeting between Zhelev and Demirel, the question of Turkey taking part in the Balkan meeting in Sofia was a quite unimportant issue, and President Zhelev was right not to ask his counterpart Demirel about it.

At the moment, Bulgaria and Turkey face a different problem, namely the rise of fundamentalism. Against this murky background, Balkan axes only appear momentarily like flashes of lightning.

For Ankara, the problem is at least clearly delineated and called by its real name. In Turkey, Erbakan's people are just waiting for power to fall into their hands like a ripe pear.

Here in Bulgaria, our homegrown fundamentalists hold power, but conceal their intentions. Due to the democratic demagogy that they pour out to serve their interests, as yet only a handful of people recognize their real image. This, however, will become quite clear if Zyuganov wins the elections in Russia.

Zhelev and Demirel probably discussed this problem, and perhaps only this. As far as the Balkan meeting in Sofia is concerned, the two presidents are clearly aware of its fundamental importance for peace, friendship, understanding between peoples, and so on.

Bulgaria: SDS Leader on Failed No-Confidence Vote

AU1406115196 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 14 Jun 96 p 4

[Interview with Ivan Kostov, chairman of the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces, by Beti Dafinova and "other journalists" in Sofia on 13 June: "Duplicity Is the Worst Form of Political Corruption"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Dafinova] Mr. Kostov, will the opposition remain united after the result of the vote?

[Kostov] Yes. The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] will continue to work for the opposition's unity and for honest partnership within it.

[Dafinova] What is your comment on the high vote for the government? This is the greatest measure of support that the government has received in such a grave crisis, is it not?

[Kostov] Scared that something might happen, that some kind of nonexistent internal opposition might make an appearance, the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] drew on all its open and hidden reserves in the National Assembly and sent them into the fray.

[Dafinova] Does the BSP have hidden reserves within the opposition?

[Kostov] No one in the SDS voted against the no-confidence motion, I can fully assure you of this. I also think that the People's Union members voted for the motion. In my opinion, the votes supporting the cabinet came from the Bulgarian Business Bloc [BBB], which is evidently the BSP's parliamentary partner. What I regard as unworthy and improper political behavior is the duplicity with which—just like the BSP—they say one thing on television and do something quite different in parliament. This duplicity is truly a mark of corruption in Bulgarian politics, and is the worst form of political corruption.

[Dafinova] How will the result of the vote affect the situation in the country?

[Kostov] The vote shows that the BSP majority and the BBB have no other policy than the one they have followed until now, the one that led to the crisis, which will deepen further. The parliamentary majority bears entire responsibility for what is happening. (Editorial note: The interview also uses questions asked by other journalists.)

Bulgaria: Tomov Says Videnov 'Main Obstacle' to United Left

AU1306151296 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 13 Jun 96 p 9

[Interview with Aleksandur Tomov, leader of the Civic Alliance for the Republic, by Todor Tokin; place and date not given: "Zhan Videnov Is the Main Obstacle to Unification of the Bulgarian Left"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A few days ago, Aleksandur Tomov announced that the leadership of the Civic Alliance for the Republic [GOR] sent a letter to the Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group.

[Tokin] What was the reason for sending this letter, Mr. Tomov?

[Tomov] We believe that the country faces a second, much more serious shock. We dissociate ourselves from the concept of "structural reform" that the prime minister proposes. It is more a question of the liquidation of companies without structural reform. The purpose of our letter was to draw the attention of those in power and especially the public to the fact that there is a solution to the situation. True, it is painful and difficult, but it is nevertheless a way out....

[Tokin] Videnov also talks about painful measures....

[Tomov] The difference between the government's proposals and our proposals is a fundamental one. They are building a stagnant economy, while we are talking about encouraging private activity and economic activity in general. Their approach is connected not only with the liquidation of companies, some of which are perfectly viable, such as the Plama Refinery and the Disc Memory Devices Plant, but also with a taxation system that will clearly cause private business to shrink and with a banking reform that will finally drive markets away from Bulgaria and prevent the restoration of confidence in our banking system for years in the future. Finally, the policies followed by the government to date are destroying people's confidence in the institutions and will revive political confrontation.

[Tokin] What are your suggestions?

[Tomov] We propose a model for a new government program consisting of 10 points. The first point is more political than economic. Our only chance of succeeding in the present situation is to form a government of people who will win the support of the broad social forces. It is not only a question of the political parties. It is clear that parliament now often seems like a circus; trust in parliament has sharply declined, and the support that the parliamentary majority gives to the government is not producing results. The kind of government that we propose will be supported by a definite majority in the present parliament, but it will need a period of grace and a certain freedom of action for a period of at least a year to a year and a half. It has a chance of turning the situation round. Unless this happens, we face a protracted death agony. [passage omitted]

[Tokin] Have the structural and personal changes that the prime minister has made calmed the situation within his party?

[Tomov] I do not think so. Because of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] no-confidence vote, the actions that more experienced people in parliament were thinking of taking have been postponed. I believe that they will wait to see the results of the measures and that there will soon be new actions. Unfortunately for society, the rifts within the parliamentary majority run very deep, and they are differences of principle. They could be overcome if they were simply personal differences. Things are not so stable as they seemed previously. However, the changes in the government are purely cosmetic. They are not leading to any change in policy, at least for the moment. The cabinet's economic team has been retained, and this means that the previous line is confirmed. [passage omitted]

[Tokin] You said that more-experienced people in the BSP are awaiting developments. At the last plenum, Aleksandur Lilov called for an extraordinary plenum, while, in the voting on the government changes, Andrey Lukanov deposited an empty envelope....

[Tomov] I confirm that almost complete agreement exists between our programs and what Lilov says, because he wants radical changes both in policies and in the government. We believe that this is the most correct path. I think that their experience enables them to see that the situation is very nearly disastrous for both the country and their own party. Now, when I tour the country as a presidential candidate, I notice that the criticisms of the government come on a mass scale from the so-called red electorate.

[Tokin] Do you expect the BSP Supreme Council to respond to your letter and arrange a meeting with you?

[Tomov] No, I do not, because even when I was a BSP member, my colleague Videnov was afraid to drink a cup of coffee with me. He has an off-putting style, a style that arouses hate rather than liking, frowns rather than smiles, a style that drives people away rather than attracting them. Zhan Videnov is the main obstacle to the emergence of a modern Bulgarian Left and to the Left uniting. On numerous occasions, he has refused to hold talks. With such a style of behavior, dialogue is impossible. This is also spreading to affect others across the whole of the Socialist Party. Dialogue is possible with Yanaki Stoilov, Georgi Purvanov, and Aleksandur Lilov, with all those who suppress their personal emotions when they consider politics. There are dozens of people with whom one can talk, but unfortunately they do not include Zhan Videnov. That is his problem, not ours.

[Tokin] What would be the effect of early elections?

[Tomov] For the time being, I regard this idea more as propaganda than a real possibility. Here lies the difference between us and the SDS. The SDS wants Zhan Videnov to stay in power for a long time, continue his policies, and, if possible, for everything to slide down so far that, as one SDS leader said to me, the BSP will be unable to raise its head again. The only question is, what will happen to Bulgaria?

Bulgaria: Japanese Bank Insists Bank's Debt Be Assumed

AU1306112896 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 13 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by Paulina Mikhaylova and Todor Petkov: "The West Is Stopping Providing Us With Money Because of Mineralbank's Debts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our country is on the verge of being isolated by the international financial community, unless the government takes over the foreign debts of the failed Mineralbank. Yonezo Kobayashi, the European representative of the Japan Industrial Bank, stated this categorically in Sofia yesterday.

"We are exasperated by the authorities in Sofia, who have not consulted the creditors," Kobayashi added.

The chiefs of the foreign financial institution hastily came to Sofia to hold negotiations on the repayment of 5 billion yen, which is equivalent to $50 million. Seven years ago, Mineralbank issued bonds to this amount and sold them to the Japanese bank, which placed them with other Japanese credit institutions and insurance companies. The bonds fall due for payment on 14 June, at which time annual interest of 5.8 percent also has to be paid out. The Bulgarian National Bank [BNB] declared Mineralbank insolvent and refused to cover its foreign debts.

According to Kobayashi, the Japanese bank decided to place the bonds because it was relying on a state guarantee. Now, however, the BNB and the government have not mentioned a word about this.

"I hope that we will reach an agreement with Dimitur Kostov [Bulgarian finance minister], because otherwise the economic relations between Bulgaria and Japan will deteriorate," Kobayashi warned.

Bulgaria: DZU To Work for Russian Defense Industry

AU0406121496 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 4 Jun 96 p 13

[STANDART NEWS staff report: "DZU Plant Will Work for Russian Defense Industry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The DZU [Disk Memory Devices] Plant in Stara Zagora is to work for the Russian military industry. This was agreed during the visit of the delegation from Goskomoboronprom and Rosvooruzhenie to Bulgaria, the Bulgarian Ministry of Industry announced yesterday. However, Industry Minister Kliment Vuchev said that the agreement is to be signed at the end of June. He added that other plants—VMZ [Military Engineering Plant] in Sopot, Terem in Travna, Beta in Cherven Bryag, and Arsenal in Kazanluk—are also expected to sign joint production agreements with Russian military plants.

It emerged later that lack of money to buy licenses has obliged our firms to choose the alternative of joint production with their Russian partners.

Informed sources confirmed that Armimex has been licensed to service shipments of Russian weapons for our troops, as well as to buy and sell licenses for our companies.

Minister Vuchev maintains that joint production with Russian firms and exports to third countries are the only way to ensure the revival of our big military plants.

Bulgaria: Experts May Take Reactor Specimens in Jul

AU1406120396 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 14 Jun 96 p 5

["DUMA PRESS" staff report: "Specimens From No. 1 Reactor To Be Taken in July"]

[FBIS Translated Text] DUMA has learned from a reliable source that the operation of taking metal specimens from the shell of the No. 1 Reactor Unit at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant is likely to start in July. The reactor has been standing idle for almost a month after it was shut down (at the insistence of the EU) before its fuel was exhausted. In effect, our country has lost almost $5 million as a result of this, informed persons note. At the moment, preparations are under way to finalize the agreements with Siemens and Westinghouse for their participation in the taking of the specimens. Within a few days, a meeting is due to take place between experts from Bulgarian and foreign organizations and EU representatives.

Czech Republic: Commentary: Zeman Unfit To Head Chamber

AU1406112696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 13 Jun 96 p 12

[Commentary by Jiri Leschtina: "Zeman Does Not Belong at the Head of the Chamber"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following his extreme statement to the German weekly FOCUS, Milos Zeman should not become parliament chairman. In criticizing Prime Minister Klaus's attitude toward an ombudsman by comparing it with Hitler's attitude toward the Jews, the leader of the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] has debased himself as a candidate for a post that requires a person of high moral character.

The tastelessness of Zeman's comment consists of the fact that the CSSD chairman had no scruples about placing the incommensurable alongside one another: the terrible tragedy of the Jews and Klaus's legitimate political resistance to an ombudsman or self-administration. Zeman betrayed a considerable lack of moral inhibition and intellect by speaking in such a manner in an interview for the Germans, the majority of whom view Hitler as a symbol of diabolical evil.

It is impossible to come to terms with the notion that a man who, without blinking an eye, has managed to abandon his responsibility as leader of the country's second-strongest party, should stand at the head of the highest legislative body. Blinded by hatred, Zeman has not only discredited himself but has also cast a most extraordinary light on this country.

In this context, it is not at all important in which political party Zeman operates. If, for instance, someone from the Civic Democratic Alliance were to campaign for the second-highest constitutional post and, shortly before his nomination, were to utter a similarly shocking statement, the candidate would immediately lose his moral claim to the post.

Zeman's career is literally riddled with invectives that far exceed the bounds of political and human taste. The accusation against Vaclav Klaus of collaboration with the communists, the statement about the senile party of pensioners, or the comparison of the Civic Democratic Party with Hitler's NSDAP [National Socialist Party] are merely a fraction of the examples that Zeman fires wide of the target more often than other politicians. However, what can perhaps be tolerated when coming from a somewhat eccentric opposition politician is absolutely unacceptable from a candidate for the second-highest constitutional post.

Zeman declared his candidacy for parliament chairman after unofficial agreements with the coalition, according to which the CSSD has a claim to this post. The CSSD itself, however, should show enough judgment and propose someone else. Namely, it is in the interest of all sensible deputies, of whom there is perhaps still a majority in the Chamber, that a lout does not stand at the head of parliament.

Czech Republic: Reasons for Military Support of CSSD, KSCM

AU1306152996 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 13 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by Radek Adamec: "The Soldiers Are Worried About Their Jobs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Some former but also current senior Army officers say that the electoral success of the Social Democrats [Czech Social Democratic Party—CSSD] in the defense department is accounted for by the persistent fear of the professional soldiers that they will lose their jobs. On the other hand, they think that the long-term contacts between General Miroslav Vacek and the top brass of the armed forces' leadership are behind the success of the communists.

The electoral success of the Social Democrats among the rank-and-file and professional soldiers is apparently associated with the six-year permanent reorganization of the Army, combined with the constant reduction of its numbers. At the same time, the career soldiers do not know exactly when it will be their turn and they will have to return to civilian life. Therefore, they do not like to refer to the problems they face in the Army because of their fears about the future. They are thus trying to avoid the disapprobation of their superiors.

"There are unmistakable and profound social uncertainty, family concerns, and fear about professional status within the Army. The average man in the Army voted for Zeman because it seems to him that there is no way out of the current situation," said an unnamed former senior Army official to LIDOVE NOVINY.

He considers a strong group of the Army top brass and their subordinates, who, throughout the entire reorganization period, have escaped a reduction in their numbers, although they are associated with the former regime, to be behind the electoral success of the communists. The LIDOVE NOVINY source also bases his claims on the department's reluctance to release officers over age 55, even though Minister Holan confirmed their departure for civilian life in an order issued last May. The Defense Ministry's press department has said that, as of the last day of May of this year, the aforementioned measure concerned 425 officers, but the minister had made an exception for 106 of them without specifying why.

The former officer points out that these "discredited" members of the Army top brass have, in the course of recent years, kept in touch with the former defense minister, General Miroslav Vacek, who now has a deputy's mandate for the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM]. Deputy Tomas Fejfar (Civic Democratic Party), a member of the Defense and Security Committee in the last parliament, also referred to such meetings recently.

The unnamed career soldier claims that Vacek was supposed to meet last week with the head of the Military Police, General Jiri Sramek, in his apartment in Dejvice. Vacek, however, denies that the meeting took place. "I give you my word of honor as a general that this is not the case. I last saw Sramek in 1994," said Vacek to LIDOVE NOVINY. General Sramek also denies just as adamantly that the meeting took place, the only difference being that he last saw Vacek in 1990. The central database containing important information on offenses and property-related offenses within the Army comes under Sramek's unit.

It is clear from unofficial reports that Vacek, who makes no secret of his negative stance toward the Czech Republic's admission to NATO, is now trying to obtain the maximum number of reports on the state of the Army and to revive his former familiarity with the department. That is, it is assumed that the communists will want to nominate Vacek for parliament's Defense and Security Committee from which, thanks to his information, he could influence events in the Army and thus strengthen the party's political position.

Slovakia: Carnogursky Fears Ethnic Conflict Over Monument

AU1306154196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 13 Jun 96 p 4

[Article by Zezana Pemova: "Conflict Over Monument on Anniversary of Hungarians' Arrival"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Velke Kapusany—Within the framework of a recent deputies' survey conducted by Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] deputies in east Slovakia, KDH Chairman Jan Carnogursky visited also Velke Kapusany. There he came across a problem that could, in his opinion, have a very negative influence on the until now peaceful coexistence between Slovaks and Hungarians in this area.

As Jan Carnogursky told NARODNA OBRODA, the bone of contention is the recent decision of the local Municipal Council, approved at the proposal of deputies representing [ethnic] Hungarian parties, to erect a monument to mark the 1,100th anniversary of the Hungarians' arrival in the Carpathian basin. According to Jan Carnogursky, the initiative for this undertaking came from the local Csemadok [Hungarian cultural association] organization at Velke Kapusany, and should be realized in the next few years. The project should be financed, apart from other sources, from the municipal budget, to which Slovaks also contribute. According to Carnogursky's findings, the Slovaks are already expressing resistance to the plan, and it cannot be ruled out that in the event of the monument's erection, they will express this resistance by violent actions as well.

Slovak political parties at Velke Kapusany, including the KDH, have expressed in writing their disagreement with the erection of the monument. They proposed that the original decision of the Municipal Council be canceled, but to no avail. "This seems to be a unique case in the Slovak Republic; I do not know of any similar one. I just think that it was a bad idea, and that the monument would aggravate relations between Slovaks and Hungarians," Jan Carnogursky said.

Slovakia: German Views on Slovak EU Membership

96CH0116A Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Slovak 2 May 96 p 2

[Article by Zoltan Mikes: "To Kohl, Meciar Stinks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mnichov—The entry of Slovakia into European economic structures, as well as into NATO, will depend to no small degree on the position taken by those countries that are already members of these groupings—without regard as to whether we like it or not. The country that exerts the most influence in Europe on our acceptance for membership turns out to be Germany.

When we consider the mutual relationship between Germany and Slovakia, we must regard our situation from numerous viewpoints. The first, and most substantial, is the unequivocal and understandable antipathy on the part of Chancellor Helmut Kohl with regard to Slovakia during the government of Vladimir Meciar. In fact, since the beginning of Meciar's third term as prime minister, Kohl regularly tends to "forget" Slovakia when it comes to appointing candidates for membership in the EU [European Union].

It is generally known that when the countries of the EU met toward the end of last year in Madrid in order to agree on the method for expanding the 15-country membership, Helmut Kohl was pushing for the final declaration to include a list of names of countries that are to be the first with whom negotiations regarding integration were to begin. Kohl saw the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary as hot candidates. The beginning of negotiations with Slovakia was not to take place until the entry of these three countries into the EU, together with other countries of "the second category"—Bulgaria and Romania. The chancellor thus used this—but also EU demarches that arrived in Slovakia in the name of Germany—to "evaluate" the policies of the Meciar government as policies that are incompatible, in the foreseeable future, with the principles of democracy in the EU countries. This sequence of countries did not make it into the final declaration in the end, which provided Bratislava with the last chance to improve its position.

When considering possible support by the German side for the Slovak application to join the EU and NATO, it is not possible to forget the question of Slovak-Hungarian relationships. The countries of the EU and NATO have very little interest in receiving such a regional conflict as a Danubian gift accompanying the entry of the Slovak Republic and of Hungary into these structures. There thus exist two possibilities: either this problem will be resolved—but then the Meciar government could not include the SNS [Slovak National Party] of Slota—and then Hungary as well as Slovakia would have a generally solid chance at membership, or the EU as well as NATO will accept only one of these two countries. The question as to whom Germany would support in such a case need not even be put. Obviously, Hungary. After all, it was Hungary that, in 1989, opened its borders to the citizens of the GDR and thus made it possible for them, in fact, to cross over into the Federal Republic of Germany, through which it started the process leading to the unification of Germany. And what is more, the minister of foreign affairs who took responsibility for this step at the time was Gyula Horn, who is today Hungary's prime minister. Our prime minister does not stand the slightest chance in the diplomatic ring against Horn with the Germans.

Slovakia made one of the few good points with the Germans during the course of last week—the German Siemens concern became the supplier for completing the Mochovce Nuclear Power Plant. The Germans valued this step and Slovak economic diplomacy, particularly its ability to split orders among several countries—which, in fact, eliminated Russian resistance to Mochovce—a fact that saw nothing but superlatives used in the German media. However, economic results in Slovakia in and of themselves are not sufficient for membership in the EU and NATO. And here it is necessary to state unambiguously that the starting situation of Slovakia could be better if the SNS of J. Slota or the ZRS [Agrarian and Worker Party] of J. Luptak were not in the government at the time of negotiations pertaining to Slovak membership in the EU and NATO. In Germany, prime ministers or the opposition political parties, for example, are not accustomed to calling journalists excrement, nor do they customarily expel them from news conferences. These two "diplomats" should be equal partners with Kohl, Waigel, or with some other chairmen of political parties in the West? Not to mention that German politicians are highly sensitive to the contrasts between the officially declared efforts of the government to achieve membership in NATO on the one hand, and the outbursts by SNS and ZRS politicians on the other hand.

Negotiations by the EU with Slovakia will most likely not begin until 1998, so the parliamentary elections in 1998 will simultaneously become elections involving the foreign-policy orientation of Slovakia. During my sojourn in Germany, I became convinced that Slovakia would achieve membership in the EU and NATO easier if the prime minister were not V. Meciar.

Slovakia: Tape Implicates Finance Minister in SP Controversy

AU1306141796 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 13 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by CTK: "Broadcast Tape Is Compromising to Sergej Kozlik"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The recording of an alleged wiretapped conversation between Slovak Finance Minister Sergej Kozlik and Lubomir Dobrik, state secretary at the Justice Ministry, concerning the most important Slovak financial institution, the Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company; SP] a.s. [shareholding company], was broadcast by Radio TWIST yesterday.

Though recording was incomprehensible, the tape documents that S. Kozlik, deputy prime minister and finance minister, was involved in the case, which has triggered a crisis in the government coalition. At the outset of the recording, S. Kozlik describes the course of the operation on 3 June during which the former SP management headed by M. Trstensky (which was close to the Slovak National Party [SNS] and the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]) evicted the "new management," headed by E. Bukovska, which had been installed by the National Property Fund [FNM], in which the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] is dominant. At the start of the conversation, S. Kozlik explains to State Secretary L. Dobrik the circumstances under which a new security agency entered the building with M. Trstensky, and took possession of the building, with Police assistance. When L. Dobrik expressed surprise at the fact that M. Trstensky had been assisted by the Police, S. Kozlik gave the following explanation: "....sure, it was a mistake by the security agency that was there, it was amateurish of them. But the policemen probably acted quite resolutely. You know, it went through Holdos (president of the Slovak Police Corps—CTK note), he is from the SNS, you know." Referring apparently to his chief, Slovak Justice Minister Jozef Liscak (ZRS representative), L. Dobrik said he would be in Banska Bystrica the next day, that is, on Tuesday [4 June], and therefore would not interfere in the case. L. Dobrik promised that he would personally "check on the matter first thing in the morning" and submit a report on it.

Sergej Kozlik refused to comment on the recording, saying he would not comment under circumstances when democratic rules are being violated.

Slovakia: SDL's Schmognerova Denies Split in SV Club

AU1406115496 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 13 Jun 96 p 2

[Interview with Slovak SDL Deputy Chairwoman Brigita Schmognerova by Martin Krno; place and date not given: "I Think This Is an Exaggerated Reaction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Krno] Farmers' Movement [HP] Chairman Jozef Klein said in an interview for ROLNICKE NOVINY that, next week at the latest, the Common Choice (SV) Deputies' Club will split into the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Club and the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS], Green Party of Slovakia [SZS] and HP Club. Have the representatives of the four parties really reached such a position?

[Schmognerova] So far, this issue has not been dealt with at any of the meetings involving our parties' political bodies. Mr. Klein made his comments after Friday's [7 June] talks with the SZS and SDL chairmen and SDSS Deputy Chairman Spejl.

[Krno] Who came up with the initiative to split the second largest parliamentary club?

[Schmognerova] This was a declaration by the representatives of the HP, SDSS, and SZS that came about as a specific reaction to the meeting with Jozef Migas. But no such decision was made during Friday's meeting; this was not even alluded to. Our quadripartite agreement lays down precisely the method for the termination of the SV coalition—14 days after a written agreement among all of the partners on its dissolution or on the basis of the written cancellation of the agreement by one of the coalition partners. To date, neither of these two circumstances has occurred.

[Krno] Could the statement by your partners be a response, as Klein is suggesting, to Migas's announcement that the SDL will go into the next elections independently?

[Schmognerova] I think that this is an exaggerated reaction. The chairman of our party was perhaps expressing just his personal opinion, because no decision has been made in this regard by the Republic Executive Committee or the SDL Republic Council. We have to wait and see how the domestic political situation develops, for the professed new electoral law. We did not discuss this issue at Tuesday's [11 June] meeting of the SV Deputies' Club, although there has been a demand on the table for several weeks that a coalition agreement be devised in harmony with the social changes that have occurred here in the past two years.

Slovakia: Poll Shows Continued Support for HZDS

AU1206131696 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
11 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by "do": "Support for Political Parties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If parliamentary elections had been held during the week of 27 May-3 June, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] would have won. This is according to a representative omnibus public opinion survey conducted by the Slovak Radio Methodical Research Cabinet to assess support for political parties and movements . The select sample consisted of 1,220 respondents. According to the Slovak Radio Methodical Research Cabinet, this research estimate is based on the answers of those respondents, who stated that they would participate in the elections and knew who they would vote for. The select sample included 65.6 percent of such respondents.

Support for Political Parties

Party	Jan 96	May 96
	Percent	
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	32.7	34.3
Christian Democratic Movement	12.7	13.0
Democratic Union	8.8	9.7
Party of the Democratic Left	10.5	9.1
Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement	5.6	6.9
Slovak National Party	5.5	4.8
Democratic Party	4.5	4.0
Association of Workers of Slovakia	4.0	3.9
Green Party of Slovakia	3.7	3.7
Egyutteles-Coexistence	2.4	2.6
Communist Party of Slovakia	2.8	2.4
Social Democratic Party of Slovakia	2.2	1.7
Hungarian Civic Party	1.5	1.5
Other parties	2.9	2.2

Slovakia: New SDL Chairman Jozef Migas Profiled

96CH0116B Kosice DOMINO EFEKT in Slovak
9 May 96 p 3

[Article by Karol Wolf: "Recombined"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first question that came to the mind of a discriminating person after the election of a chairman at the Fourth Congress of the SDL [Party of the Democratic Left] at Nitra was the following: "Why was it precisely Jozef Migas who was elected?"

No, this is not a question of casting a priori doubt upon the suitability of the above-mentioned gentleman to lead his comrades into battle. Jozef Migas turns out to have absolutely splendid qualifications. He studied at the Kiev State University, he taught the "rising young generation" of comrades at the Advanced School of Political Science in Bratislava, and he worked honestly within central party structures, where he was responsible for the purity of science, specifically for the SAV [Slovak Academy of Sciences].

Apart from that—but this is now only the icing on the cake—the records of the StB [State Secret Police] list Jozef Migas, born on 7 January 1954, as a confidant with a cover name of Mig. (However, the finding of the Constitutional Court of the CSFR, dated December 1992, exempted the category of confidant from the jurisdiction of the lustration law.) The new chairman of the SDL was also born on 7 January 1954, but denies cooperating with the StB. However, let us be realists—even if he were not to deny this, nothing would happen. In Slovakia, as the classics say, that is how it is.

But let us return to the original question. Why specifically Migas, who is recognized in Slovakia only by a few people and who has never been an active element in Slovak politics? The first possible answer is based on the theory that the delegates to the SDL Congress this time "stole a march" on its leadership and, following a pirouette in the direction of Robert Flco, simply wanted to have their own way and chose an unknown person. But it is useful to analyze the Flco somersault in more detail. It is virtually unbelievable to note how far the leaders of the SDL went astray in their endless gains. Flco, who was the absolute favorite before the congress, unexpectedly conceded to Fogas immediately prior to the election. It is difficult to make a serious comment regarding this step—particularly because the author sat in the congress hall and listened to a logical question posed by an irritated delegate: "Mr. Flco, you say that you have agreed with Mr. Fogas not to oppose each other. Good, I understand that, but tell me why Mr. Fogas did not concede to you, because you had more, many more nominations?" Flco did not respond. And he could not, because the humbug was so obvious that only a blind or deaf person could not notice it.

After that, there was much lobbying and much explanation at the congress. The lawyer team of Flco-Fogas produced one justification after another. Flco even stated that he is too young. The pinnacle, however, was the "whispering campaign" indicating that Fogas and Magvasi allegedly threatened antiparty activities in the event Flco was elected. According to this interpretation, Fogas was said to have an imminent interest in taking the reins of the SDL into his own hands, but he was unsuccessful in this as a result of the timely development of willfulness on the part of the delegates who, in the end, gave him approximately the same amount of votes as they did a year and a half ago at Poprad, when he was opposing Weiss.

The second explanation as to how the surprise in the name of Jozef Migas came about is somewhat more convoluted. It is based on the information that Migas was sure of his position from the very beginning. An unnamed, traditionally well-informed source, who has been active in Slovak politics for six years now (not within the SDL) drew attention a month ago to the fact that if Flco is not elected, then Jozef Migas will become chairman. The unnamed source earned only concealed smiles for his prediction at that time. However, it is impossible to claim with certainty that the entire farce at the congress, including the Flco move, was thought through to the point that it counted on the natural humanly willful reaction of the delegates—but this can also not be excluded. It is generally possible that the new chairman of the SDL was not elected by delegates to the congress, but by someone completely different in a different location. It is similarly possible that this man, who is unselfishly intending to give up his diplomatic post in Kiev and return to Bratislava as a professional party chief, today already has certain party assignments about which the average delegate does not even have a clue, in contrast to, say, Flco, Fogas, and Magvasi.

It would certainly be useful to know how they came up with Migas; what is important, however, is what it really means. For tactical reasons, as well as from the standpoint of new party assignments regarding the creation of an "independent leftist opposition policy," the election of an unknown person to head the party is totally irrational. As he has already indicated himself, this is the only way Migas can improve the relationship between the SDL and the government coalition, or, in other words, still further separate the SDL from the remaining portion of the opposition.

But it is also necessary to state that the formation of an independent leftist opposition policy in the SDL tradition will only signify the beginning of the end of that party as an autonomous whole. Sooner or later, such a policy will move in the direction toward the coalition to such an extent that it ceases being in opposition. The SDL will clearly not swing into the coalition in this election season, but the warming of relationships following the departure of Weiss will obviously not manifest itself until subsequent elections, when there will no longer be anything to debate. And the SDL will, in the final analysis, clash with the HZDS in the same way as they have been clashing and at the same time tolerating each other for many years now.

For the duration of this interim period, however, intraparty conflicts will persist—something from which the SDL continues to suffer and for which it has no medicine for a single simple reason—such a medicine simply does not exist. That which the SDL tradition has been pursuing for several years now—and we have become accustomed to calling it the transformation of communists into Social Democrats—turns out to be the actual underlying reason for the state in which the party finds itself. Simply stated, the democratic spasms, which were being demonstrated by the unthreatened Weiss when he was attempting to steer the party into "standard waters," were not natural. The maxim for that that had been achieved was the myth that the SDL was changing course and was not unambiguous. But the change in course is slowly coming to an end and the Migas reality is taking over. It is an independent reality, and one that is leftist to a T, a reality that is in opposition less and less with the passage of time.

Slovakia: Cabinet Paper on Need To Regulate Agrarian Market

AU1406115596 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 13 Jun 96 p 5

[Report "prepared by" Pavel Kapusta in the "From the Government Session" rubric: "Regulation of Agrarian Market Is Inevitable; Process of Disintegration in the Agricultural-Food Sector Has Been Halted"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Among the informative materials discussed at the cabinet meeting the day before yesterday was a document evaluating measures that have been taken to update conditions for the implementation of conceptual agricultural policy plans in 1996. [passage omitted]

As it transpires from the paper, the process of disintegration in the agricultural-food sector has been halted. The repercussions of the crisis-ridden development in the sector have been markedly alleviated, and the situation has gradually stabilized. Despite unfavorable climatic conditions, the 1995 losses from working on the land were 10 percent lower than in 1994 (and 80 percent lower than in 1992). At the same time there is an evident tendency to invest in structural changes, especially in modernization of technology. However, last year's results also show a permanent growth in agriculture's internal and external indebtedness, which is manifested in the growing obsolescence of plants and equipment, the relative decline in agricultural wages compared with other sectors, and the growing insolvency of companies involved in primary agricultural production. The practice so far demonstrates the inevitability of measures in the sphere of organizing and regulating the agrarian market, because under European conditions such an unregulated market practically does not exist. This is confirmed, for example, by experience from the sugar and grain markets, but also from the food market in general, where domestic producers are getting into an unequal position in competition with highly subsidized imported foodstuffs. [passage omitted]

B-H: Summit Says Decision on Elections by 'End of June'

LD1406115196 Rome RAI Televideo Teletext in Italian 1045 GMT 14 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The decision on whether or not to respect the deadline of 14 September for holding elections in Bosnia will be taken by the end of June.

This was announced at the Florence summit om Bosnia [Bosnian Peace Implementation Council] by the president of the Organization for Security and Cooperation In Europe [OSCE], Flavio Cotti of Switzerland.

Cotti stressed that it is necessary that war criminals be handed over to the Hague tribunal because "their influence threatens the elections and the whole peace process." Assessment of the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords is the other main question at the summit, which ends today.

B-H: Prime Minister Muratovic Addresses Florence Summit

AU1306190696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Announcer-read report on statement by Hasan Muratovic, prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the Florence conference on 13 June]

[FBIS Translated Text] On behalf of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina ministers were addressed by Republican Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, who expressed gratitude to all those who are working to implement the peace agreement. The prime minister thanked the foreign minister [words indistinct] and government of the Republic of Italy for their hospitality and for the organization of the conference, as well as for their constant and considerable material aid to our country (?destroyed by) the Serbian aggression.

Prime Minister Muratovic emphasized that the implementation of the General Framework Agreement on Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina is an extremely complex project that requires the synchronization of a great number of (?mediators) [words indistinct], organizations, and therefore it is difficult to make a general assessment on such a huge mission, Muratovic said, adding that it will be possible to make some fuller assessments only at the forthcoming separate sessions of this conference.

Muratovic went on to present the Bosnia-Herzegovina visions [vizije] and assessments of the implementation of the Dayton accord in [word indistinct] (?entities). The peace agreement brought about peace, and its implementation brought about changes that can be neither described nor assessed, Muratovic said. After the war and a struggle for mere survival, a situation has come about in which life is beginning to normalize and people are being engaged in economic reconstruction and are beginning to think about (?reconciliation) and elections. The Governments of the Federation and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina have made huge efforts, in cooperation with IFOR [Implementation Force], the high representative, international bodies, and the government of the Serb entity.

According to Muratovic, the military part of the agreement has been implemented efficiently. Unfortunately, the accord on the subregional arms control has not been signed. As for the question of human rights, Muratovic emphasized that this question is a critical part of the civilian part of the agreement. Muratovic went on to point out that the question of all questions is the cooperation with the tribunal in The Hague and the extradition of indicted war criminals, as well as access to mass graves. Speaking of economic reconstruction, Prime Minister Muratovic pointed out that it is a precondition for the success of the peace agreement, and added that of $1.8 billion of pledged donations at the past two donors' conferences [words indistinct].

Muratovic also spoke about (?the elections). According to him, the elections should crown the implementation of the civilian part of the agreement this year, and he added that they cannot be held until the preconditions set forth in the Annex [words indistinct] are not fulfilled. The holding of the elections under the influence of war criminals and mafia would mean the legalization of the current state and a prolongation of our agony. The prime minister pointed out that, so far, 45,000 refugees have returned to our country, and, within the country, around 35,000 displaced persons have returned to their homes.

At the end of his speech in Florence, Prime Minister Muratovic demanded [words indistinct] improvement of [word indistinct], and, in that context, that the control of [words indistinct] be established, that the freedom of movement of goods and people be secured, that Sarajevo airport be reopened, a road toward Gorazde be constructed, a timely arbitration for the disputed region of Brcko be carried out, an efficient organization for investigation into (?war crimes) be set up [words indistinct] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia, as well as an efficient system of procedures for the realization of refugees' rights to return and claim private property.

Concluding his speech, Prime Minister Muratovic thanked the United States, the World Bank, the European Union, and all the donors and countries that [words indistinct], as well as all international organizations that are involved in the process of implementation, for their efforts so far in establishing peace.

B-H: Bildt: Dayton 'Has Not Created Peace'

BR1306135396 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 13 Jun 96 p 18

[Interview with High Representative in Bosnia Carl Bildt by Vanna Vannuccini in Sarajevo; date not given: "Bildt's Alarm: 'Bosnia Must Vote or There Will Be Chaos'"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Vannuccini] What recommendations will you make to the Florence conference regarding the elections, Mr. Bildt? Should they be held or not?

[Bildt] The dilemma is that putting the elections off would mean delaying the creation of joint institutions in Bosnia Herzegovina. My position is not dictated by the American presidential election. I am convinced that the disintegration and division of Bosnia will become worse without joint institutions. The state will not exist until the institutions are up and running.

[Vannuccini] Is there not a danger that elections held while war criminals like Karadzic are still in power, and while there is a complete lack of freedom of speech and the press, will consolidate the power of those now wielding it, in other words those who started the war and who now need time to prevent peace?

[Bildt] First of all, Karadzic cannot run for election, so other people will go into power. I do not rule out the possibility of their pursuing his policy, but a more cooperative approach might also come about. Anyway, how can they think of recreating medieval statelets? They would not survive.

[Vannuccini] They would survive if they joined up with larger states, which is the line taken by the Bosnian Serbs and Croats. Do you not fear that this will be the outcome in a few years' time?

[Bildt] A lot will depend on the overall situation in the Balkans, the Kosovo, for example, where I see dangers that might increase and which it is important to bear in mind.

[Vannuccini] Everyone in Sarajevo believes that the political peace mechanism will remain at a standstill unless the murderers, the torturers, and their instigators are arrested.

[Bildt] Things are not that simple. It is not merely a matter of Karadzic or Mladic. The climate of fear is very strong, added to which there are the extremists who are burning houses down, removing graves, and stoning buses.

[Vannuccini] A NATO spokesperson has said: Unless we clearly state the responsibilities of those guilty of genocide, it may become impossible to move ahead toward a brighter future. Do you not think that the climate of fear would be lessened if such an allocation of responsibility were made?

[Bildt] The peace agreement is based on a compromise, something that is at the same time problematic and promising. The compromise forces us to act with caution, but reaching it was worthwhile because it saved human lives. I am one of the people who believe that a peace deal could have been struck in 1993, which would have prevented hundreds of thousands of deaths.

[Vannuccini] The chairman of the Hague Tribunal, Antonio Cassese, has been here, and he told you: If you really cannot arrest the war criminals, at least use the weapon of economic sanctions against those who breach the Dayton agreement. Is it not a good idea?

[Bildt] Cassese has not read the Security Council resolutions thoroughly. I cannot apply sanctions against the Republika Srpska in isolation. In my terms of office, the Republika Srpska and Yugoslavia make up a single package. Anyway, even if they work, sanctions take a lot of time.

[Vannuccini] Be that as it may, four years' experience tells us that the only thing that has worked with the Serbs is the big stick. We now have a state of military overkill in Bosnia, with 58,000 men. Could it be a good idea to go in for a bit of political overkill?

[Bildt] I would not call it overkill, because we did not know what situation would face the IFOR [Implementation Force] troops when they arrived in Bosnia. However, military cooperation has been good, because there was a strategic consensus on all three sides. Nevertheless, the IFOR mandate is extremely limited. They can arrest Karadzic only if they come across him in the course of their normal duties. This was the condition that the Americans set for sending their troops. However, I have to say that there is now greater awareness, particularly in U.S. military command quarters, of a need for changes. But a society devastated by 42 months of war cannot be set to rights in a few months. The people have to be brought back, and they have to work together. Paradoxically, the black market is a factor for integration.

[Vannuccini] The process is a slow one, but IFOR has to pull out by the end of December. Is it not a contradiction?

[Bildt] There is no reason to keep a force like IFOR, which costs taxpayers in the West something like $5-6 billion a year, in Bosnia. However, I do not rule out the possibility of another type of force, substantially smaller, being created.

[Vannuccini] Without the Americans?

[Bildt] Not at all. The issue is a political one, and the main players have to act together.

[Vannuccini] Might this smaller force have to stay on for a long time?

[Bildt] I do not rule it out.

[Vannuccini] Will you make specific requests at the Florence conference?

[Bildt] Yes, but I cannot say now what they will be. I will submit two reports, a general one on the line to be taken and another, very critical, one on human rights. There are human rights violations on a massive scale in the Republika Srpska, and the situation in the Croat-Muslim Federation is not encouraging either. However, we have made a lot of progress. We have got rid of all the checkpoints, and there is more coming and going between the two "entities." Incidents are still occurring, of course, but we also have many instances of Muslims, especially elderly Muslims, returning to their homes in the Srpska Republic. I am only talking about a few hundred.

[Vannuccini] Was Dayton an agreement on peace or on a truce?

[Bildt] It put an end to a war, but it has not created peace. And yet it is more than a truce, because the armies have largely been demobilized.

B-H: ICRC: Missing Glamoc Serbs in Jail Near Mostar

AU1406123796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0849 GMT 14 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 14 June (BETA)—The four representatives of the Bosnian Serbs, refugees from Glamoc, who on 1 June set off to attend negotiations with representatives of the Croatian authorities in that city, are being held in Rodoc jail near Mostar, the ICRC [International Committee of Red Cross] stated today.

ICRC representatives have visited the detained Serbs, and the same news has been confirmed by Berislav Pusic, chairman of the Croatian Government's Commission for Exchange.

The detainees are Djoko Vuleta, director of a sawmill in Glamoc, the firm's driver Nedeljko Jandric, Krstan Cegar and Mirko Corkic. They set off from Banja Luka on 1 June, dressed in civilian clothes and with prior notice, to meet with Ile Knez, chairman of the Glamoc Municipality appointed by the Croatian authorities.

The last time they were seen was 1 June at Mliniste, 25 kilometers north of Glamoc, where a demarcation line between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Serb Republic is located, after which they simply disappeared.

The UN international civilian police also searched for the missing Serbs, even though there were some indications, even confirmed ones, that they were being kept hidden at a police station in Livno.

B-H: Correspondent Reports on Interview With Karadzic

LD1306191096 London Channel 4 Television Network in English 1800 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Interview with correspondent Lindsay Hilson by Jon Snow; Snow in London studio, Hilson in Sarajevo; from the "Channel 4 News" program—live]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Snow] Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has told "Channel 4 News" that he has no intention of standing down from his political responsibilities despite international pressure to charge him with war crimes. In an exclusive meeting with our diplomatic correspondent Lindsay Hilson at his stronghold in Pale, he said he wasn't afraid of being captured and sent for trial in The Hague. Today ministers from more than 40 countries have begun a two-day meeting in Florence to review the progress of the Dayton peace accord. Lindsay Hilson joins us now live from Sarajevo. First of all, Lindsay, it is extremely rare for anybody to get to see Radovan Karadzic. As far as I can tell nobody's seen him exclusively in several months. How did you get to see him and what did you find when you got there?

[Hilson] Well, it wasn't exactly cloak and dagger. We saw some senior officials and asked if we could see Mr. Karadzic, and it was agreed. They said: Oh well, he's rather busy at the moment, but come back later. So we did go back later. He was very clear that he would not be filmed. He would not appear on television. Now I understand that that's because there is an understanding now with the office of the High Representative—those are the people who are putting into action the Dayton accords—that he should not be seen in public and he should not make media appearances. But clearly he wanted to see us and he wanted to show that he is still very much there and very much in control. In fact he said: I control everything.

[Snow] Right. Now that's exactly the point. The international community wants him stripped of all political power, but you seem to say that he's now actually running the political process up till the election.

[Hilson] Well, he says that he is still president, although he has given some of his duties to his vice president. He said he was concentrating on the party and on legislation and when we saw him he was having a meeting with his party henchmen. Now, with elections coming up soon, obviously the party is very crucial, and the whole atmosphere was that he was the man, he was in charge. He strode into this office, there was a big mahogany table. He offered us wild strawberries which were there on the table. He had big maps next to him which he showed us various things on. He was showing that he was in charge. There were flunkies around, men with pistols in their pockets; they were doing his bidding.

[Snow] Any sign that this was a man who recognized that the international war crimes tribunal wanted him in The Hague?

[Hilson] Oh well, obviously he knows that, but he said about the IFOR [Implementation Force] troops who are looking for him: I see them from time to time at a distance, but I have ways of avoiding the checkpoints; this is my country. Now I think to some extent that is bravado. But obviously he is still there and they haven't caught him.

[Snow] How near were international forces when you actually met him?

[Hilson] Oh well, I would say that they were within a couple of miles. But I think that one should also say, though, you can't just say that this man is in control and he is running rings. I think he's also something of a fantasist. He didn't really want to talk about that. He wanted to show me his maps of Pale, which is a little mountain village, and the pink area which he says is going to be the business area—the Wall Street of Serbia, with a stock exchange and two hotels and a banking area. He also has his fantasies about his mountain kingdom.

B-H: Klickovic Says UN Will Not Try To Arrest Karadzic

AU1406115396 Paris AFP in English 1110 GMT 14 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Florence, June 14 (AFP)—The NATO-led peace force in Bosnia would not dare try to arrest Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic said here Friday.

Klickovic said the two leaders, both indicted as war criminals, "are not only protected by an army and a police force but also by the people." Klickovic was speaking to reporters on the sidelines of international peace talks on Bosnia in Florence.

Klickovic said the pressure on Belgrade for the arrest of Karadzic and his military chief Mladic was "immoral and wrong."

The two are wanted by the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague for crimes against humanity and genocide.

Klickovic did not rule out Karadzic one day becoming an election candidate despite international pressure for him to withdraw from public life, but added: "He doesn't really believe he will be a candidate in the next elections."

The Dayton peace accord on Bosnia excludes war criminals from occupying public positions and from being candidates in elections.

Klickovic said Karadzic was now "busy reorganising his party" for the elections in order to "complete the establishment the state" of Serbia in Bosnia.

The Dayton accord made the Bosnian Serb state, Republika Srpska, an entity in Bosnia but it does not have the status of an independent nation.

Klickovic said Karadzic was innocent, the victim of political accusations. He said it was "difficult to be a war criminal and the protector of his people at the same time."

B-H: Klickovic Refuses To Hand Over Karadzic, Mladic

LD1406115496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 14 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] We should perhaps also mention, in our summary of this morning's work of the Florence conference, that Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, again refused to hand over Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic to the Hague tribunal, claiming as before that the court is a political and not a human rights' instrument, and that it serves those who are against the Serbs. He said he would be supplying a reply to Antonio Cassese, president of the tribunal, after his demand that the two criminals be handed over or sanctions would be reimposed on Belgrade.

B-H: Release of War Crimes Suspect Assailed

96BA0335A Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 23 Apr 96 p 5

[Article by Dj. Kozar: "Why the Colonel Was Released"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The investigation of this colonel uncovered evidence that he had committed two serious criminal acts; judicial bodies skirted for Krsmanovic's exchange.*

The release from Sarajevo prison of Colonel Aleksa Krsmanovic of the Forces of the republic of Srpska [VRS] (on Monday) was met with surprise and perplexity. He was not a prisoner, but rather a person under investigation by the High Court in Sarajevo on the well-founded charge of having committed a war crime. Just when it was expected that he would be indicted, he was suddenly exchanged and returned to Pale.

Politics played its part. The Serb side presented an ultimatum, as announced by the chairman of their assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik, Sunday evening on Pale television: deputy Ibran Mustafic in exchange for Aleksa Krsmanovic! They had captured Mustafic last summer in Srebrenica and were simply waiting for the opportunity to "sell him at a high price."

Extensive File Left Behind

This exchange was obviously decided on at the highest state level of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Everything was arranged with lightning speed: As late as Friday, the colonel was being interrogated, and on Sunday he was released! Sarajevo senior prosecutor Domin Malbasic, under whose orders the investigation of Krsmanovic was launched, told us on Monday that he learned of the colonel's release from custody from the Journal program of Bosnia-Herzegovina Television. This confirms the fact that in this case the judiciary was bypassed and that none of the competent state institutions informed the prosecutor in advance that he was losing the man suspected of one of the most serious criminal acts. On the evening of 3 April, the Hague Tribunal had returned Col. Krsmanovic to Sarajevo by special charter flight since it had not found any grounds for indictment. This decision by the Hague prosecutor did not bother the Bosnia-Herzegovina judicial authorities. In accordance with their jurisdiction, they were determined to finish the job that they had begun, independently of The Hague. Thus, the examining magistrate with the High Court in Sarajevo, Izet Bazdarevic, in cooperation with prosecutor Malbasic, continued the investigation against Krsmanovic. The file was getting bigger and bigger....

Were there grounds for indicting Aleksa Krsmanovic? we asked senior prosecutor Malbasic. "The office of the senior prosecutor in Sarajevo certainly would have indicted Col. Krsmanovic since during the investigation we found enough evidence to charge him with a war crime," the prosecutor says. According to Malbasic, if Krsmanovic had remained in custody he would have been charged with two criminal acts: first, an inhumane attitude toward prisoners of war, and second, the use of prohibited means of warfare. Both acts are covered by the Geneva Convention, and our legislation classifies them as criminal acts against humanity and international law.

Based on the statements of witnesses and other facts, during the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina this officer of the Forces of the republic of Srpska participated in ethnic havoc and genocide against Bosniaks in occupied territory in Semberija and Romanija.

Confrontation With Witness

One person who was an eyewitness to Krsmanovic's order to liquidate civilians and who miraculously lived to tell about it immediately recognized the colonel among several people who were shown to him in prison. When confronted with him, Krsmanovic said that he had never seen that witness in his life. He had obviously been prepared in the Serb entity not to admit at any price that he had ever met a witness when confronted with one.

The investigation also revealed that as deputy commander of the so-called Sarajevo-Romanija Corps of the VRS Aleksa Krsmanovic, during the battle at Treskavica, acquired projectiles with a chemical charge, with which the positions of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina were bombarded. The firing of such shells is prohibited by the Geneva Convention, and whoever orders their use or supplies them for combat is committing a criminal act. This colonel knew that he was doing something that was prohibited, because he had learned that as a boarder at the Military Academy and later, but nevertheless he provided horrible chemical ordnance to Serb artillerymen. The colonel should celebrate 21 April, the date of his release, because the penalty for both criminal acts with which he was charged is death.

B-H: Belgrade-Pale Allegedly Cooperate To Abuse Muslims

*96BA0335B Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE
in Serbo-Croatian 23 Apr 96 p 7*

[BH PRESS report: "Arrests of Bosniaks: Belgrade Toys With Sanctions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The arrest of four refugees is only the latest episode in the continuing mistreatment of Bosniaks in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro.*

Sarajevo—The Belgrade-Pale axis continues to function to an extraordinary extent. Activities are fully coordinated between these two regimes. Almost at the same time that war criminal Karadzic detains 19 Bosniaks and Croats in prison in Pale on the charge of alleged war crimes, Slobodan Milosevic does the same thing, arresting and holding in a Belgrade prison, without any basis whatsoever, four Bosniaks who survived the Golgotha of Zepa, the State Commission for the Exchange of Prisoners of War says in a statement.

The arrest of the four refugees is only the latest episode in the continuing mistreatment of Bosniaks in the territory of Serbia and Montenegro. We recall that in the spring and summer of 1992 a large number of Bosniaks were arrested in Serbia and on the Montenegrin coast, then deported to Bosnia and, contrary to the Geneva Convention, turned over to Karadzic's paramilitary formations, after which all trace of them was lost. At the same time, wounded people and patients sent to hospitals in Belgrade, Pljevlje, and Uzica from the Gorazde hospital disappeared without a trace.

Even after two years, the ostensible investigation of the disappearance of Bosniaks from Sjeverin and Strbac has yielded no results. The Belgrade regime is also responsible for the fate of Bosniaks deported to Serbia from Foca prison during the summer of 1992.

The latest arrest of four Bosniaks on the ostensible charge of being war criminals is only further evidence of the direct involvement of the Belgrade regime in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The regime in Belgrade is not only refusing to extradite its citizens accused of war crimes to the Hague Tribunal; it is also arresting innocent Bosniaks, citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, against whom the Hague Tribunal has not and will not initiate proceedings.

Thus, if the four innocent Bosniaks are not released from prison in Belgrade immediately, we believe that that satisfies the conditions for lifting the suspension of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and for reimposing them. This is especially true since in a letter of 21 November 1995 to U.S. Secretary of State Christopher Slobodan Milosevic promised to release all prisoners immediately.

The UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] was supposed to offer full protection to all refugees in the Sljivovica camp until they are repatriated or deported to a third country, but since it has obviously not done so, at least with regard to these four Bosniaks, it is obligated to force their immediate release with the instruments at its disposal.

Otherwise, if these four innocent people are not released, the question that arises is how then it will make it possible for more than one million refugees to return, which is its duty based on the Dayton Accord, the State Commission for the Exchange of War Prisoners says in its public statement.

B-H: IFOR May Take Control of Sava River at Brcko

AU1406085896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0800 GMT 14 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A special IFOR [Implementation Force] is expected to come to Brcko very soon, BH PRESS has learned from IFOR sources in Zagreb. IFOR intends to take over complete control on the Sava River near Brcko and [words indistinct], so it has already demanded that the FRY authorities discontinue all trade from the Sabac port with the Serb entity. So far no further details are available. If IFOR really does what it has announced, it would be the first sign of goodwill and of resoluteness on the part of the international community to use its arbitration to help Brcko enter the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, that is, the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. International arbitration on that town has been envisaged by the Dayton agreement.

B-H: Serb Police in Doboj Protest IFOR Conduct

LD1306192996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1713 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 13 Jun (SRNA)—The Public Security Center [PSC] in Doboj [northern Bosnia] lodged a protest today with the commander of the Nordic-Polish brigade of IFOR [Implementation Force] against behavior which is not in the spirit of the Dayton agreement and not within the powers of the international forces.

"Despite the PSC's cooperation and the complete safety of IFOR's units, they are continuing to check civilians, vehicles and traffic, and, against 'European standards', setting up checkpoints," the statement says.

The PSC in Doboj has warned the commander of the Nordic-Polish brigade that, under the Dayton agreement, IFOR does not have the authority to set up checkpoints and check civilians and vehicles at random and without any need outside the zone of separation.

"On the pretext of European standards, IFOR has almost prevented the work of the police on the roads, taking over their duties. By behaving in this way IFOR is ignoring and humiliating both the IPTF [International Police Task Force] and the police of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic," the statement goes on to say.

The Nordic-Polish brigade commander is reminded that the PSC has proposed joint patrols consisting of Serb Republic police, IPTF, and IFOR military police, but has not received any definite answer to the proposal.

Pointing out to IFOR that there does not exist a single law or international agreement under which civilians in the Serb Republic have to allow IFOR to check their vehicles outside the zone of separation, the PSC warns that "IFOR is in this way provoking incidents which could have serious consequences even for the safety of their soldiers."

B-H: Assembly Says Conditions for Elections Unfulfilled

AU1306201396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Report by Fahida Mustafic, Milorad Filoni, and Ljiljana Radulj on the 14th Session of the Constituent Assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovia Federation in Sarajevo on 13 June—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Mustafic] The introductory expose on the conditions for the holding of elections, read out by Mirko Boskovic, member of the interim electoral commission, was followed by a debate in which more than 20 deputies took part. The views of the debaters mostly boiled down to the conclusion that the conditions for the holding of the elections have not been created yet and that the fundamental precondition for this was the removal of war criminals from posts of authority.

Mirsad Dzapo believes that the local elections in Brcko can only be held after the arbitration and on the basis of the 1991 census. Deputy Abdulah Konjicija believes that the elections should be held at all levels [words indistinct] municipal elections. The ideal conditions for the elections do not exist, however, we can secure the minimum conditions to hold the elections at the level of counties, entities, and the state. The duty of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is to organize rather than (?create) [words indistinct] only (?90 days are left) until then. These are only some of the opinions that could be heard in the debate on the conditions for the holding of elections.

After several interruptions and coordinations of views, the final conclusions were formulated by Dzevad Mlaco, president of the club of Bosniak deputies:

[Mlaco] The Constituent Assembly of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation favors the realization of the elections envisaged by the Dayton peace accord.

The Constituent Assembly concludes that the conditions for the elections envisaged by the Dayton Accord do not exist, especially not in the Serb Republic entity.

From all incumbent Federation's offices, the Constituent Assembly [?requests] the freedom of [words indistinct], freedom of movement, freedom of media, return of expellees and refugees, and everything that constitutes the preconditions for the democratic and [word indistinct] elections.

The Constituent Assembly demands that war criminals be removed from political life and brought before the tribunal [word indistinct].

The Constituent Assembly demands that all incumbent federal authorities and the [word indistinct] electoral commission do their utmost to facilitate free and democratic elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The elections should be held at all levels, and the refugees who [words indistinct] until the elections should be allowed [words indistinct] in the countries of their temporary abode.

The Federation president and vice president, the prime minister, [words indistinct], and the members of the interim electoral commission from the Federation are tasked with determining, together with the interim electoral commission, the manner and the possibilities for holding the local elections in Brcko after the final arbitration ruling, in view of Brcko's special status.

The members of the Federation's interim electoral commission are tasked with regularly informing the Constituent Assembly on [words indistinct].

[Mustafic] Following a brief debate, these conclusions were adopted with a majority of votes.

[Filoni] The introductory expose prior to the beginning of the debate on the return and the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina refugees and expellees was read out by Minister [words indistinct]. He emphasized that there has been no large-scale return of refugees [words indistinct]. While some positive shifts have been registered on the Federation's territory, the situation in the Serb entity remains frozen, Minister Alic said.

The process of the refugees' return is, to a great extent, also obstructed by [word indistinct] authorities. The international powers should be asked to do more on the return of refugees and expellees. The realization of Annex (?Seven) of the Dayton Accord is of great importance for the resolution of the problem of the refugees' return.

The first one to speak after Minister Alic's address was Mumir Tarik who stressed that (?Travnik must be included among the) territories on which everything agreed on the refugees' return was realized consistently. Mirko Prskalo said that some refugees are treated unequally and that their rights should be equalized. What is happening in Bugojno is that the Croats are returning, but they do not report themselves to the Croatian Democratic Community and it appears that the Croats are not allowed to return to their homes in Bugojno, Dzevad Mlaco said. Mirko Prskalo disputed this statement, saying that what Mlaco said was not true because he, as a former Bugojno resident, cannot return to his town. That is why he demanded [words indistinct]. In response to this, Dzevad Mlaco cited information that approximately 50 Croatian and Bosniak houses on the Bugojno territory are being refurbished with the funds of the Swedish and Swiss Caritas.

Deputy [words indistinct] that refugees' return to the areas where the conditions for their return exist, citing [word indistinct] as an example. After the signing of [words indistinct] the refugees' living conditions have deteriorated, Hajrudin Sejmenovic stressed. Deputy Smajl Ibrahimpasic proposed the drafting of a plan according to which each refugee [words indistinct] when he can return to his home. Edin Muhic stressed that the problem did not lie with the makeup of the federal [word indistinct] but in the lack of political will to ensure the refugees' return. [Words indistinct] Mirsad Dzapo spoke. He also proposed that the government compiles a [word indistinct] plan for the refugees' return. [Words indistinct] spoke about the coexistence in Gradacac [words indistinct] 120 citizens from the Serb entity arrived to Gradacac to examine the possibilities for their return.

We will also single out an explanation by Interior Minister Avdo Hebib on the situation regarding the return of the Croats from the Travnik area, about which some media have made a lot of fuss. It is true that 13 Croats were turned back from the Travnik area to the place of their departure because they failed to report themselves to the local authorities, which would approve their further stay in the region. [Words indistinct] and not thousands of people, which is what the press reported, Minister Hebib said.

[Rradulj] That, apart from the organizers of all activities, the clubs of deputies should also be involved in the realization of the concrete program on the return of refugees and that greater responsibility should be demanded from the Federation's top officials were only some of the proposals by the deputies who took part in the continuation of the debate.

The UNHCR still has not secured two thirds of the funds for the return of the refugees and, in the opinion of a handful of deputies, unemployment could be alleviated by engaging the returnees in the reconstruction of [words indistinct] food, for which the preconditions exist.

After an exhausting debate, Federal Assembly Speaker Mariofil Ljubic proposed conclusions that were adopted with a majority of votes. [passage omitted]

B-H: Assembly Postpones Debate on Defense Law

AU1306182996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Report by Senada Cumurovic from the Federal Assembly—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] After a break of approximately 20 minutes, the 14th Federal Assembly session broke up to resume on Wednesday, 19 June. Speaker Mariofil Ljubic proposed that the continuation of the session be postponed due to the importance of the issues on which the deputies are supposed to vote, namely, a proposal of the Law on Defense and a proposal of the law on a coat of arms and a flag, a definition of the Federation's state insignia. There are still a certain number of uncoordinated issues on both these legal proposals on which the commission, that is, [word indistinct] is working.

Regarding the announced 32d item on the agenda, the debate on the situation in the Federation in which Federation Vice President Ejup Ganic was supposed to read an expose, it, too, was postponed until the next session, although D. Ganic advocated the assembly resuming the debate on the situation in the Federation and the legal proposals tonight on the grounds of the importance of their adoption. It was nevertheless voted to resume the Federal Assembly session on Wednesday, 19 June, at 1100 [0900 GMT].

B-H: Parties Register Before Deadline

AU1406113596 Paris AFP in English 1100 GMT 14 Jun 96

[By Jacques Charmelot]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 14 (AFP)—Bosnian political parties were making last-minute applications Friday ahead of a 1500 GMT deadline to register for Bosnia's first post-war countrywide elections.

The moves to register for the vote—a step forward for the electoral process in Bosnia—came as OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission chief in Bosnia Robert Frowick, speaking in Florence, Italy, said Friday he was recommending that the country's first post-war elections go ahead as planned by mid-September.

"I have decided to recommend to the OSCE chairman-in-office, Federal Councillor (Flavio) Cotti, that these elections take place within the timeframe stated in the General Framework Agreement—that is by September 14," he told a Dayton peace accord review conference.

"Overall I believe it is more wise to go forward with the elections than not to hold them and risk an unraveling of the entire process, in both its military and civilian dimensions," he said.

In Sarajevo, an official of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is organising the Bosnia poll, said in Sarajevo that "more than five" parties had put in their lists and necessary documents by midday Friday.

The deadline for parties and individuals to register was 1500 GMT Friday and several parties were making last-minute applications, he said.

The Democratic Action Party (SDA) of President Alija Izetbegovic told AFP Friday it intended to register its candidates by midday Friday, while three opposition parties—the Republican Party, the Liberal Party and the former communist Social Democratic Party, said they would make their applications with just hours to go before the deadline.

The Bosnian wing of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and two independent candidates announced earlier this week that they had entered lists for the polls.

Once the applications are in, it will then take several days to check the applications. Voter lists for the polls, where 2.4 million refugees and displaced people have the right to vote, still have to be approved. In all seven elections are due to be held, for authorities ranging from a common, republic-wide presidency, to parliaments of the two political entities (the Moslem-Croat federation and the Republika Srpska) and down to the municipal level.

A first taste of elections in post-war Bosnia is due on June 30 when the city of Mostar, still divided between Moslems and Croats after fighting in 1993 and 1994, goes to the polls.

Speaking in Florence, Cotti said "certain minimum conditions must be established for the ideas of 'free', 'fair' and 'democratic' mentioned in the (peace) accord to retain their meaning."

But elections were only a staging post on the road to democracy and reconciliation, he said and could "even if flawed, be an important boost" to the peace process, he added.

The Moslem-led government of Bosnia and supporters of the idea of a multi-ethnic country have expressed alarm that the vote could lead to a more permanent ethnic division of Bosnia.

Frowick regularly refers to the polls in Bosnia as the most "complex electoral process in history."

B-H: SDA Threatens Opposition With 'Ruthless Fight'

AU1306101396 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 31 May 96 p 5

[Article by "B.B.": "Threats and Warnings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Edhem Bicakcic, deputy chairman of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], said at a news conference that in the interest of the Bosniak nation, the party will begin a ruthless fight against the opposition if it does not recognize the SDA's leadership in ethnically mixed environments. Opposition parties responded with claims that the SDA has already begun to fight those who do not have the same political ideas by removing company heads who are not members of their party. Meanwhile, leaders of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] are not hiding the support of the Republic of Croatia and their final goal—the creation of a Croat state in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Encouraged by the statements by Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak that Stolac is just as important to Croatia as Cakovec, and that the Croatian army will defend what the Croats had "conquered" in Bosnia-Herzegovina, [word illegible] so-called Herceg-Bosna, which somehow does not die out, the HDZ leaders are competing in the formulation of Croat interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ivan Bender, head of the delegate's club in the Assembly of the Republic/Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, made the following statement at the canton assembly of the HDZ in Zenica: "Our goal is a Croat state.... We want authority, our areas, our economy, a judicial system, police, and an army. We have our leader, Franjo Tudjman, who created with us the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the HRHB [Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia]...." At the same time, Federation President Kresimir Zubak (not the president of the Croats in the Federation), in an interview for VECERNJI LIST, stated that

"Bosnia-Herzegovina is a state which was historically created by Croats." The HDZ had concurrently started an initiative for the creation of Croat majority municipalities in Zenica and Tuzla, and that they later be set up as towns with "a de-authorized [razvlascen] central portion as a district."

In the meantime, Liberal Party leader Rasim Kadic is warning the state bodies that too little attention is being given to the forthcoming arbitration on the status of Brcko, which could be a motive for the beginning of a new war.

B-H: Issue of Multiple Functions of Politicians

96BA0295B Sarajevo FOCUS in Serbo-Croatian 2 May 96 p 18

[Article by Ermin Cengic: "Versatility or a Passion for Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In recent years, the domestic media have examined and discussed at length the question of the "multifunctionality" of figures in Bosnian public life in various ways, both positive and negative. By and large, there has been no adequate answer to the question of whether there is a Bosnian homo universalis and are those who hold several posts (offices) really able jacks of all trades, or is there simply a chronic shortage of quality experts in various fields (most frequently politics, economics, or law)? Unfortunately, there is no common denominator that would apply to all those who out of their own desire for advancement, possible specialization in several professions, or because of the shortage of educated and useful politicians or economists work or figure in various bodies and institutions of the social reality of Bosnia-Herzegovina [BiH].

For example, Stjepan Kljuic, Ejup Ganic, or Kasim Begic can be regarded in one context, Edhem Bicakcic and, say, Rusmir Mahmutcehajic in another, and Hasan Muratovic or Enver Kresa in a third context of an amazing human characteristic: one man—several abilities, offices, and public or private positions. All in all, in none of these cases can we avoid being ironic about the everyday Bosnian situation, which is sometimes so comic, and sometimes fatally, i.e., criminally, serious.

"I Must Make a Living Somehow..."

"I work as a journalist because I must make my living somehow...," says Stjepan Kljuic, member of the State Presidency, chairman of the Olympics Committee of Bosnia-Herzegovina and of the Republican Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, a man with one state office, one political post, and one athletic position makes his living working in his own profession, which is almost incompatible with the previous positions because of their critical rejection of it. Nevertheless, Kljuic himself replies thus to the question about the existence of people whose abilities are manifold in our society: "I personally do not believe that. Engels said somewhere that the Middle Ages needed universalists and had them. Today, we do not need them, because we live in a time of clear specialization. This is particularly essential in connection with government, whose dispersion would signify democratization, because many people who individually would have less power would be making decisions...."

In his case, the motivation for holding several positions arises from some purely spiritual impulses and an inclination toward politics or athletics, but they are far from universality.

The story about universality might to some extent also apply to Rusmir Mahmutcehajic, whose talent for the natural and social sciences is not put to use in performance of several public obligations, but he still is sovereign ruler of the informal Bosnian political and cultural scene. Or, on the other hand, Edhem Bicakcic, whose public function is that of a precise businessman, but who also holds several political offices.

A Man With "a Million Jobs"

The problem with most of the "multiple-office holders" is their unfailing presence in all the pores of the media and the switching of arguments whereby it is themselves rather than their abilities which are offered. It is in that context that true legends are generated about people who do not know themselves where they have been assigned and how many "jobs" they hold. Through no fault of his own, Kasim Begic has become a synonym for a man "with a million jobs," although he says of himself that he is no genius, but simply has a large number of obligations. Begic is dean of the School of Law at Sarajevo University and a deputy in the Assembly of the Republic/Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina [R/F BiH], and the following posts follow from those two jobs: he is a member of three parliamentary commissions, a representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the temporary election commission, an adviser for legal and economic matters in the Bosnia-Herzegovina State Presidency, and chairman of the Board of Directors of Radio-TV [RTV] Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at one time he was one of the people in the top leadership of the publishing house Bosanska Knjiga.

Begic replies to malicious remarks about his overemployment: "Those positions are not required for any kind of advancement, because they are mainly work-related. Because there have been no salaries during the entire time of the war, positions have not helped a man to put together income from various places. Third, these positions do not benefit any party, nor do they benefit my personal advancement within any party...."

Private Business and Public Office

However, the dean and deputy did in a "give-and-take" show his work in the "true light" when he said that never in his life had he worked more than in the last four years, but that the financial and political results do not exist for him personally! "In normal market economies and systems, the number of positions is not essential, because the market regulates everything, and if someone has to pay for your services, that is, if he is satisfied with them, even if there are 50 of them, each is given its own value...," Begic concluded.

Nevertheless, however "normal" such stories might be for the conditions of Bosnia, and however sad and funny they may sound at the same time, it is impossible to get around the essence of the problem when it comes to stringing together positions, and this is the mutual incompatibility, i.e., noncomplementarity, of the differing public responsibilities or their combination with private business. The informants we consulted in connection with the incompatibility of public offices all agreed that the legal regulations defining ranges in this area are not immune to poor solutions.

Absurdities which were possible and perhaps justified at the height of the aggression simply occur in the constitutional system of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the Bosnian state should long ago have ceased to function under emergency circumstances. Recently, amendments to laws have made it possible for deputies in the republic and federal Assembly to be ambassadors as well. But what has been happening? Those who held those positions simultaneously were given the freedom of choice to decide which they wanted, although they were elected deputies, and here their will is limited, because the voters demanded that they be representatives of the people in the country, but not of the state abroad.

All the Bosnian Symbioses

It is not abundantly clear whether this provision also applies to other personnel of diplomatic and consular missions, so that it appears that a deputy, if he cannot be an ambassador, is in no way prevented from being, say, a councillor in a diplomatic and consular mission.

Still worse things and "wartime laws" are associated with the paradox, described many times, of a man being simultaneously in the legislative and executive branches, i.e., both a minister in the government and a deputy in the Assembly. For some people, the system of "the judge bringing the charge, and the judge trying the case" still seems to be in effect. The crowning symbiosis of offices is certainly bringing together public office and personal business, which is a widespread phenomenon in both governments. Of course, no one can legally restrict the freedom of any citizen of this state from having a private firm and turning over his capital (if he has any).

Nevertheless, it seems more than incompatible and absurd for someone who is paid in some fashion to write and enforce orders and laws to enjoy at the same time the blessings of private life, which can (although it need not) be ideally connected to public office. And all of it out of purely personal material interest and without anything at all to do with the "fight for Bosnia-Herzegovina" and the pledge to patriotism, which domestic politicians often claim to be their sole motivation for engaging in politics.

Although recently the domestic press has in fact written something about the "scandals" related to certain ministers of Croatian nationality, this does not mean at all that the Bosnjak members of the two governments are resistant to challenges in the form of the "wonderful world" of public office and private business.

After all, even when it is a question of versatility and multidisciplinary ability, but also when it is a question of a talent for monkey business and abuse, it is all a question of the individual, never the people.

B-H: Cross-Border Shooting Reported in Bosanski Samac

LD1106111996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1035 GMT 14 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Samac, 14 Jun (SRNA)—Sasa Rakic, a six-year-old boy, sustained serious head injuries last night from a bullet fired from an infantry weapon in the Croat village of Prud in the Muslim-Croat federation. They are fighting to save his life in Banja Luka hospital.

Ratko Mihajlovic, head of the Samac public security station, said the reason for the shooting, which went on until the early hours of the morning, was most probably the marking of a Croat religious holiday. Implementation Force [IFOR] and the International Police Task Force have been informed of the incident.

B-H: Croats Say Muslim-Croat Ties Deteriorating

LD1206194096 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The leadership of the municipality of Kakanj with its temporary seat in Capljina was visited today by a delegation of the EU monitoring mission. On this occasion, the EU observers were briefed about the current deterioration of the political and security situation in the municipality of Kakanj, particularly in connection with the latest cases when the security of Croats living in the municipality of Kakanj was threatened.

Both sides concluded that the latest examples of violent behavior by the Muslim police and their failure to take measures to find the perpetrators of serious crimes committed against the Croats in May this year are particularly worrying.

In addition, the EU observers were also informed about the work of the Kakanj municipal committee of the Croatian Democratic Union; it was said in this connection that the Muslim authorities in Kakanj, despite a decision by an interim municipal council, has not yet provided premises for the seat of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] municipal committee in Kakanj; this is hampering HDZ activities in Kakanj and thus thwarting the creation of impartial conditions for the forthcoming elections.

B-H: Croats Call For Territorial Reorganization in Tuzla

LD1406120596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1034 GMT 14 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 14 Jun (Tanjug)—The county committee of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] in Soli, as Croats now call Tuzla, has decided not to take part in the local elections until a new territorial and political reorganization of the present municipality is carried out, [Tuzla] Croat Radio reports today.

A declaration issued by this committee says that Tuzla must be organized as a town and community of municipalities with a Croat part, a Muslim part, and a central zone (district) without administrative powers.

The Croat Radio correspondent says the Muslim cantonal authorities, invoking some kind of multiethnic and civilian equality, have rejected all the Croat calls hitherto for their own municipality.

As a result, the HDZ county committee is calling on all Croats from this area—wherever they may be in the world and there are about 30,000 of them—to prepare and take part in a referendum and vote for the division of Tuzla along ethnic lines.

"The September elections cannot be held within the inherited administrative borders of Tuzla but only in new federal, locally self-administered units," Croat radio says.

B-H: Deadlock in Novi Travnik Repatriation Project Noted

AU1206163396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 12 Jun 96

[Report by Sabahudin Dziho—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] is the sponsor and UNCRO [UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia] the organizer of [words indistinct]. The Bosniaks and Croats in Travnik are more than interested that the pilot project for the return of refugees come to realization as soon as possible. Since mid-March up until today nobody has returned to his home. Sabahudin Dziho tried to find an answer to why this is so.

[Dziho] Talks on the initial steps to facilitate the return of Bosniak-Muslims and Croats to their homes in the Novi Travnik municipality began as early as mid-March this year. At the time representatives of UNHCR, the sponsor; UNCRO, the organizer; and of the interested Bosniak-Muslim and Croatian sides agreed that nine Croats would return to the territory under the control of the legal authorities, and that the same number of Bosniaks would return to the territory of Novi Travnik under the control of the Croatian Defense Council. Since then the expectation of their return has been heightened by the talks and agreements between leaders of the Bosniak and Croat citizens in the Novi Travnik municipality, but unfortunately there has been no visible progress yet.

In this atmosphere the speculation has been that the lack of progress was due to an obstruction for which one or the other side was responsible, or that it was about their unwillingness to respond to all the requirements prescribed by the Nine for Nine pilot project. However, it seems that the speculations of a great number of interested returnees have come to an end. As we have been told by the chairman of the Novi Travnik municipality, Salih (?Krlic), the Bosniak-Muslim side has proposed a list with nine names of heads of household whose houses are located in the city proper, the most remote house from the current demarcation line being hardly 1,000 meters away. The chairman also pointed out that the Bosniak side really has nothing against the return of the nine Croat families, even if they want to return the same day. However, the leaders of the Novi Travnik branch of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] cannot guarantee security for Raisa Sahbegovic, Muhamed and Dzafer Kotic, Casim Slobo, Nihad Koric, Ahmed Turic, Mehmet Habibic, Ragib Zugic, and Sulejman Krusanovic, because they need an opinion and reportedly approval from the municipal committee of the HDZ and the Croatian municipal council of Novi Travnik.

B-H: Novi Travnik Muslims Bar Croats From Celebrating Mass

LD1306204496 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Muslim authorities today prevented the celebration of a Mass to mark St. Antony's Day in Dolac parish in Novi Travnik. Nebojsa Dimitrijevic has a report:

[Dimitrijevic] Although the celebration marking St. Antony's day, the patron saint of Dolac parish near Travnik, had been announced in due time, it was not held today as planned. The reason for this was unacceptable conditions set by the Bosniak Muslim authorities in Travnik, which Dolac priest Fra Ivo Curak could not accept.

The church and a large part of Dolac parish have been under the control of Bosnia-Herzegovina Army forces since 1993. Almost 3,000 believers of Dolac parish have been expelled from their homes, while the church and the priest's residence have been completely destroyed. [passage omitted]

Although the right to celebrate religious rites is guaranteed by existing agreements on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, the priest requested, and was granted permission from the Travnik authorities, to hold a Mass on St. Antony's Day. Around 10 days ago workers and machinery were hired to prepare the area around the church. But, on the same day, the self-styled president of the Dolac local community brought in a police unit to send the workers away, we were told by priest Ivo Curak.

The Travnik authorities said that they did not ban the Mass in Dolac, but that all believers arriving for the Mass by bus had to be subjected to tight control. They would not allow individual arrivals by car or on foot. Priest Fra Ivo Curak did not want to accept these conditions because they are humiliating for believers, and the announced tight police control could have caused unwarranted incidents. Hence, the Mass in Dolac has been canceled. The Mass was held in Nevic Polje, part of Dolac parish in Novi Travnik municipality controlled by the Croat authorities.

This is even more odd if we remember that a major road passes through Dolac parish and is used every day, without any special control, by thousands of vehicles on the way to Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and western Bosnia. This is why we interpret the action by the Bosniak Muslim authorities in Travnik as pressure on the Dolac Croats who are trying to return to their homes and on priest Fra Ivo Curak, who is trying to obtain permission to return to Dolac and repair the church and his residence.

B-H: Plans for Referendum on Usora Municipality Rejected

LD1206224896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The president of the Zenica-Doboj canton has issued the following statement in connection with the organization of a referendum in the area of the Tesanj municipality by the so-called Joint Initiative Committee of the local community for the founding of the so-called Croat municipality of Usora:

The initiative on the organization of a referendum on 14 and 15 June this year on the founding of a new municipality in the area of the municipality of Tesanj does not contain even the minimum conditions required under the decision of the Constituent Assembly. The initiative was submitted by illegal organs of the Joint Initiative Committee, which was formed without the agreement of the relevant bodies of the local community and state bodies of the municipality of Tesanj, and is supported by only one political party, the HDZ.

The citizens of the municipality of Tesanj, mostly members of the Croat nationality, are therefore advised not to be taken in by such provocations, and to realize their rights with regard to the administrative reorganization of the municipality exclusively in accordance with the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the decision on uniform criteria for the constitution of new municipalities.

B-H: Usora-Tesanj Referendum 'Raised the Temperature' in Doboj

LD1306185996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1610 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 13 Jun (SRNA)—The referendum of Croats in the Usora-Tesanj area [northeastern Bosnia], not without reason, has raised the temperature in Doboj as well, the SRNA correspondent in this town reports.

The headquarters of the Nordic-Polish Implementation Force brigade announced today that the Danish unit, which covers the above-mentioned region, has stepped up its patrols because of the events in Usora.

According to its press officer, "it is possible that the voting by Croats on whether to separate from Tesanj and form their own municipality began today—in other words that the Muslims have been outmaneuvered."

The Muslim authorities in Tesanj and Bedrudin Salcinovic, the governor of the Zenica-Doboj canton, have been announcing that a referendum, which they condemn, was supposed to be held on 14 and 15 June.

Interest in Doboj in these events is great because part of this future Croat municipality would border on Doboj municipality, so it is not a matter of indifference to Doboj citizens who their neighbors will be, despite the fact that in either case [whether a mainly Muslim or mainly Croat municipality] the neighboring municipality would be in the Muslim-Croat federation.

The referendum in Usora has meant fewer citizens of Croat nationality coming to Doboj today from the villages of Ugarica and Simsa: It is clear that everything is taking second place to this event.

B-H: EU Holds News Conference on Mostar Elections

LD1406123296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 14 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The elections were discussed in the EU Administration's headquarters in Mostar. Here is a report from Mostar by Anton Mrkonjic:

[Reporter] EU Deputy Administrator Klaus Metscher said that the EU recommends to the governments of all countries that they allow people to enter their country on 30 June. [sentence as heard].

Metscher devoted most of his news conference to the insulting letters which the EU has received from the eastern part of Mostar over the past few days. They sharply criticize the EU administration for its indolence in preparing for the elections. Asked to give more concrete details of this, Metscher cited the letter from the mayor of east Mostar, Orucevic, who requested that the EU administration ensure the registration of the five opposition coalition parties. [passage omitted]

In conclusion, Klaus Metscher said that the electoral lists will be ready by 24 June, after which Mostar citizens will be able to check to see whether their names are on these lists.

B-H: Mostar Serbs Want More Voting Sites

AU1406113696 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 6 Jun 96 p 3

[Interview with Obren Lozo, representative of the Serb Civic Council from Mostar, by A. Jugo; place and date not given: "Bosniaks For, Croats Against"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Jugo] How do you view the documents related to the elections in Mostar that have been signed up to now?

[Lozo] I have no special objections to the "Transitional Status of the City of Mostar" and the "Regulations for the Election of the City Council" and of the councils of the city municipalities of Mostar. However, the agreement on local elections, which was signed on 25 May 1996, placed the Serbs of Mostar in an unequal position. This agreement envisages that voting locations be established in Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland.

At the Advisory Council's session on 30 May 1996 I asked that the agreement be expanded so that voting places be set up in Belgrade and Nevesinje. While the Bosniak side accepted this proposal, it was rejected by the Croat side, so that the agreement remained as was originally proposed, i.e. as it was signed.

[Jugo] Unless there is a change in the agreement, what will the outcome be for the Serbs of Mostar?

[Lozo] If the agreement is not changed, the Serbs of Mostar who are currently refugees will not be able to realize their rights and take part in the elections. The agreement envisages the organization of transport by buses or other means for displaced persons and refugees who wish to take part in the elections in Mostar. However, I do not expect that many people from Mostar will come to the elections in this way.

[Jugo] Have you had any contacts with Belgrade concerning the elections in Mostar, with the authorities and with the refugees from Mostar?

[Lozo] We do not have much contact with the refugees from Mostar, but we expect to have mutual visits and talks in the coming days.

[Jugo] Who signed the document at the Advisory Council on behalf of Serbs, and why?

[Lozo] Mr. Rajko Gatalo signed the agreement on local elections on behalf of Serbs. I do not know why he signed such an agreement.

[Jugo] What do you want from the European Union?

[Lozo] We ask the administrator and his administration to open voting places in Belgrade and in Nevesinje and thus enable the displaced persons and refugees from Mostar to vote.

B-H: HVO Arrests 2 Serbs Near Drvar Kremic

LD1306193096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1549 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 13 Jun (SRNA)—Two Serb civilians, Rade Bajic and Luka Basic, were arrested near Drvar around 1800 yesterday by Croatian Defense Council soldiers, Vlado Kremic, the witness to this abduction, told SRNA today.

According to Kremic, the arrested are refugees from Drvar who were visiting their farms in the villages of Mokronoge and Nagradje, together with Marinko Markanovic and himself.

Returning to Prnjavor, where they are settled as refugees, they met the HVO military patrol, which arrested Bajic and Basic.

For the moment nothing is known of their fate.

B-H: Buha Confident of Regional Stabilization Accord

LD1306103996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0725 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 13 Jun (SRNA)—Serb Republic Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha said late last night he is confident an agreement on regional stabilization will be reached soon, and that the preamble to the agreement will not be changed on the insistence of the Muslim side.

He told SRNA that the agreement has not been signed because the Muslim side refuses to sign the preamble which clearly lists all sides—participants in the conference on regional stabilization.

Although the four sides (the Serb Republic, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina) agreed to sign the agreement, the Muslim side representing Bosnia-Herzegovina refuses to sign it because the Serb Republic is mentioned in the agreement; the Muslim side is demanding clarification that the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation are entities, not states.

Buha recalled that the Serb Republic delegation was ready to sign the agreement in Vienna, and that the Serb Republic was invited to Oslo to attend the official agreement signing ceremony where the Muslims were expected to sign it too.

"However, after arriving in Oslo, it transpired that Norwegian General Eide Vigleik, who was supposed to convince the Muslim side to sign the agreement, did not succeed," Buha said adding:

"After that, the Americans took the initiative, asking us to make some changes so that the Muslims would accept the text."

"Instead of putting pressure on the side which was not ready to sign the agreement, concessions were sought from the side which was ready to keep its word," Buha said, adding that the Serb side refused to accept any changes.

According to Buha, the whole affair was resolved by Eide "freezing" time; this problem has to be solved within seven days, during which time the international community, according to his expectations, should bring the Muslim side to its senses and persuade it to accept what is reasonable.

The foreign minister explained that the text of the preamble is literally taken from the annex to the Dayton Agreement which refers to regional stabilization and recalled that the annex was signed by all parties to the Dayton and Paris agreements.

"It is absurd that the process should now revert to square one," Buha said.

Explaining the text of the agreement on regional stabilization, Buha said that it "comprises three parts: the preamble, restrictions regarding military resources [efektive], and the part which deals with the timescale for the reduction of weapons in accordance with figures contained in the agreement."

"The agreement is an integral document and any changes will inevitably lead to restarting negotiations on the other two parts," Buha said adding that there is no reason to do anything like that.

"There is no reason why we should be asked to make concessions as we were ready to accept this agreement in Vienna," Buha said, concluding that the Serb Republic government has accepted it and that the Serb Republic delegation is ready to sign it in Oslo.

B-H: Buha Promises To Honor Election Deadlines

LD1306082796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2235 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 12 Jun (SRNA)—Serb Republic Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha told SRNA late this evening that the Serb Republic will observe all deadlines set by the OSCE in connection with the forthcoming elections, irrespective of whether the Muslim-Croat federation does the same.

"On several occasions we have confirmed our readiness to take part in the elections within the timescale set by the OSCE; in Florence we will insist on it being observed," Buha said.

He warned that the Serb Republic "will pay no attention to what the federation does in this connection," although he said there are indications that the federation will try to undermine the timescale for the elections.

Adding that the forthcoming conference in Florence will "sum up the results of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement so far," Buha expressed the conviction that the conference will "highlight omissions or delays in certain areas."

"I believe that the international community will primarily insist on deadlines for the elections," the Serb Republic foreign minister said, confirming that a Serb Republic government delegation is leaving for Florence on Thursday morning.

The Serb Republic delegation is led by Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic. Its other members are: ministers Aleksa Buha, Marko Arsovic, Ljubisa Vladusic, Deputy Foreign Minister Radomir Lukic, presidential adviser Jovan Zametica, and prime minister's adviser Slavisa Rakovic.

B-H: RS Defense Minister Visits Repair Works in Serbia

LD1206223396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1706 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Pale, 12 Jun (SRNA)—On the occasion of Yugoslav Army Day, Milan Ninkovic, defense minister of the Bosnian Serb Republic [RS], and his colleagues visited the technical repair works in Cacak today and had talks with its management on the continuation of cooperation in the overhaul of weapons and military equipment carried out at the works, the Serb Republic Defense Ministry announced.

On this occasion, Minister Ninkovic presented the works management with the Njegos award of the first order, which Serb Republic President Dr. Radovan Karadzic awarded to the Cacak technical repair works for the results achieved in carrying out the general overhaul of weapons and military equipment belonging to the Bosnian Serb Army.

During his visit to the FRY, the statement received by SRNA says, the defense minister will also visit the Momo Stanojlovic Air Force Institute and a number of special purpose enterprises. A visit to the Federal Defense Ministry is also planned.

On the occasion of Yugoslav Army Day, Minister Ninkovic will convey to federal Minister of Defense Pavle Bulatovic, on behalf of Serb Republic President Dr. Radovan Karadzic, sincere greetings and best wishes for the continued successful development and strengthening of the Yugoslav Army as a guarantee of the defense of the Serb nation as a whole, the statement concludes.

B-H: Banja Luka SDS Reacts to Milosevic's Interview

AU1306164496 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by V. Djordjevic: "Milosevic the Forecaster?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian president's interview to the German DER SPIEGEL, in which he announced, among other things, radical changes to the leadership of the Serb Republic after the September elections, has not been commented on by Pale for the time being. None of top officials, whose removal Milosevic announced, has been ready to comment on it. "We ceased commenting on the actions and statements of President Milosevic long ago because his word is no longer as respected as it used to be," a representative of the Pale authorities who wanted to remain anonymous stated for our newspaper.

In Banja Luka, however, the interview has met with disapproval on the part of the leadership of the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS].

"Milosevic is merely forecasting," Borivoj Sendic, chairman of the Municipal Committee of the Banja Luka SDS, stated for NASA BORBA, and added: "What does he mean by radical changes? Perhaps he meant changes within our party, that is, the addition of a faction that would support even more strongly an independent Serb Republic? After all, he spoke about things in rather general terms, so the interview is his own personal matter," Sendic concluded.

B-H: Klickovic Rules Out 'Unitary Bosnia'

LD1306155696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1510 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 13th June (SRNA)—Despite the efforts of the international community, there can no longer be any question of the creation of a unitary Bosnia, Gojko Klickovic, prime minister of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, has said.

In an interview with the weekly JAVNOST, the prime minister said international factors "by their irrational pressure on the Serb side" are dealing a final blow to the already weak union.

"No force can any longer prevent the Serb people from acting according to their own instincts and judgment," Klickovic said.

According to him, the new civilian option means "fresh killing and genocide." Klickovic expects "the definitive creation of a Serb national state" from the forthcoming elections.

The problem of Brcko is a strategic task of the first order, and must be resolved within two months, the prime minister said, and added that reconstruction and renovation work on buildings in the outskirts would soon begin in this town, and afterwards people would be moving into them.

According to the Dayton agreement, the town itself is not in dispute, only the [nearby] borders.

The prime minister cited the moving of the Bijeljina security center to Brcko as a positive example of organizational changes and measures to ensure citizens' safety.

B-H: Most Serb Parties Support Leadership on Brcko

AU1306145796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1050 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 13 Jun (BETA)—On the eve of tomorrow's meeting in Florence, the Bosnian Serb leadership received full support for the demand for Brcko to remain under the control of the Serb entity in Bosnia, the BETA Agency was told by sources close to the authorities of the Serb Republic [RS].

Pale and Belgrade reached agreement on Brcko during a series of meetings prior to the meeting of the Dayton agreement signatories held in Geneva on 2 June.

According to the same sources, in Florence, the Serb side will insist that the object of the arbitration for Brcko be established precisely, that is, that it should be established precisely whether the decision should involve borders between the two Bosnian entities in the general region of Brcko or in the town itself. "It is certain that the Serb delegation will not agree to the current separation lines being moved to the Serbs' detriment," the source said.

Agreement on the status of Brcko exists among virtually all RS political parties. In their opinion, the transfer of Brcko to the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation would mean an end to the RS, as it would then be divided into two parts.

B-H: Brcko Mayor Optimistic About Arbitration

LD1406120296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0950 GMT 14 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Brcko, 14 Jun (SRNA)—Miodrag Pajic, president of the Brcko municipal assembly, has said in an interview to SRNA that the question of arbitration [over Brcko] is one of state and not local significance, and that the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic will decide on this.

"I personally believe that we are prepared to begin the arbitration on 20 July because Serbs have nothing to lose from this process, and they could gain significant territory," Pajic, who is a member of the arbitration commission, said.

Pajic said this territory extends 12 nautical miles from the current border between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation, as far as the village of Maoce. This would mean restoration of the villages of Brka, Rahic, and Brod to the municipality of Brcko.

Croatia: Tudjman Receives UN Administrator for Slavonia

LD1306123296 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Report by Zoltan Kabok from the presidential palace]

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the Republic Dr. Franjo Tudjman has received the head of the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem [UNTAES], General Jacques Klein. On this occasion, Gen. Klein informed the Croatian president of progress in the process of the peaceful integration of the Croatian Danubian region, in particular the process of disarming the area.

During the talks, which were also attended by Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Kostovic; General Zvonimir Cervenko, chief of general staff of the Croatian Army Corps; Vesna Skaric-Ozbolt, deputy head of the president's office; and Ivica Vrkic, head of the government office for the transitional administration, President Tudjman said that he is satisfied with the work of Gen. Klein and his cooperation with the Croatian Government, adding that Croatia wants the process of peaceful integration to be completed within the mandate of the transitional administration of one year, because this is also in the interests of the local population.

Croatia: Granic, Bosnian FM Discuss Florence Conference

LD1306202696 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The two-day Florence conference on further implementation of the Dayton Agreement has started with an introductory speech made by Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dini. Representatives of around 50 countries and international organizations that are part of the peace process are attending the conference.

The Croatian delegation is led by Mate Granic, the deputy prime minister and foreign minister. Andjelko Perincic reports from Florence:

[Perincic] [Passage omitted] The conference then continued behind closed doors, so we asked Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic, who also spoke at the introductory session, to summarize his speech for our listeners.

[Begin Granic recording] The Republic of Croatia strongly supports the Federation and the peace process in its entirety. The Republic of Croatia supports cooperation with the Hague tribunal and timely elections because without elections there cannot be a full integration of Bosnia-Herzegovina in line with the Dayton Agreement.

In the same vein, we support the removal of Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic from the political scene.

As for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia believes that too little has been done so far, that projects are lagging, but that part of the responsibility for this has to be assumed by Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially if we recall all the processes in the Federation. The passing of the laws is lagging, even that of the already agreed laws, such as the defense law. We also believe that a big mistake will be made if the disarmament agreement is not signed. This will slow down all other processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well.

We are in favor of the Mostar elections being held on time—this will be a good sign for the general elections. [end recording]

[Perincic] Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic assessed for us future activities in the peace process:

[Begin Prlic recording] If stopping the war and creating better living conditions on the whole territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the main goal in the first six months of the implementation, after this introductory part of the Florence conference I can now say that it is obvious that the second six months will be characterized by the introduction of a democratic way of making decisions, the organization of the elections, and the beginning of the return of a considerable number of refugees to their homes. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Croatia: 'Surprise' Expressed at Refusal To Sign Arms Accord

AU1306203696 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jun 96 p 2

[Commentary by Frane Plancic: "The Name of the Culprit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] That Sarajevo is the name of the culprit responsible for the failure so far of the "Agreement on Subregional Arms Control" is the most unpleasant surprise from Oslo.

Instead of the expected adversary from Pale, the "agreement" has almost failed because of incomprehensibly fierce resistance from Sarajevo. In addition, if one mentions the refusal of the September elections, the conclusion is that Sarajevo is striking the two bedrocks of the Dayton agreement, thus bringing into question not only Croatia's vital (state, military, and other) interests but also the hard-won consensus on Europe's security architecture.

Everyone could have understood the Muslim tactics of refusal as a justified formal reason not to recognize the "Serb Republic" as an internationally legal subject. But when a reasonable Croatian proposal to call the three states and two entities "parties, only for the needs of this agreement," was rejected, one suspected that Sarajevo was not only applying tactics, but also a strategy.

Immediately, everybody tried to guess what the strategic objective could be.

According to one group, the Muslim leadership—as the most seriously injured in the war—is now ready to reach for a radical solution—that is, force of arms—if it can manage to draw IFOR [Implementation Force] to its side. The second extreme is the speculation about the coordination of the strategy with Belgrade, which would be welcomed by a part of Europe and by which the United States would be excluded from the game together with the Dayton accord and this arms control agreement.

These extremes and everything between them represent too big a bite for weak Sarajevo. Therefore, it is unlikely that such guesses are near the mark, although Sarajevo has rich experience of radical solutions. Nevertheless, one has to remember that those were very bad, tragic experiences. One also has to remember that Croatia has had nothing to do with such radical solutions so far, so Croatia will not have anything to do with them in the future.

Croatia: Committee Proposes Forming Municipality of Usora

LD1306133496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Report by Ivan Katic in Usora]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Citizens of Usora [generally known as Tesanj] are making their voice heard today with an initiative launched by 12 local communities which proposes setting up a Municipality of Usora with a Croat majority population. The initiative is based on a decision by the Constituent Assembly of the [Muslim-Croat] Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on uniform criteria for setting up new municipalities. The signing of petitions begins today and will go on until 15 June in Usora, Stuttgart and Munich in Germany, Villach in Austria, [word indistinct] in Switzerland, and in Zagreb.

The Municipal Committee of the Croatian Democratic Union of Usora has called on the population to voice their opinion without fear or doubt, as they used to do when defending Usora. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Serb Commissions To Attend Talks on 'Croatian Territory'

AU1306132396 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 11 Jun 96

[Unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At today's session, the government of the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem suspended an earlier decision banning Serb commissions active in within UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] committee from attending talks on Croatian territory. The ban was imposed in protest against the selective law on amnesty proposed by the Croatian Government. Prime Minister Vojislav Stanimirovic characterized today's decision to lift the ban as a sign of willingness to cooperate on the Serb side. Consequently, as of today negotiations team will take turns attending talks on the Serb and Croatian sides as was done in the past.

Following a proposal of Cedo Koncalovic, secretary of health, welfare, and the problems of soldiers and disabled veterans, today's session chaired by Executive Council Chairman Vojislav Stanimirovic, decided to form funds in the framework of the secretariat in question. The government formed the fund for health and health insurance, the fund for old-age pension and disability insurance, and the fund for the labor market.

A report on the spring sowing submitted by Agriculture Secretary Simo Sijan is just one of the reports heard and adopted by the district government. [passage omitted]

Regarding the functioning of the economy, the district government demands an urgent investigation to determine whether the hard currency from the sale of last year's wheat harvest really ended up in the budget. [passage omitted]

Slobodan Jovcic, PTT committee chairman and secretary of construction and urban planning, informed the government about tomorrow's opening of telephone lines between Vukovar and Vinkovci. The restoration of telephone lines will be done on the model of Beli Manastir of 21 May, 1996.

The government is continuing the session with a debate on the supply of petroleum products in the district and other issues.

Croatia: Hadzic Says U.S. To Offer Serbs Guarantees

LD1206192296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1706 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Erdut, 12 Jun (TANJUG)—Goran Hadzic, president of the Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem, said after talks with a delegation of the U.S. State Department today that the United States is ready to offer special guarantees to the people who wish to remain in the region.

Hadzic added that he gained the conviction "in talks with representatives of the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and White House that they do not share the view of the Croatian side that the process has to be completed quickly and at any price."

He added that he drew the attention of the U.S. delegation in particular to the fact that the Croatian Amnesty Law and the Law on Territorial Organization are in complete contravention of some parts of the Erdut agreement, primarily of point 12 which envisages the possibility of setting up Serb municipalities in eastern Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem. [passage omitted]

Croatia: 'Victims of Chetnik Terror' Exhumed in Rakovica

LD1306123496 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] An expert team made up of officials from the Defense Ministry, the Justice Ministry, the Health Ministry, and the Internal Affairs Ministry of the Republic of Croatia today continued exhuming the bodies of victims of Chetnik terror in the municipality of Rakovica. Trajko Grkovski reports from Rakovica:

Twelve bodies have been exhumed in the village of Lipovaca; exhumation is continuing this morning in Rakovica, Korita, Irinovac, Rakovicko Seliste, and Brajdic Selo. These are predominantly civilian victims of Chetnik terror; the exhumation of victims in Dreznik Grad and Catrnja near the Plitvice Lakes is to begin tomorrow.

According to Rakovica Mayor Franjo Franjkovic, 38 bodies may be found near Rakovica. They will be buried on Saturday 15 June in local cemeteries in Rakovica, Dreznik Grad, and the surrounding villages.

FYROM: Prospects for New York Negotiations Viewed

AU1406134596 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 14 Jun 96 p 2

[Commentary by Zoran Andonovski: "'New York Genie'—in a Bottle"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Macedonian-Greek negotiations are at a standstill, and there doesn't seem to be any real prospects for their advancement. It seems as if the momentum obtained by the signing of the Interim Accord and other bilateral agreements between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and Greece has vanished. To the clear statements of Macedonian Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski—that we have no intention of changing the state's name and that the end of the negotiations in New York is near—the "first party" (Greece) reacted with announcements of a new investment blockade and with a memorandum from its members of parliament in which "Skopje's persistence" is mentioned. If we add to this situation the fact that Frckovski's visit to Athens has been practically frozen, partly because of his statements and partly because some people in Athens and Skopje have probably assumed that such a meeting would produce nothing spectacular, then the seriousness of the state of relations between the two countries is clear.

Now is not the time to ask who is being more inflexible: whether Greece is responsible for the situation because it has resumed accusing us of persistence, or whether Macedonia is responsible because it has taken the emphatic position, which has been more clearly articulated in the last months, that it will compromise on the name of the state. What is really important is to reactivate the New York spirit and find an outcome for the given situation.

Businessmen and diplomats who are working and communicating with Greek partners say that the threat of an investment blockade is not just talk and that it is starting to be widely felt. It is very simple to explain why Athens has thought of threatening to restrict investments: Economic relations between the two countries have started to follow their own logical development and the policy is losing its influence, which is unacceptable for the Greek side, considering that this is one of the trump cards it uses to force Macedonia into concessions. It is actually a very important trump card, which Greece first uses to try to show the world it is a good neighbor that is concerned with Macedonia's welfare, and second, it gives Greece influence and even control over the situation. Since Athens's first announcement of a Greek blockade of investments in Macedonia due to Skopje's persistent position on the name (as if this were something new that required a reaction), two different opinions have developed. The first—primarily Greek—overestimated Greek investments in Macedonia by some fantastic sum; and the second, which was mainly promoted by skeptical domestic analysts, played down the southern neighbor's investments to the level of "two to three sweets shops," directly suggesting that we should not be worried by announcements that fresh Greek money would be cut off, stating that we can go on living "without Greek sweets."

With the signing of the Accord, Greece took on (actually it was given) the role of Macedonia's promoter to the European Union and its organizations. Even more importantly, Athens received the privilege of being the one through which all European financial injections would run. At that time, it looked ideal: Macedonia will get the money invested in its economy through Greek companies. The benefit (for Greece) will be that part of the profits will go to Greek companies and pockets, and Macedonia will profit from fresh money. The common benefit was to move the two economies closer and, more importantly, minimize the mistrust and misunderstandings.

Unfortunately, that has not been the case, and the situation is much more different and serious. The Greek pressures with the new Simitis-Panghalos team have become more subtle. There is no longer any militant shouting, nationalistic screaming, or mass rallies, but underground efforts are under way to define the seriousness of the inflexible Macedonian position with the aim of forcing it to be changed.

The delicate state of relations, which cannot yet be described as critical, is affirmed by the intensive activities of the head of the Greek Liaison Office in Skopje. His talks with high-ranking officials in the Macedonian Government and diplomacy only indicate that Greece is trying to redefine its position toward Macedonia. Nobody seriously expects anything from the New York discussions, which are increasingly becoming a pretext for regular contact between the two sides. What can their real role be when conditions are such that both states have appointed diplomats who are in contact with the hosts on all levels? Can negotiators Tosevski and Zaharakis do anything more in the presence of mediator Vance than, for instance, Alexandros Malias, head of the Greek Office in Skopje, who is indirectly talking to Frckovski and Crvenkovski? What can be decided in New York that cannot be decided in Skopje? So it seems that the New York dialogue is designed to be a discussion between two experienced diplomats who know each other perfectly well but have different opinions on one question. Unless in New York, far away from the Balkans and in a far more relaxed atmosphere, a productive dialogue is actually taking place that will have a satisfactory outcome for Macedonia.

Poland: Rosati, Iranian Foreign Minister Talk in Vienna

*LD1206174796 Tehran IRNA in English
1418 GMT 12 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, June 12, IRNA—Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmud Va'ezi in Warsaw on Wednesday held talks on bilateral relations.

Rosati said Poland attaches high importance to its relations with Iran and that the Islamic Republic is an important trading partner of Poland meeting 20 percent of Polish fuel requirements. He termed political cooperation between Tehran and Warsaw as excellent and added that the two countries share the same view toward international issues.

Referring to Iran's important situation in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East and Poland's situation in central Europe, Rosati called for expansion of cooperation between the two countries.

Va'ezi on his part pointed to the historical relations between the two nations and voiced Iran's willingness to develop relations in political, economic and cultural areas. Va'ezi described the recent visit to Tehran of the Polish minister of planning and construction and the head of Chamber of Commerce as effective in developing mutual relations, hoping that Tehran-Warsaw joint economic commission would hold a meeting in Tehran soon.

He invited Rosati to visit Tehran which was accepted by him.

Poland: Iran's Va'ezi, Polish Officials Discuss Cooperation

*LD1306221796 Tehran IRNA in English
2009 GMT 13 Jun 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tehran, June 13, IRNA—Iran and Poland explored avenues of industrial, technical and parliamentary cooperation in separate meetings in Warsaw between Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Euro-American Affairs Mahmud Va'ezi and the Polish ranking officials.

In his meeting with Va'ezi on Wednesday, the Polish minister of industry and trade announced his country's readiness to further cooperate with Iran in industrial and technical sectors.

He offered cooperation with Iran in the areas of light industries, ship and aircraft building industries, machine building particularly agricultural machinery and road building machines.

He also called for expansion of cooperation between the two countries' private sectors and chambers of commerce.

Va'ezi in response, welcomed Tehran-Warsaw industrial cooperation and said that the inauguration on May 13 of the Mashhad-Sarakhs-Tedzhen railway will boost the existing traditional cooperation between the two countries.

The 295 km. railway project links landlocked Central Asian states to international markets via Iranian ports on the Persian Gulf.

In his meeting with Va'ezi on Thursday, the vice-speaker of the Polish parliamentary expressed interests in cooperation with the Iranian Majlis.

He said that he was looking forward to a visit to Poland in the near future by Iran's Majlis Speaker Hojjat ol-eslam 'Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri.

Va'ezi referred to the two countries' historic relations and said that exchange of parliamentary delegations would enable Iran and Poland to further expand their ties.

Later in the day, Va'ezi had a meeting with the Polish president's supreme advisor for international affairs, who announced Warsaw's interest in expanding bilateral relations with Tehran.

Va'ezi said that the forthcoming 7th joint economic commission meeting in Tehran of the two countries, scheduled for the first half of October, would be a suitable forum finalizing the agreements reached so far between Iran and Poland.

The two sides also discussed regional issues and other political matters of mutual interest.

Va'ezi is in Warsaw on a 2-day official visit.

Poland: Gdansk Shipyard Strike Over

*LD1306141296 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1320 GMT 13 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] Gdansk, 13 Jun—A two-day sit-in by Gdansk Shipyard employees protesting against the decision to wind up the yard's activities and the announced redundancies ended with a field Mass celebrated at 1400 by Father Henryk Jankowski at Gate No. 2.

According to the Gdansk Shipyard protest committee, 2,500 employees took part in the sit-in at night and about 3,500 during the day. A group of several dozen people employed in maintaining the yard's essential services and employees of the Begesto company, building a bulk carrier for a Norwegian shipowner, continued to work.

Jerzy Borowczak, head of the yard's Solidarity, reported before the Mass that the final decision regarding future forms of protest will be made on Friday by Solidarity's National Shipbuilding Industry Section. Borowczak also announced that a demonstration, with Gdansk shipbuilders taking part, will be organized on 21 June in Warsaw.

Poland: Top Secret Documents Disappear From Gdansk UOP Division

WS1406115496 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by "KNYSZ": "Loss at the Gdansk UOP Division; A Commission Will Investigate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Very important, top secret material disappeared yesterday from the Gdansk division of the Office of State Protection [UOP]," UOP Chief Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski told us yesterday. "We are trying to establish when this happened."

An internal UOP commission was appointed yesterday by Col. Kapkowski at the request of the chief of the Gdansk UOP division, Adam Hodysz. Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski told journalists that Hodysz is the one who found the documents to be missing: "Having assumed his duties, he checked the files and noticed something was missing." The minister did not say whether the secret documents were a dossier on "Bolek" (the code name under which Lech Walesa was registered by the Secret Service during the time of the Polish People's Republic).

We asked Col. Kapkowski how he will prevent further leaks. "We will discipline officers in UOP and elsewhere. The effects will soon be visible," said the UOP chief. He added that an investigation is currently under way to explain all of the leaks to date: "We are asking ourselves the question of who stands behind this."

Poland: L[illegible]h Walesa Denies Possession of UOP Docume[illegible]

LD1406103996 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 0900 GMT 14 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Lech Walesa has said that he does not have in his possession the documents that went missing from the Gdansk State Protection [UOP] division. According to press reports, the missing file contained data on the agent code-named Bolek.

[Begin Walesa recording] I do not have these documents in my possession, but I do know that such documents existed and still exist, and that not everything was destroyed in Swiecie. [end recording]

A commission to investigate the circumstances and to establish who was responsible for the disappearnce of some top secret documents was set up a few days ago, following an instruction from Adam Hodysz, the head of the Gdansk UOP branch.

Poland: Head of UOP's Information, Analysis Bureau Resigns

LD1306193596 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1730 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Relayed by the TV Polonia network]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our news program has learned that Captain Adam Aduszkiewicz, director of the Information and Analysis Bureau of the State Protection Office [UOP], has resigned.

The bureau is involved in white intelligence—that is, the gathering and analysis of publicly available information.

Aduszkiewicz is a graduate of the Catholic Theology Academy. In 1993 he replaced Piotr Niemczyk as director of the bureau. In the 1980's, Aduszkiewicz and Niemczyk were involved with the opposition movement.

Poland: UOP Division Head's Ousting Viewed

WS1406112096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 13 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Agnieszka Kublik: "After Captain Bodaryk's Dismissal; Purge at UOP?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"It could be said I was dismissed for political reasons," Captain Krzysztof Bondaryk, former head of the Bialystok division of the Office of State Protection [UOP], told reporters yesterday [12 Jun].*

Bondaryk, dismissed on Wednesday [12 June] by Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, predicts that all those who had never worked for the Secret Service [SB] will soon be dismissed.

Both Minister Siemiatkowski and UOP Chief Colonel Andrzej Kapkowski explained the reasons for their decision before the Sejm Secret Services Commission: "Capt. Bondaryk was dismissed because he did not rise to the job." Col. Kapkowski: "I no longer trust him. He has not learned anything over the past six years. Others have learned much more." "Was he dismissed because your orders were leaked?" asked GAZETA WYBORCZA. "I did not say that directly."

On Tuesday, however, Minister Siemiatkowski clearly suggested that Capt. Bondaryk lost his post in connection with the disclosure of the UOP chief's secret orders by Deputy Konrad Napierala of the Union of Labor. The former UOP division head firmly denied being the source of the leak. Napierala himself said yesterday that he does not know Bondaryk: "I have never seen him, I have never received anything from him."

Bogdan Borusewicz (Freedom Union), chairman of the Sejm Secret Services Commission, told journalists that the interior minister has already withdrawn his charges.

The commission is to further investigate the issue of the UOP chief's orders. Minister Siemiatkowski said that, despite his earlier statement, the document was not "top secret of special importance." It was classified routinely, like other UOP documents. Napierala retorts: "If the minister claims this was a routine ciphered message, he is lying. UOP wanted it to reach a chosen few, but the operation was to be covert. It was an operational instruction to form an intelligence network."

Napierala says that a purge has been launched within UOP, and anyone standing in the way will be dismissed. Borusewicz claims likewise. Asked whether they will continue to dismiss UOP division heads with Solidarity roots, Siemiatkowski and Kapkowski said they would not. Siemiatkowski gave examples of dismissed officers who had worked for the Interior Ministry before 1990 and newly appointed officers who had never worked for the SB.

—In the first years of the Solidarity movement and during Martial Law, Krzysztof Bondaryk was an activist of the Independent Association of Students. In April 1982 he was arrested. He was released in November. After the Roundtable talks, he became an activist of the Solidarity Civic Committee for the Bialystok Region. Once the SB was liquidated, he was appointed head of the UOP division formed at the time (at the recommendation of the Bialystok Solidarity).

Poland: Cabinet Office Chief: UOP Will Be More Accountable

LD1306124596 Warsaw Radio Zet Network in Polish 0615 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today's Radio Zet guest is Leszek Miller, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM]. Good morning to you. [passage omitted]

What problems will there be with the planned reform of the central administration?

[Miller] I think that, fortunately, there will not be any because the special [Sejm] commission has completed its work. The bill received its second reading yesterday, and maybe the entire package of bills on reform of the center will have its third reading during this session of the Sejm. One can clearly see that the deputies, including those from the opposition but, above all, those from the ruling coalition, want to see this through. This will mean that there will be very important changes in the way ministries and provincial governors function.

[Announcer] Does that mean that there will not be a Ministry of Internal Affairs and that the State Protection Office [UOP] will be subordinated to the prime minister?

[Miller] UOP will be subordinated to the prime minister, so it will not carry out tasks set by just one minister but will perform tasks set by the government. So UOP will not set its own tasks and decide on its own how well it has fulfilled them; the Council of Ministers will do this. We shall be dealing here with something that is completely new. As for the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it will continue to exist, but it will be of a different nature. It will also implement tasks stemming from cooperation with provincial echelons of the general administration—in other words, with provincial governors. It will take part in the territorial local government reform. And this is why the nature of the ministry will change. [passage omitted]

Poland: Further on UOP Order on Trade Unions

WS1306141296 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "A.M., M.M., M.D.Z.," and PAP: "Siemiatkowski Gives Assurances That the Secret Services Are Not Surveiling Trade Unions; Dismissal of the Bialystok Division Chief of UOP"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski has signed the dismissal of Captain Krzysztof Bondaryk, the chief of the Bialystok Division of the Office of State Protection [UOP]. The unofficial reason is the fact that Bondaryk disclosed secret orders issued by UOP Chief Andrzej Kapkowski to surveil companies. Deputy Napierala, who revealed the text of the orders, denies he received it from Bondaryk. Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz does not see anything wrong with the fact that orders were issued to track the attitudes among employees of companies of key importance to the national economy. Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski has notified the Ministry of Justice that a crime has been committed and that companies are surveiled by UOP.*

"This is yet another example of, to say the least, ignoring the law in Poland, particularly the law on the protection of state secrets," said Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who was commenting for Polish Radio on the fact that Deputy Konrad Napierala disclosed secret orders issued by UOP Chief Andrzej Kapkowski. Government Spokeswoman Aleksandra Jakubowska stated that Interior Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski filed a complaint against Konrad Napierala with the Sejm speaker. The presidential spokesman also spoke on the disclosure of the UOP instructions by Konrad Napierala. "UOP has the duty of collecting information on state security. The president is informed about state security every day and also about the situation in major companies," said Antoni Styrczula. The spokesman added that Aleksander Kwasniewski "disapproves of the fact that secret documents have been revealed to the public once again."

Yesterday [11 June] Marian Krzaklewski notified the General Prosecutor's Office that UOP is surveilling companies. Stanislaw Alot, secretary of the Solidarity National Commission, said yesterday that the trade union members do not doubt that the orders issued by Kwiatkowski violated the laws on UOP, trade unions, and group conflicts. The trade union representatives also complained to the National Labor Organization, claiming that the convention on freedom of association has been violated.

Civil rights spokesman Adam Zielinski asked Minister Siemiatkowski for the orders issued by the UOP chief. Zielinski said he wanted the document because he "received signals indicating that the freedom rights of trade unions have been violated." The [Sejm] Secret Services Commission is to look into the issue of the orders issued by Colonel Kapkowski. Chairman Bogdan Borusewicz said that the commission also intends to examine instructions issued by the UOP chief forbidding his officers to contact politicians and the press.

Deputies from the Union of Labor [UP], who met with Minister Siemiatkowski yesterday, were not unanimous in their opinion on the disclosure of the text of the orders by their party colleague. Artur Smolko recalled that, in 1990, Deputy Cimoszewicz disclosed a secret report developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Belarusian minority in the Bialystok region. [UP Chairman] Ryszard Bugaj said he protested similar UOP activity in the past—for example, when Milczanowski was interior minister—and criticized instruction 0015 [on the surveillance of political parties].

The interior minister denied that the orders provide a basis for establishing intelligence networks in companies: "Since 1990, UOP has been collecting intelligence on social morale, conflicts, and coming strikes. You do not have to establish intelligence networks to get information in advance. 'White intelligence,' ordinary reconnaissance, and talks suffice. The orders do not provide for applying operational techniques. No operations are carried out against trade unions or national minorities." The minister also gave assurances that instructions exist forbidding seeking information sources in certain communities, among them priests, reporters, and trade union activists. UOP, however, has to supply information and will not cease to collect it at rallies and during strikes: "How can I react to the information that, for example, a rally in Gdansk might lead to a blockade of the city?"

Siemiatkowski also said that he learned about the orders from the media, but it is one of hundreds of instructions sent out to the UOP divisions in order to check on companies that are to be privatized, companies with foreign capital, and strategic investors. This was most recently done in the fuel and tobacco industries. UOP particularly closely watches all those institutions that have the possibility of using violence included in their statutes. Col. Kapkowski's orders will not be withdrawn.

Deputy Napierala continues to claim that the orders pertain to operational procedures. He says that the method by which they were circulated proves this. The minister says an encoder was used. Napierala says it was disseminated in the form of a letter, which he claims is the standard UOP procedure for sending operational instructions to the divisions.

Minister Siemiatkowski gave assurances that trade unions are not surveilled and wrote a letter inviting Ewa Spychalska, chairwoman of the All-Poland Trade Union Agreement, and Solidarity Chairman Marian Krzaklewski to meet and discuss any doubts. He also announced that the text of the disclosed orders will be published.

Poland: Interior Minister Opposes Establishment of Civil Guard

LD1306205696 Warsaw PAP in Polish
1610 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 13 Jun—According to Internal Affairs Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski, the establishment of a civil guard will be neither possible nor useful. "Let us not multiply entities beyond what is necessary," said the minister at the Sejm on Thursday, responding to a question from Ryszard Nowak.

According to Siemiatkowski, there are no financial resources in the budget for setting up and maintaining the guard, and they cannot be taken away from other institutions, especially the police. "The MSW [Internal Affairs Ministry] is against setting up the Civil Guard and only then looking for sources to maintain it," the minister said.

According to the internal affairs minister, no one will do the job of the police for them, whereas the establishment of a volunteer mass organization could be associated in some people's minds with ORMO [Civic Militia Volunteer Reserve]. The best way to ensure safety in Poland will be to increase expenditure and provide more police service jobs.

Siemiatkowski described himself as a "passionate supporter" of municipal and parish guards, which perfectly supplement the work of the police. He reported that the MSW was preparing a bill that will regulate their status and provide them with greater powers and more extensive possibilities of action. The bill, which should reach the Sejm before the end of the year, will enable the guards to maintain public order and safety. "The activities of the municipal guards should not be restricted to the issuing of fines," said the minister.

The head of the MSW reported that, during the first four months of this year, crime in Poland declined by 11 percent, from 369,000 cases to 327,000. Ninety-two percent of all crimes are perpetrated in cities, 50 percent in the eight major conurbations, and 12 percent in Warsaw itself. At present, the largest police force—Warsaw—has 11,000 officers and this year should receive an additional 1,000 personnel. Siemiatkowski said he hoped that the present strength of the police (102,000) will increase by the year 2000 to 120,000.

According to several deputies, an attempt to revive a "paramilitary organization" appears dangerous. Juliusz Brown, criticizing Nowak's proposal to finance the Civil Guard from private funds, said that this could create a "private army acting in the interests of the people prepared to finance it." To improve the citizens' safety, the deputies recommended that the training of municipal guards be improved.

Poland: Sejm Approves Law on State Civil Service

LD1406102296 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 0900 GMT 14 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sejm has passed the Law on State Civil Service. The law envisages the establishment of a stable, expert, and nonpartisan corps of civil servants. According to the law, the civil service will be composed of employees who are appointed and difficult to dismiss, who will work in the state government administration, ministries, and central, provincial, and regional offices.

The process of setting up the state civil service will take from two to three years. The law must still be approved by the Senate and the president.

Poland: Center-Right Parties Discuss Issues

WS1306124596 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski: "'Poland and Poles 1996'—Conference of the Lech Walesa Institute Foundation; The Center-Right Seeks Joint Platform"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Is it not time to join forces once again?" asked Andrzej Zakrzewski, former minister of state at the Presidential Chancellery, opening yesterday's conference at the Royal Palace [in Warsaw]. Freedom Union [UW] Chairman Leszek Balcerowicz spoke for strengthening political parties and against creating joint election tickets in haste.

The leaders of a dozen-odd center-right parties (with the exception of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, which declined the invitation) met yesterday. Present were Lech Walesa, former ministers from his Chancellery, previous heads of the so-called presidential ministries, and experts.

Zakrzewski stressed that no new "Lech team" will be formed. He said that the conference was the first attempt at "developing a possible joint election platform."

"In order to be strong, the Polish state must be unitary. Poland has no tradition of lands," said Wieslaw Chrzanowski, a leader of the Christian-National Union [ZChN], in a speech on the state, the Constitution, and the law. The Constitution requires a preamble, which, according to him, should include an invocation to God so as to show that "the state is not the supreme authority." "The state has to follow certain values," the former ZChN chairman argued.

"A national state is and will remain prevalent in Europe at the turn of the 20th century in Europe," said Krzysztof Skubiszewski in a speech delivered in his name. The former foreign minister criticizes the idea of "a separate security zone in the East, a belt of states between Germany and Russia."

Leszek Balcerowicz claims that the post-Solidarity groups should reach agreement. It must, however, be based on a specific platform. He thinks it is necessary to "complete the process of creating a cohesive system of political parties," which cannot be "substituted for by platforms developed on the spur of the moment." Such alliances would fall apart soon after the elections. The UW leader also said that, unless privatization is completed, it will be impossible to lower taxes in Poland considerably. If the social security system is not reformed, the "system will go bankrupt" in about 2010. Carrying out this reform and finalizing the privatization process requires, in his opinion, cooperation between the state authorities and the opposition.

"How many of us have contributed to hampering privatization, as a result of which Poland is no longer leading the privatization process?" asked Andrzej Olechowski, a leader of the 100 Movement.

"I could not leave my office with the unanswered question of whether the head of state was connected with the Russian intelligence services," said former Interior Minister Andrzej Milczanowski. He claims that the most recent developments have paralyzed the operations of Polish intelligence and counterintelligence and cooperation of the Polish secret services with foreign intelligence for many years to come. Asked about orders issued by [chief of the Office of State Protection—UOP] Colonel Kapkowski on "monitoring" companies, something revealed by Union of Labor Deputy Konrad Napierala, he said that, when he was interior minister, the state authorities were informed about the internal situation in the country by reports developed by the UOP Analysis and Information Bureau on the basis of so-called white or open-source intelligence.

Former President Lech Walesa said that, unless the orders are canceled today, "it will be too late."

Artur Balazs of the Peasant-Christian Party appealed to political parties to take up the problems of the rural areas. "We cannot leave people in the rural areas to fend for themselves and force them to choose between Oleksy and Pawlak," he said. Maciej Jankowski, head of the Mazowsze Chapter of Solidarity, appealed to the party leaders to accelerate talks on the joint election ticket.

Poland: Critical Commentary on Constitutional Draft

96EP0052A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 29 Mar 96 p 5

[Article by Wojciech Sadurski, under the rubric "Analyses, Opinions, Comments": "A Baroque Constitution: On the Constitutional Draft"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The framers of the Constitution should adopt Tadeusz Rozewicz's poetic rule, "A minimum of words." Unlike newspapers, which sometimes involve doing crossword puzzles, the fewer words in a constitution the better. All the unnecessary locutions, superfluous formulas, and verbal adornment are not only superfluous but even harmful.

That is because a constitution is a legal act and not a collection of political declarations. The principal purpose of a constitution is to establish rules delimiting power, so that democratically elected representatives of the society will not cross certain boundaries. These boundaries may be in the nature of powers (with the powers of discrete bodies defined), and they also may be procedural (definition of decisionmaking procedures) and substantive (the wording of civil rights and liberties, which no government may violate). A constitution is not, on the other hand, a declaration of intentions, a collection of socioeconomic precepts, or a charter of public morality.

Every word of the constitution should be suitable for enforcing. On the basis of articles of the constitution, citizens who believe that their rights were violated may appeal to the Constitutional Tribunal or to the citizens' rights spokesman. The Constitutional Tribunal may rule on inconsonance of laws with the constitution. So that such rulings may be issued precisely pursuant to the constitution, every word in the constitution must serve a purpose. Words that entail no legal consequences are mere noise.

The noise may even be harmful. Words used as ornaments inscribed in the constitution for beauty's sake may be years later utilized for purposes not foreseen by the framers of the constitution or against their intentions. A needlessly added word, some adjective that is unnecessary at present, or some empty rhetorical device may in a couple of years become the subject of legal analysis before the Constitutional Tribunal. On such basis, lawyers will attribute to the framers intentions that they had not had at all.

Unneeded Ideology

"Ideological" declarations in the constitution that have no legal basis and are intended to express some general ideals entail moreover the threat that the constitution will not be widely accepted. The ideal of the constitution is to outline a consensus acceptable to all. A constitution must extend its hand to all, even if for political reasons it is not at first supported by all social forces. All may reach agreement on procedures, on institutional shape, and on the civil rights that the authorities may not violate, whereas not everyone will be in agreement on a declaration of ideological principles. Ideological declarations create, even if they do not cause tangible harm, a symbolic barrier to consensus on the constitution.

Such are the reasons why the constitution should be maximally spare verbally, precise, legal, and nonideological. Seen from this standpoint, the parts of the constitutional draft that have already been accepted by the Constitutional Committee do not look that good; they deserve a grade of D or perhaps a low C. This can be clearly seen from the first two chapters of the constitutional draft, "Principles of the Political System" (Chapter 1) and "Rights, Liberties, and Obligations of Man and Citizen" (Chapter 2). They are wordy, strewed with banalities, and abound in superfluous slogans that have no legal basis and create the risk of improper interpretations.

Such loquacity is especially evident in Chapter 1 of the constitutional draft, "Principles of the Political System." Who needs, for example, Article 2, which states, "The Republic of Poland is the common good of all citizens"? The legal significance of this provision is nil; it is hardly conceivable that the Constitutional Tribunal would invalidate any democratically adopted law on the grounds of inconsonance with this provision. As for those who feel alienated from the Polish state because they are very poor or deprived of chances for career advancement or disgusted with politics, Article 2 will not convince them anyway that the Republic is their "common good."

The Nation and Dignity

"Supreme power in the Republic of Poland belongs to the commonalty of citizens, who form the Nation, which exercises that power through its democratically elected representatives." I have nothing against the concept of the nation, but it has a specific common connotation linked to a commonalty of historical experiences, culture, language, ethnic unity, and so forth. The definition of the "nation" in Article 4 serves no purpose because that concept is not again mentioned in the constitution anyway (aside from the wording of the oath taken by Sejm deputies or the president). On the other hand, Article 26 of the draft refers to the rights of Polish citizens "belonging to national minorities." Can one be a member of the nation and at the same time of a national minority? That is a bit illogical considering that a "national minority" seems to refer to some nation other than that to which the majority belong.

"The innate and inalienable dignity of man is inviolable" (first sentence in Article 21). Why are as many as three adjectives needed to define dignity, considering that the next sentence in the same article states anyway, "...its respect and protection is an obligation of the public authorities," which means the same thing as inviolable. But as for defining human dignity as "innate," there is no need to suggest an association with just one of many philosophical traditions on which respect for human dignity can be based, namely, on the tradition of so-called natural law.

That is because the claim that human dignity is "innate" is tantamount to stating that man is born with it, that it is, as it were, an attribute of the human species and anyone who lacks it—or is deprived of it—is not fully a human being. Yet most societies have treated their members in a manner clashing with our present-day interpretation of dignity, and hence it is not innate in the sense of a requirement of nature. One thus can be a defender of human dignity without accepting the view that, in the philosophical sense, it is "innate." Article 21 confers an unnecessary ideological slant on the constitution.

Justice

This also applies, although from a different ideological perspective, to "social justice," which is mentioned already in Article 1: "The Republic of Poland is a democratic, law-ruled state translating into reality the principles of social justice." No, I am not one of those who get a heart attack when hearing the words, "social justice," but I believe, following Hayek, that this is either tautology or a base socialist notion intended to equate the wise with the stupid and clean people with the unwashed. At one time I stated in an article in RZECZPOSPOLITA that social, i.e., "distributive" justice is totally consonant with a liberal system of values, as demonstrated, for example, by the famed theory of John Rawls, the author of "Theory of Justice," published in this country two years ago.

On the other hand, it is a fact that some people in present-day Poland are ready to view this constitution as a work ideologically alien to them, because they believe that "social justice" is a slogan linked to one ideological orientation alone. Since the formula of social justice is too general to serve as a basis for rescinding laws on grounds of inconsonance with the constitution, including it in the constitution serves no purpose and merely causes harm by alienating those who refuse to accept this concept.

Some might object that "a democratic, law-ruled state" is as nebulous a concept as "social justice," but I do not consider it a mere verbal embellishment and am not suggesting that it be eliminated from Article 1. For the difference is that a "law-ruled state" is par excellence a legal concept, whereas "social justice" is not. The requirements for a "law-ruled state" are primarily of procedural importance: they concern the form of law and the rules for making laws and publicizing them, enforcing them, and so forth. In principle they are not part of the substance of laws themselves. In this context, the principles of "a democratic, law-ruled state" are accommodated within that minimum scope of consensus about the constitution by all citizens and all actors on the political scene.

On the other hand, "social justice" is not accommodated within that minimal consensus. Therefore, the constitution should not proclaim it as a legal principle, although, of course, the government and the parliamentary majority have the right and even the obligation to act in accordance with their interpretation of social justice, should that be the mandate of the voters.

Sophistry

"He who benefits from rights and liberties is obligated to respect the liberties and rights of others," states Article 22, Paragraph 2 of the draft. Why has this otherwise just tenet been included? For what purpose? If this is mere moralizing, then the constitution is not the proper vehicle for transmitting moral precepts to the society. The worthy uncle who says, "Don't do unto others what you would not do unto yourself" (because that is what the above-cited provision reduces to) should not treat the constitution as a tribune for philosophizing.

If, on the other hand, that article is taken seriously, as a legal formula having a precise and enforceable meaning, then it undoubtedly makes no sense. It might suggest that a person who violates the rights and liberties of other persons thereby forfeits the right to the constitutional protection of his own rights and liberties. But of course that is not so: A person accused of a crime (that is, of violating the rights of others) does not forfeit the right to the protection of due process; a criminal guilty of torturing other persons cannot be tortured himself through the majesty of law; an employer guilty of discriminatory practices does not thereby forfeit his right to equal treatment under law. Thus the reference to the obligation of respecting the rights and liberties of others is a mere rhetorical device.

There is more such verbal ornamentation in the chapter on civil rights. Article 23: "No one may be discriminated against in political, social, or economic life by sex, race, national or ethnic origin, state of health, physical or mental handicap, social origin, birth, sexual orientation, language, creed or its lack, views, property, or any other reason." The last four words cause this list of forbidden discriminations to become absurd; since discrimination due to "any" reason is forbidden, why enumerate 15 other reasons for banning discrimination against citizens?

The State as Guardian and Protector

In the chapter on the system of society Article 7 proclaims, "The Republic of Poland guards the independence and inviolability of its territory, safeguards the liberties and rights of man, protects public security, guards national heritage, and secures environmental protection, guiding itself by the principle of balanced development." This provision is a list of functions of the state. As known, every state guards (more or less effectively) its independence: there is no need for proclaiming just this in the constitution. And we do know that the Republic of Poland safeguards civil rights and liberties because that is already stated in a separate chapter enumerating precisely these rights and liberties. As for the other functions listed in Article 7, they surely also are hardly controversial, and the question arises: Why this enumeration?

Its sole legal rationale could be the desire to restrict the functions of the state solely to those mentioned in Article 7. That would be consonant with the role of a constitution as a means of limiting state power. And if that is so then Article 7 is undoubtedly faulty, because the state may also have other functions that are not listed in that article; for example, safeguarding freedom of private enterprise (Article 15), safeguards for the development of the culture and customs of national minorities (Article 26), or social protection for persons incapable of work (Article 53).

Thus the functions listed in Article 7 are not the sole legally permitted functions of the state; then why, in this case, this provision? There exists a risk that in the future someone might argue before the Constitutional Tribunal that the intention of the constituent assembly was to limit the permitted functions of the state solely to those that are explicitly enumerated in Article 7 and that any actions not specified in Article 7 are inconsonant with the constitution. I do not believe that the members of the Constitutional Committee, who in their majority derive from the leftist-peasant governing coalition, have seriously voiced such a view.

Chatter, Chatter

Article 34: "Everyone has the right to a fair and public trial without any unjustified delay by the proper, independent, impartial, and autonomous court of law." But why so many adjectives to define a court? Surely learned lawyers, expert at linguistic nuances, could readily prove that "independence" is not the same as "autonomy." After all, lawyers get paid for such expertise. But I will bet that to John Q. Public this distinction is meaningless.

This is so especially considering that the constitutional draft itself is not coherent in this respect. In the articles of Chapter 7 ("Courts and Tribunals") the word "independence" is always linked to "courts" and "autonomy" to judges. It looks like some wise guy has decided that courts may be independent but judges may be only autonomous. Well and good, but why then does Article 34 of the draft refers on one breath to an "independent, impartial, and autonomous court of law"?

And so forth, and so forth, the constitutional gabfest continues. Some may think that I am harping on words, but what is a constitution after all? If it is to be a constitution for many a year, then happy blather must be eliminated from it.

A consoling thought: It could have been much worse. For example, the committee might have instead accepted the draft of the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland], which abounds in such gems as, "Under the Republic and its civil rights, liberties, and obligations the life of the society is developing" (if you turn this sentence around, it will have just as little sense), or: "The worthy outcome of the efforts and merits of citizens for the common good will serve as the criterion of their moral right to influence political issues" (how is this provision to be concretely translated into reality?). But to the modern constitutionalist the fact that the current official draft is better than the draft of the constitution of King Macius I [an allusion to a children's book by Janusz Korczak] is little consolation.

(This article is a revised version of an excerpt from a paper prepared for the Center on Constitutionalism and Legal Culture, Institute of Public Affairs in Warsaw.)

Poland: ITME Director on Research, Funding

96EP0052B Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 29 Mar 96 p 13

[Interview with Dr. Zygmunt Luczynski, director of the Institute of Electronic Materials Technology, by Marcin Jankowski; place and date not given: "Predatory Early Capitalism and Research: The Custom of Sponsoring Scientific Research for Prestige Has Not Yet Arrived in Poland"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Jankowski] How does it happen that despite the general destitution of Polish science the Institute of Electronic Materials Technology [ITME] is not complaining?

[Luczynski] We are benefiting from the boom in the electronics industry. We conceived of a good way of supporting ourselves by selling our products. Our profits are not, of course, as huge as those of, say, amphetamine producers. Every penny earned has to be immediately invested in research. Otherwise the opportunities for sticking it out on the silicon market would be nil.

Year after year our volume doubles. This is due not so much to the broadening of the market as to what we offer. Our customers include, among others, Yale University, Alcatel, and Hewlett-Packard. Our subassemblies fly in Boeing aircraft and activate air cushions in motor vehicles. We have succeeded in winning 0.3 percent of the total world market for silicon.

It has only been recently that electronics have become widely used merchandise. The U.S. housewife nowadays prepares breakfast by using appliances equipped with microprocessors, whereupon she drives her child to preschool in a car stuffed with electronics, and all the dolls with which her child plays have a tiny computer in their bellies.

[Jankowski] How did the ITME begin to become self-supporting?

[Luczynski] Three years ago Cemat '70, S.A., a conglomerate with which the ITME had a working relationship, became bankrupt. Its employees were discharged and production was discontinued. At the time the ITME helped to set up an employee stock ownership system. Forty persons bought jobs for themselves—the new shares in Cemat Silicon, S.A.

With the aid of targeted projects the Institute watches over the output level of Cemat Silicon, that is, it supervises its quality and modernity, and the company pays us in return.

Also owing to that cooperation we created special zones with exceptionally pure filtered air. In one of these zones we succeeded in reducing the impurity concentration to one particle per cubic foot.

[Jankowski] But the Institute supports itself not only from sales of silicon. What part of its income derives from a subsidy from the KBN (Committee for Scientific Research)?

[Luczynski] The statutory KBN subsidy accounts for one-third of our funds. About as much is being won by our scientists in various (KBN and European) competitions for grant money and targeted projects. Another third derives from the money earned independently by the Institute from production and sales.

Sometimes we also practice the art of "overnight" [preceding word in English]: If we do not have to make a payment on a Friday but can do it on the Monday following, then we make a special weekend bank deposit. If we multiply this by 52 weekends in a year, then our savings reach hundreds of millions of zlotys. Once an accountant from an institute that was to transmit money to us on Friday evening asked, "What is that?" when we suggested the "overnight" for her company.

[Jankowski] How does the ITME view the dispute, conducted on the pages of GAZETA, between scientists "studying rare ants" and "the tank called the KBN"?

[Luczynski] The ant is wrong. The KBN, fortunately, does not decide on the level of salaries paid at research institutes. That level is determined by the general situation of an institute and not by some decision or special subsidy of the KBN. We receive funds for our statutory activity—scientific research. The subsidy provides for materials acquisition, electricity fees, and staff salaries. In the research projects of the grant type salaries, too, account for a fraction (in addition to acquisition of equipment, travel, and so forth) of the funding. Likewise, in the income from production and sales we make provision for all these items.

[Jankowski] In contrast, a scientist who studies a variety of a rare ant or ancient writings has no opportunity to benefit financially from his research.

[Luczynski] The KBN has only limited influence on deciding what funds will be allocated for research. All members of the government and a majority of the deputies have, insofar as I know, a higher educational background, but nevertheless, or perhaps just because of it, they agree with the state's allocating for research a very tiny proportion of what is termed the GDP, the gross domestic proportion. For this year 0.54 percent was allocated. But while the state allocates for research definitely too little money, its further distribution among individual branches of science and various institutes, against the background of their general destitution, is generally fair. Before 1990 the state used to allocate much more for research but the money was much more often wasted.

[Jankowski] How do you define a fair distribution of funds? Giving a little to everyone or funding only the most promising prospects and condemning the remainder to a minimum level of subsistence?

[Luczynski] The KBN had the good idea of distributing funds according to the quality of research institutions. Unfortunately, with time the criteria became blurred and more and more institutes become, for no reason, ranked higher. Now the guidelines for assigning grants have been changed somewhat. Formerly the nature and purpose of a project had to be stated on the first page of a grant proposal. So now information about the presenter has to be given. Formerly a cook could submit a grant proposal to the KBN and be awarded a grant if it was graded well. Now the emphasis has shifted to the identity of the presenter. There is a rationale for it. If a presenter is an authority in some field and is awarded a grant, then he is not likely to waste the funds.

But I am most disturbed by proposals for altering the guidelines for funding research by abolishing the so-called vacatio legis, i.e., by making a decision overnight, so to speak. If someone decides that an institute like mine will receive a huge subsidy only if it employs 50 professors, then I will need time to consider whether I will be able to provide jobs for these professors, or, vice versa, whether I should instead switch to doing something else and transform the institute into a factory. Rapid changes in funding guidelines bode ill.

[Jankowski] In the United States nearly 12 percent of research funding in the biomedical branch is provided by industry. Can a similar thing happen in Poland? Will we ever have our own counterparts of such renowned laboratories as Bell and Sony, which despite their purely commercial orientation have repeatedly been the sites of epoch-making discoveries in fundamental research?

[Luczynski] For the time being our industry is not prepared for this.

Cemat Silicon, the company manufacturing silicon on the territory of our institute, sells everything for export. Last year its sales volume exceeded $5 million. It has so many orders that it is booked up for the next two years.

The profits on these sales are on the order of 12 percent. But after the taxes are paid, so little money is left that the company is looking for a funding source for research.

[Jankowski] Why are such rich giants as, for example, the companies quoted on the stock exchange not interested in investing in scientific research?

[Luczynski] I don't believe that in the next few years Polish companies will be inclined to spend money on R&D work. The profits from such research are too distant in time, and it also happens that the findings are utilized by others than those who invested in it. Besides, our early capitalism is rather too bottom-line oriented. In this country we still do not have the custom of sponsoring research for reasons of prestige. I cannot conceive of any Polish company funding, e.g., archeological studies of papyrus specimens. This may happen elsewhere, but in this country it is still in the future.

[Jankowski] Has not industry been afforded some instruments facilitating the sponsorship of scientific research, such as tax relief or allowable deductions?

[Luczynski] To a limited extent, by now, yes. The first swallows have appeared. Consider, for example, the KBN's booklet, "The State's Proinnovation Policy." It contains provisions encouraging enterprises in the direction of scientific research. And indeed, enterprises are eligible for some relief for the funds invested in research and application work. And this is already happening, though to a small extent. The relief thus provided to a company is not, of course, in tangible financial form. This is not enough if we want to perform research on a big scale.

Unfortunately, for a long time yet it is mainly the state that has to support scientific research.

At present, for a targeted project to be launched, for example, some of the money is invested by the concerned party itself, e.g., a factory, and the remainder is contributed by the KBN. Later the factory either avails itself of the findings of researchers and applies them in its production or discards them.

I believe that it would be much more sensible for the state to fund perhaps even all of R&D work and strictly supervise the application of its results in industry. Institutes that received funding for projects that were not applied should return such funds. That would be a strong control mechanism, and ultimately companies should benefit from it.

[Box, p 13]

The Warsaw ITME—Institute of Electronic Materials Technology—was established in 1979. It employs 295 persons. It researches into and manufactures primarily semiconductor materials serving as a raw material for the needs of the electronics industry.

Zygmunt Luczynski, director of ITME, is 47 years old. Before assuming directorship of the institute in 1994, he worked for 13 years at the Institute of Nuclear Research (IBJ). When the IBJ was disbanded in 1983 on the recommendation of Wojciech Jaruzelski, he began to do research at the ITME.

Poland: Growth in Regional Economies Compared

96EP0056A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6-8 Apr 96 pp 12-13

[Article by Jedrzej Bielecki, including regional reports from Barbara Sierszula (Prague), Andrzej Niewiadomski (Bratislava), Grzegorz Lubczyk (Budapest), and Marek Suchowiejko (Sofia): "Time for Growth: The Pace of Change Varies"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The countries of the former CEMA as a whole already have passed through the stage of economic collapse and laying the foundations of macroeconomic stability. Following a steep decline of national income by 15 to as much as 50 percent depending on the country, the growth rate of GDP in these countries likewise varies greatly. As a rule the smaller countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Albania, Moldavia, Estonia) are coping best; they have succeeded in reducing the inflation rate below 10 percent annually, limiting the budget deficit to as little as less than 3 percent in some cases, and completing the process of privatization. The reason for their successes has been, in addition to their size itself (Estonia, for example, has a population of only 1.5 million), the determination of their governments to strengthen newly gained independence, as well as the need to adapt to intense competition on international markets, given that their domestic markets are small.

On the other hand, the larger countries found it much more difficult to cope with reforms. Aside from the as yet nascent Bosnia, this year only three countries in Europe are certain not to experience economic growth—Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The economic collapse in these three countries is now in its sixth year, and while in Russia and Ukraine growth is to commence a year hence, for Belarus, the sole European country to consistently shy away from structural reforms, not even that is certain. One exception among the countries of the region is Poland, where the economic collapse lasted only three years, and since 1992 the growth rate of its GDP has been breaking records on the scale of all of Europe. Relatively good results, following a prolonged stagnation in carrying out reforms, are also being recorded in Romania, where this year the growth rate of the economy may reach 4.5-5 percent.

In a class apart are the unfortunately increasingly numerous countries that failed to avoid a deep crisis of public finance or a collapse of their banking system. Last year, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Latvia joined Hungary in that group. In these countries the economy grows at a slower rate (2.5-3.5 percent) and is certain not to suffice for reducing the civilizational gap between them and Western countries.

New Owners

Many Central-East European countries have by now succeeded in permanently changing the ownership structure of the economy. In most of them about two-thirds of the GDP is generated by the private sector, and some (Czech Republic, Hungary) have even decided to privatize such sensitive sectors as petrochemistry, telecommunications, or utilities. Many countries (especially those belonging to CEFTA) have decided to surrender to foreign companies practically all of control over key industries such as consumer goods, chemistry, automotive industry, or food processing.

Also often impressive are the achievements in controlling inflation. Price rises in several countries (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Albania, Croatia) by now do not exceed 10 percent annually, and this year Estonia is certain to approach that level. A common occurrence in the region is the appreciation of domestic currencies relative to the dollar and the mark, owing to the rapid rise in foreign exchange reserves (Belarus, among others, is an exception). Aside from the Czech Republic and, to some extent Hungary, no other country in the region has, however, decided to reform its social insurance system, which is causing growing problems in maintaining a balanced budget.

The best yardstick of the differences in development among the countries of Central-East Europe is the extent of foreign capital invested in them. Only in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland is that extent of a palpable magnitude, because in these countries economic growth is rapid or reforms are considerably advanced, and their governments have decided to conduct extensive capital-based privatization. Russia, on the other hand, is repelling investors owing not only to its instability but also to barring to them access to the most attractive branches of the economy, namely, the extractive industry and the development of mineral resources. In nearly every country of the region there exist the following additional barriers to attracting sizable foreign capital, among other things: high taxation, political instability, low personal savings, and poor work habits, that is, precisely, the absence of the factors that have contributed to the rapid growth of southeast Asia. As a consequence, foreign investments most often merely promote growth without being a major factor therein.

Rapid Integration With the World

Another achievement of the region's countries in the last few years is the substantial advances in integration with international economic institutions. The first step here is joining the World Trade Organization, to which by now all the countries of Central Europe belong but no East European country does. Negotiations on this issue are in their last stage for, among other countries, Ukraine and Bulgaria. Many countries have already concluded trade or association agreements with the European Union. Also increasingly attractive, in measure with the growth of that organization, is membership in CEFTA, for which—following Slovenia—Romania, Bulgaria, and Lithuania are currently applying. But the greatest accomplishment of the region's countries would be membership in the OECD, something of which only the Czech Republic and, since recently, Hungary can boast.

Along with their membership in economic organizations and the attendant reduction in customs barriers—this does not apply to Russia—the countries of the region are rapidly making up for their backwardness in trade. Most of them have by now succeeded in shifting most of their trade links to Western countries (in the case of the Baltic countries and Ukraine contacts with that region account for one-half of their volume of trade), but now the time has come to partially rebuild former trade relations within Central Europe itself, and sometimes also within East Europe.

Poor Countries

Before the collapse of communism few had doubted that the Central-East European countries would not pull abreast of Western countries in prosperity. Nowadays, however, this truth is easily demonstrable and sometimes shocking: Albania, Moldavia, or Belarus are not only the poorest countries of Europe but also poorer than many Asian, Latin American, and even African countries. From the standpoint of the consumer, the level of development of a given country is best reflected by the average wage, especially when the price level is comparable with (or lower than) that of the Western countries. The unemployment level (12-18 percent of the able-bodied population) also is comparable with what has been recorded in the West for years. The sole exception in this respect is the Czech Republic. In Belarus, Ukraine, and certain other countries of the former USSR, on the other hand, the unemployment level is artificially reduced, because, owing to the failure to restructure them, many enterprises have a bloated workforce that they either pay extremely low wages or delay paying them for months. [passage omitted]

—Jedrzej Bielecki

Czech Republic

The Czech economy is growing ever faster. Last year its GDP increased by 5.2 percent (after the third quarter it reached about $34.6 billion) and this year it will grow by 5.3-6 percent. Industrial output alone increased by 9.4 percent last year. Per capita national income (in terms of parity of purchasing power) amounted to $8,422.

The share of the private sector in generating the GDP reached 67.2 percent last year. Labor productivity in industry in 1995 increased by 10.5 percent, and in construction by 8.9 percent. Real wages last year were 7.2 percent higher in industry and 5.2 percent in construction. On the other hand, farm output increased at a slower rate, about 4.2 percent last year. At year end unemployment in the Czech Republic was still exceptionally low (153,041 persons), accounting for 2.93 percent of able-bodied persons. The Czechs also are faithful to the principle of the balanced budget, which was adopted in 1991. Last year the budget amounted to 411.7 billion Czech crowns. Another asset of that country is its low foreign debt, which in September 1995 reached $14 billion (about 40 percent of GDP).

The Czechs have one of the lowest inflation rates in East Europe. Last year it was 9.1 percent. During the same period the crown appreciated by 5.5 percent in relation to the dollar, but its rate of exchange for the mark decreased by 1.8 percent. The average loan interest rate at present is 13-14 percent. [passage omitted]

The Czechs have already completed most of their privatization. At the end of 1994 nationwide privatization-by-voucher was declared ended. It resulted in privatizing more than 2,400 enterprises and transferring 80 percent of government property to private hands. The total value of the assets privatized by now is appraised at 864 billion Czech crowns. In 1995 the petrochemical industry and telecommunications were privatized. IOC, an international consortium (Agip, Conoco, and Shell) invested in Czech petrochemical industry by purchasing a 49-percent stake in the Czech refineries Litvinov and Kralupy. The Czech Telecom was privatized with the aid of a Dutch consortium, Tel Source, which paid $1.32 billion for a 27-percent stake in the company. The metal industry and coal mining are being privatized. The Northern Czech, Ostravsko-Karvinska, Mostecka, and Sokolovska mines will be privatized within two to five years. The same goes for the Vitkovice and Nova Huta steel plants.

Under the aegis of the Ministry of Industry and Trade a total of 1,715 companies with combined assets amounting to 704.6 billion crowns has been privatized. [passage omitted]

The reform of the social insurance and welfare system was started in 1990 and currently it is in its final stage. In 1993 the health insurance system was isolated from the social insurance system (retirement pensions, various so-called sickness benefits). Health insurance is mandatory. [passage omitted] In January 1996 a retirement pension law extending retirement age for men to 62 years and for women to 57-61 years took effect. This is one of the last elements in the reform being implemented.

The Czech state is the 100-percent owner of only two of the 60 banks existing in the Czech Republic. They are the Cech Bank Narodni (CNB) and Consolidation Bank Praha. In the other banks, which are Czech-owned or joint ventures, the government holds specified shares that vary in amount. The number of banks with Czech capital is 17, that of joint-venture banks with the participation of foreign capital, 20, and that of foreign banks, 21. Following 3 April 1995 the extent of crown deposits increased by 22.7 percent. [passage omitted]

The level of direct foreign investment in the Czech Republic (as of 31 March 1995) was $3.5 billion. The biggest investor in that country is the FRG ($1.3 billion), followed by the United States ($0.7 billion) and France ($0.4 billion). Foreign capital owns the largest share in the automotive industry (Skoda-VW) and tobacco industry (Philip Morris).

The Czech balance of trade for the first 11 months of 1995 was negative and amounted to 101.7 billion Czech crowns. Imports, compared with a like period in the preceding year, increased by 28.6 percent and reached 554.3 billion Czech crowns; exports increased by 10.3 percent and amounted to 452.6 billion crowns. The bulk of Czech trade is with EU countries (63 percent), principally with Germany, Austria, Italy, and France.

—Barbara Sierszula (Prague)

Slovakia

Its GDP grew by 6.5 percent last year, and this year it should increase by an additional 5.8 percent. Industrial output in 1995 grew by 10 percent but farm output increased by only 1 percent. Unemployment dropped last year by 0.9 percent to (figures for November) 15 percent of the able-bodied population.

The budget deficit in Slovakia is high, corresponding to 5.8 percent of the GDP. On the other hand, last year the inflation rate was only 7.2 percent and it should remain at a similar level in 1996 as well. Slovakia's gross foreign debt was $4.8 billion (figures for the end of August 1995). This amount consists of a $2.2-billion debt of the government and the National Bank of Slovakia plus $2.4 billion owed by commercial banks, with the remaining $0.2 billion being the estimated debt owed to the former GDR.

In recent years the share of government in the economy was markedly restricted. The share of the private sector in the GDP has by now reached 63 percent (60 percent in transportation, 92 percent in trade, 64 percent in industry, 81 percent in construction, and 81 percent in farming). Last year the government sold directly 371 enterprises, thus earning 39.9 billion crowns. According to TREND weekly that amount corresponds, however, to only 0.4 percent of the actual value of the companies sold. [passage omitted]

Under the law on so-called large-scale privatization 26 enterprises exempt from privatization were identified; this includes three big power plants, the Slovak petroleum industry, Slovak Postal Service, Slovak Telecommunications, the arms industry (Dubnica nad Vahom, ZTS TEES Martin, ZVS Dubnica nad Vahom, Konstrukta Defence Trenczin, Konsztrukta [as published] Industry Trenczin—including the mint in Kremnica), the pharmaceutical industry (Imuna—Szarlske Michalany, Medika-Bratislava), agriculture (12 enterprises, mostly of the forestry kind), and the Vodnohospodarka (Water Management) Vystavba-Bratislava.

After the existing mass privatization system was suspended, it was determined that bonds guaranteed by the National Assets Fund will be issued until the year 2001, each for 10,000 crowns (to be distributed to about 3.5 million persons who had registered for the second stage of the "kuponki" [privatization vouchers]). The bonds may be used to pay in installments for directly purchased enterprises.

Last February Prime Minister Meciar announced that banks would be privatized soon. The premise was that the largest banks must remain Slovak, and that they will be privatized through the mediation of big industrial plants. This means, the opposition claims, a huge concentration of economic and political power.

Slovakia's trade has reached (according to the Slovak Information Agency) 506 billion crowns, which means an 18.8-percent increase compared with the preceding year. The balance of trade in 1995 was positive, with the surplus amounting to 1.79 billion crowns (in 1993-94 the balance of trade was negative). Slovakia has a positive balance of trade with some EU countries (surplus recorded in trade with Germany, Italy, and Holland) and with CEFTA countries (including Poland), as well as with, among other countries, Ukraine. On the other hand, its balance of trade with OECD countries (including the United States) was negative. A surplus of imports over exports was also reported in trade with certain other EU countries and Russia.

Slovakia's principal trade partner continues to be the Czech Republic, which in 1995 accounted for 32.5 percent of its exports and 27.5 percent of its imports.

Total exports last year amounted to 254 billion crowns, 18.5 percent more than in the preceding year. EU countries accounted for 37.4 percent of Slovak exports and OECD countries 40.6 percent. Slovak imports increased last year by 19.1 percent and reached 252.3 billion crowns. Imports from EU countries accounted for 34.5 percent, and from OECD countries 41.3 percent.

According to figures provided by the Polish Office of the Commercial Attache in Bratislava, the value of exports was $8,598 million [as published] (a 27.5-percent increase) and imports $8,452 million [as published] (a 26.9-percent increase).

The total foreign capital investment in Slovakia (as reported by the Slovak Information Agency) was 19.8 billion crowns ($660 million) at the end of September 1995, or 44 percent more than in the preceding year. According to other figures, reported in the NARODNA OBRODA daily, the level of foreign investment at the end of 1995 was about $733 million, nearly one-third more than at the end of 1994.

More than 8,500 joint ventures operate in that country. The biggest investors are Austria, Germany, Czech Republic, the United States, France, and Great Britain. Investors from each of these countries invested the equivalent of more than 1 billion crowns, and altogether these countries account for 84 percent of the foreign capital committed in that country. According to the Office of the Polish Commercial Attache in Bratislava, capital invested by Polish companies in that country totals about $40 million, and they own shares in 160 Slovak companies. Foreign capital is invested chiefly in industry, trade, banking, and insurance. Projects in the nation's capital attract most attention from the investors: According to the progovernment daily SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA, 62 percent of capital was invested there. [passage omitted]

—Andrzej Niewiadomski (Bratislava)

Hungary

The financial crisis in Hungary caused the growth rate of national income in that country to remain very slow. In 1994 it was 2.9 percent; last year 2 percent, and this year it is certain to be about 1.5 percent. Still, industrial output this year is to grow at a faster rate (by 4-5 percent).

The output of machinery and equipment is rising at a particularly fast rate (by 46 percent last year), this being chiefly the merit of the Western automotive plants sited in Hungary—Opel, Suzuki, Audi, and as of this year certainly also Korean car plants. Industrial employment dropped by 5.3 percent in 1995. Labor productivity is rising rapidly: by 15 percent in 1994 and by 12 percent last year, while at machinery plants it has risen by as much as about 30 percent.

Unemployment is stable: It was 490,000 in 1994 and 520,000 (11 percent of the able-bodied population) in 1995, and this year it should be about 510,000.

Despite a rigorous program for financial stabilization Hungary still has problems with reducing its budget deficit. Last year that deficit was 134 billion forints (6.3 percent of GDP), and for this year it is planned at 133 billion. In its letter of intent to the IMF the government pledged that in 1996 the budget deficit will not exceed 4 percent of the GDP, which corresponds to 255 billion forints. National debt also is high (86 percent of GDP). However, the Hungarian Government has succeeded in reducing its foreign debt to $11.5 billion this year from $16.5 billion in 1990.

Hungary also has problems in fighting inflation, which climbed from 18.8 percent in 1994 to 28.2 percent last year, and for this year it is expected to be 23 percent. Likewise, a rapid depreciation of the forint could not be avoided. Its average rate of exchange in 1994 was 110.69 to the dollar, and in 1995, 139.4, while for this year it should be 162. [passage omitted]

Hungary was the first CEMA country to undertake privatizing the energy and gas sectors (majority shares) and the electrical sector (minority share). It was also the first to sell, in December 1995, majority shares in the telecommunications monopoly Matavu (Hungarian Telecommunications)—Magyar-Com Consortium. A consortium formed by Ameritech and Deutsche Telekom paid about 1.7 million [currency not specified] for a stake of more than 65 percent in Matavu.

In 1995 the government's stake in MOL Company (fuel distribution) was reduced to 58.6 percent from 88.3 percent, and this reduction is to be continued in 1996.

Altogether, privatization in 1995 contributed 473 billion (against the planned 150 billion) forints to the state budget. In sum, last year $4.3 billion in foreign capital was invested in Hungary compared with $1.1 billion in 1994, and in 1996 this may verge at $2.5 billion. In 1995 the private sector generated about 70 percent of the GDP.

Following the privatization of Budapest Bank, preparations for the sale of other financial institutions—Magyar Hitel Bank and Magyar Kulkereskedelmi Bank—have reached a highly advanced stage.

Already in the OECD

Hungary belongs to the WTO, which it has joined together with other GATT countries. Last March Hungary's membership in the OECD was approved. Its chances for membership in the EU are about the same as in the case of Poland. [passage omitted]

In the last seven years Hungary has received about $12 billion in the form of investments and active capital. This year credit needs amount to $3-3.5 billion. A particularly characteristic and positive example of foreign investors is provided by Ameritech and Deutsche Telekom, which caused the number of telephones per 100 capita to increase from 10 in 1990 to 20 in 1995, and after new investments amounting to 74 billion forints (about $565 million) are implemented in 1996-97, this indicator will rise to 28. Huge capital is also being invested by car makers, and the new owners of the regional networks of gas and electricity companies are following suit.

In recent years both the trade deficit and the current-account deficit have declined. Hungarian exports in 1995 reached a total of $12.9 billion (a 21-percent increase), while imports declined by 7 percent to $15.5 billion. The former CEMA countries account for 25 percent of Hungarian trade. Hungarian exports to CEFTA countries increased by 33 percent, while tightly controlled imports increased by 10 percent. The principal trade partners of Hungary are EU countries, among which Germany ranks first. [passage omitted]

The reform of the social insurance system commenced with a radical slashing of social services, including a plan for depriving a substantial proportion of Hungarians of child allowances. But that bill, drafted by Lajos Bokros, caused an uproar in parliament and led to a hearing before the Constitutional Tribunal, which last year discerned in it irregularities and rejected it.

The governing coalition plans to prepare during this a budget reform for 1997, with the principal element being a reform of the retirement-pension and health care system. Hungary, with a population of 10,245,000, has more than 2.9 million pensioners, or 28.6 percent of the population. The social insurance deficit in 1995 was 40 billion forints (about $280 million). [passage omitted]

A sign of the proper direction of changes is the growing popularity of voluntary insurance systems. By now 417,000 persons use this form of insurance. In Hungary there exist 165 retirement-pension funds and 13 health-insurance organizations.

—Grzegorz Lubczyk (Budapest)

Bulgaria

In 1995 its GDP increased by 2.5 percent (to $12.7 billion), but that still equals only 75.6 percent of its level in 1989. The planned growth rate for 1996 also is to be 2.5 percent. On the other hand, industrial output increased by 5 percent last year. Unemployment reached 520,000 (14.7 percent of the able-bodied population). Its high budget deficit is a problem to Bulgaria; last year it reached 58 billion lev ($870 million), or 6.8 percent of the GDP. This year it is to be maintained a the same level, which corresponds to 5.3 percent of anticipated GDP.

At present the principal problem is how to achieve a recovery of the banking sector, whose losses last year reached—using international accounting standards—about 100 billion lev ($1.5 billion).

Bulgaria's debt also is extremely high. Its foreign obligations amount to about $11 billion and its domestic debt, about 330 billion lev, or altogether 130 percent of the GDP. When allowance is made for the debts of state enterprises (about 500 billion lev), the total reaches 200 percent of the GDP. The 1996 budget allocates 11 percent of the GDP, or 40 percent of its expenditures, on paying the related obligations.

Last year the inflation rate was cut to 32.9 percent, although during the same period the exchange rate of the dollar to the lev increased by only 7 percent. The prime interest rate was cut to 42 percent from 72 percent.

A problem to Bulgaria is the slow pace of its economic restructuring. By the end of 1995 the government has sold more than 1,500 companies with a combined value of barely 19 billion lev ($285 million). In the preceding years the housing and other real estate nationalized under communist rule was restored to original owners. However, no decision was made about returning nationalized forests to their owners. By the end of 1995 about 28 percent of the land of the former kolkhozes was given back. At the same time the rise of new communal farms is continuing. By now they number 2,800 and account for, among other things, about 80 percent of grain output.

It was also decided that 12 big enterprises of decisive importance to the nation's infrastructure are to remain Treasury-owned. They include the railroads, the gas industry, telecommunications, and geodesy and cartography. At 17 other enterprises the Treasury is to retain a share of more than 50 percent, and the privatization of 32 enterprises will require a special permit from the government. That last group includes steel plants, refineries, shipyards, and chemical conglomerates.

Early last January the first stage of mass privatization began, with shares in 1,063 enterprises having a combined book value of 80 billion lev, or about 13 percent of the assets of the state sector in industry, to be privatized. In the case of lucrative companies such as the Sunny Seacoast Hotel Complex, the Neftochim Refinery, and chemical conglomerates, no private company may hold the controlling block of shares. [passage omitted]

In Bulgaria last year the private sector generated about one-third of the GDP. In industry its stake increased to 12 from 8 percent. The industrial plants of the public sector reported an overall growth of 1.4 percent and those of the private sector 50 percent.

A major challenge to the Bulgarian economy is restructuring and privatizing the banking sector. In that country exist 45 banks: 11 (large) state banks, 24 private banks (including one large), and 10 branches of foreign banks. It is likely that in the very near future three more banks will be established. The owner of Treasury shares in the commercial banks is the Banking Consolidation Company, which is controlled by the government. [passage omitted]

So far Bulgaria has not joined the WTO. On the other hand, Sofia succeeded in signing with the EU a preliminary association agreement under which all customs barriers and other restrictions with respect to industrial products will be abolished within 10 years. In addition, agreements on a free-trade zone were signed with the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

Bulgaria's balance of foreign trade in 1995 was positive. Its exports last year reached $4.6 billion, with imports amounting to $4.3 billion. [passage omitted]

Direct foreign investment remains limited. Its combined value has reached $514 million, of which $102 million was from last year. Germany continues to be the biggest investor.

—Mark Suchowiejko (Sofia)

Romania: Iliescu May Become Active on PDSR's Behalf

AU1306155296 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 10 Jun 96 p 12

[Editorial by Adrian Patrusca: "The Boss Got Busy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The disaster of the first ballot [of the local elections on 2 June] has caused great confusion within the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]. The best proof of this state is the very proposal to maintain the current 3-percent threshold for representation in Parliament, despite the fact that the PDSR itself had initially proposed raising this threshold to 5 and even 8 percent. A higher threshold would have limited the number of groupings taking their seats in the next Parliament, but would have also restricted the PDSR's maneuvering space for the formation of a new government. The task of forming the government automatically falls upon the winner of the election. The winning party must look for allies, with whom it can obtain together the support of the majority of parliamentarians. When it proposed raising the threshold for admittance, the PDSR was sure it will win the general elections. It counted on enticing the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] to join it in government, since the PDSR and the CDR would have had a comfortable majority, plus the support of the West.

However, the poor Whitsuntide results have upset all PDSR calculations. The party suddenly became aware of the possibility of not winning the fall elections, that is of losing the main asset, namely that of being charged with the formation of a government. The other possibility was that the PDSR might barely win the elections, only to find that it has no partners to rule with, meaning that the party must hand over the prerogative of forming the cabinet to the next party placed in the electoral race. An electoral threshold of 5 percent would have probably reduced the number of parliamentary groupings to four: the CDR, PDSR, the Social Democratic Union [USD], and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]. A simple play of figures indicates that the PDSR was threatened with being left out in the cold and going into the opposition!

This hypothesis has totally scared the PDSR people, who quickly changed their stance. They made a turnaround, as if nothing has happened, and asked that the 3-percent threshold be maintained. This low threshold will probably enable five or six smaller parties to enter the Parliament, with the PDSR thus hoping to increase its maneuvering space in the fall and create a reserve of likely future allies in the government.

However, the fast realignment on the issue of the electoral threshold is nothing but the quiet before the coming storm. Last Sunday's failure actually amounts to a crushing victory for the tough wing within the party. Until Whitsuntide, President Ion Iliescu gave free hand to Adrian Nastase [PDSR executive president] to do as he saw fit. As is known, Nastase put his namesake, the tennis player, at the head of the PDSR list for Bucharest. Likewise, Adrian Nastase replenished the riddled face of the PDSR with American cosmetics: spectacular appearances on television, flowers in the markets, house-high advertisements, balloons, and billions thrown away with the wind. But when he saw the results, Ion Iliescu got mad. The president is an old-fashioned type. He favors "working with the people," that is long talks with the electorate and the countercandidates. He favors lying in wait for his adversaries and smacking them when they feel most secure. The president tolerated Adrian Nastase's American tricks just this time, so that he cannot be accused of not having given them a try. But he is not prepared to tolerate them indefinitely. Therefore, Iliescu took hold of the reigns himself. Shaking off the lethargy into which he was sunk by Adrian Nastase's performance, the boss got busy. First, he flexed his muscles, by threatening to run as an independent, if the PDSR disaster continues after the second ballot of the local elections, too. Fearful of losing the driving force which can carry them into Parliament, the tough PDSR leaders Solcanu [Ion Solcanu, PDSR vice president], Vacaru [Vasile Vacaru, PDSR vice president], and Dumitrascu [Gheorghe Dumitrascu, member of the PDSR Executive Bureau] jumped up in alarm and probably swore their allegiance and faithfulness, while Adrian Nastase was quietly brooding over the disaster.

Iliescu is not the man to desert his comrades in times of hardship. He will do everything possible to keep the PDSR afloat, as long as there is some hope. Ion Iliescu has probably asked the government to forget about the IMF and the World Bank and to throw all reserves on the market: pension increases, indexations, slashing the U.S. dollar, and postponing price increases. It is expected that the president, in imitation of Mihai Viteazu [16th century King Michael the Brave of Wallachia], will soon take the battle-ax in hand and throw himself in the whirl of the electoral battle. If driven to extremity, he may also dump the Vacaroiu government, to the delight of the electorate.

Romania: PSM's Verdet Views Party, Election Issues

AU1306194396 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 10 Jun 96 pp 8-9

[Interview with Ilie Verdet, president of the Socialist Party of Labor, by Anne Juganaru; place and date not given: "There Is Only One Viable and Credible Alternative for Romania's Coming Out of the Current Crisis; An Alliance of All Left-Wing Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Juganaru] Mr. Verdet, before the first round of local elections, you were at Cotroceni Palace [Presidency], where, together with the other parliamentary parties, you discussed the issue of this autumn's elections. How did things look then?

[Verdet] Indeed, the major problem discussed at Cotroceni was connected with the presidential and parliamentary elections due this autumn. We also exchanged ideas on other issues. The general opinion was that especially the Party of Social Democracy of Romania [PDSR] is aiming at speeding up these elections, certainly within the limits of the law and taking into account the fact that, on 29 September, the four-year term expires. The discussions heated up when this law had to be matched to the law on political parties, which stipulates that all political formations have a six-month registration period from the day of the promulgation—that is, up to 29 September. Therefore, the law cannot be by-passed. There were various interpretations, and each person looked at things in a different way. At first glance, the issue seems strictly judicial, however, we think that it has a political undercurrent. We insisted that the law should not be violated and everybody should wait until all parties have a chance to register, and elections can be held on the first Sunday after that. The second, quite important problem was to separate the elections. This is no longer a technical problem. We have been in favor of separate elections, which would have given us the possibility of falling in line with the practice of all those countries that have such a parliamentary system. This claim was interpreted in every possible way. No credible and convincing reason could be found for holding the elections simultaneously, other than it would be too costly to call the people to the ballot several times. In any event, we will have to get into the normal flow some time.

[Juganaru] As regards the electoral threshold, did you agree to the proposed 5-percent threshold?

[Verdet] I believe that this is not the essential problem. The circulation of this idea, that is, of increasing the electoral threshold, does not affect us as a party, and it is and has been used to exercise pressure on the smaller parties, to push them towards association with larger parties. Indeed we have too many parties, but I do not believe that this way—that is, applying legal pressure—is in accordance with promoting a democratic spirit.

[Juganaru] Does this 5-percent threshold not scare you?

[Verdet] I said, and I repeat it, this 5-percent threshold does not affect us. In fact, the partial results of the local elections have showed us that we will get over this threshold.

[Juganaru] On the other hand, it showed others that they are very far from their goal, including the PDSR, which changed its mind about the 5-percent electoral threshold and about making radical changes to the electoral law. Can you comment on these issues?

[Verdet] The PDSR's problems, just like the problems of other parties, do not concern us. I think they say that politics is the art of the possible. In order to make the "possible" become practicable, such last minute "changes of mind" are also permitted! Mr. Adrian Nastase's [PDSR executive president] arguments are legal, and we do not think that these changes are accidental. The PDSR could not rely on one card. Our participation in ruling along with them has offered us enough surprises. However, the PSM has other problems. First of all, to mobilize its own electorate, and then the inequalities of representation at a national level. We do not have all the data available now, but the vote cast in favor of the right wing in the local elections is not a good omen for the left wing.

[Juganaru] Mr. President, today, the left wing seems more disunited than ever. Do you not think that this fact had a negative impact on the electorate?

[Verdet] And how about the right wing, does it find itself in a different situation? The entire Romanian political arena is very fragmented. And there is another problem: Which is the right, and which is the left? Are we making assessments on the basis of programs and the practice of parties, or are we looking at the statements issued by formations, in which they alone define their position in the political arena? I think you are right, the left wing is rather disorganized, however, it is much closer to the possibility of forming an alliance than the right wing, which has not defined a clear program. The programs of the left wing are closer, mainly in the way of approaching the current issue of coming out of the present crisis. Regarding the future, however, there are serious differences between the proposed goals. As early as when our party was established, I insisted and continue to insist on the idea that there is but one viable and credible way for Romania to emerge from the current crisis; through an alliance of all left-wing forces.

[Juganaru] In your view, will this alliance with a socialist character also include the Socialist Party [PS] and the PRM [Greater Romania Party]?

[Verdet] You are approaching the issue from an angle that I do not like. We have thought about things in a different way. Two years ago, in September 1994, we drafted a platform on the possibility and the need for an alliance of all forces on the left of the political spectrum and also formulated the goal that a democratic left wing should have, without naming the parties that it should include or believing that this issue is taboo. This was an invitation to dialogue. We wanted to organize a dialogue with all those who came close to our way of thinking in finding a platform-program that would lead to the concrete establishment of a Romanian national democratic left wing.

[Juganaru] Whom did you have in mind when you formulated this proposal?

[Verdet] We had in mind all the political formations represented in the parliament or outside the parliament, trade union movements, socioprofessional and cultural organizations, and various personalities with left-wing ideas who could have made an important contribution to pulling our country out of its misery. We avoided saying which are the left-wing or center-left parties or what formation is extreme-left oriented. Each party found something, which is not always essential, to define itself and justify its existence. However, it is not our business to make such an analysis. Nevertheless, we judge by deeds.

[Juganaru] Do you believe that the left side of the Romanian political spectrum also includes radical and extremist formations?

[Verdet] I believe that the left also has radical formations, just like the right.

[Juganaru] Even extremist ones?

[Verdet] No. I could not say extremist, because extremism is characterized by actions of violence and force. Certainly, we have also had such cases in our country, but they were not characterized by an organized movement, and I do not know of any such extremist formation on either side, although there have been some individual actions.

[Juganaru] Do you believe that chauvinism and anti-Semitism are also part of the arsenal of extremist movements?

[Verdet] Yes, there have been such manifestations, but they are not part of a movement in Romania. These are ideas, individual actions, but not a phenomenon that comprises organized masses of people. These phenomena are not found only in Romania. These are characteristic to all countries. There is such a tendency in very developed countries with an old democracy. You see, Fascist formations have appeared in Italy. Such manifestations are recorded also in Germany and France, never mind in Arab and Asian countries, where extremism has reached a great level. However, such movements are not in the majority. In our country, I, at least, do not know of such organized actions of an extremist or chauvinist nature.

[Juganaru] What are your relations with the PRM [Greater Romania Party]?

[Verdet] In the beginning, we had the idea of holding a dialogue with all political formations, most intensely and frequently with left-wing parties or the nationalist-patriotic ones. We have had normal relations with the PRM. However, we have no alliance with any party yet. Nevertheless, I could say that some signs of dissatisfaction and even friction have reached the press. We never wanted to spread this problem and create conflicts between parties. We do not wish this. Nevertheless, there is a certain cooperation among parties in some provinces. But this cooperation is not based on formal documents. There is a certain cooperation, and this can be also seen with the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party] at the local level.

[Juganaru] I was about to ask you what your relations are like with the parties that you share headquarters with.

[Verdet] In the provinces, mainly in Transylvania, there are such signs of cooperation. At the central level, there is no understanding between us whatsoever, so the relations are restricted only to dialogue, contacts, information sharing, and consultations on certain issues, but these are not ruled by certain understandings among parties.

[Juganaru] Given the fact that we have been talking about Transylvania, whom will the PSM support in this region, considering that its own candidate has not qualified for the runoffs of the local elections?

[Verdet] This is an absolutely local issue and differs from one place to another. There is no general trend in this respect. These decisions will be taken exclusively by the party's Steering Committee.

[Juganaru] If the Socialist Party's candidate is going to achieve a better placement—we are talking about places where the elections will be repeated due to an absenteeism that exceeded 50 percent—will you support him?

[Verdet] We attended a very successful electoral rally in Lugoj where the president of a Greater Romania Party branch said that the person designated by them to run in the election is a good man, but placed much lower than our candidate. Thus, they called on their members and sympathizers to vote for our candidate. This was their own initiative. It could happen that things will be the other way around in some other place. I see that you constantly refer to the Socialist Party.

[Juganaru] Yes, because your doctrines are closer.

[Verdet] Yes, our doctrines are closer, but individual friction separate us. The ambitions of those people who broke away from our party created confusion and heated up some spirits in provinces. I am not happy about it, but this is a fact. Nevertheless, I cannot deny the fact that, in the provinces, there are also some contacts between people and that these contacts might lead to cooperation. For the time being, I do not know of any area or locality, a municipality or town, where such an understanding has been reached.

[Juganaru] Mr. President, political formations usually nominate the head of the party to run in the presidential elections. Your party is an exception to the rule and nominated the first deputy president. Why?

[Verdet] This was our reasoning and, regarding the customary rule that the head of the party should run for the office of president, it is not being applied everywhere, neither in other countries nor here. There are also exceptions to the rule. In some developed countries, the head of the party runs for the position of prime minister. In France, there is a semipresidential system, but in Germany, Italy, Spain, Austria, or England the prime minister is more important. In those parliamentary systems, the head of the party always runs for the leadership of the executive because that is where the program of the party that supported him in the electoral campaign will be reflected or not.

We aspire to rule. Our party proposed itself to engage in the race to take power. We will see who is the best qualified to assume responsibility for this very important position.

[Juganaru] How do you regard the electoral campaign for the general elections?

[Verdet] I think certain things are going to happen before the general elections. And I believe that these will be actions to regroup forces and clarify political programs. Before that, however, we have to wait for the final results of the local elections. For me, the local elections are important because they are a political and psychological test. The parliamentary elections will get a lot of inspiration from the way in which the local elections have unfolded and from the aspects that will emerge from this confrontation of programs and alternatives. Meantime, it is good that in the electoral campaign things have not degenerated so much as to cause us anxiety. However, a deviation from what was essential did take place. Instead of a confrontation of programs and alternatives, the stress was placed mainly on the policies of those parties that have their representatives in this race. In many places, it became an open, very heated debate between candidates, between political adversaries. This is a negative fact. If the parliamentary elections are going to follow this line, then they will be even worse. The political formations should eliminate this struggle between people and eliminate individual cases, however, they should not ignore them altogether. In any event, I believe that debates should play a greater role and that a greater importance should be attached to solutions, individual programs, because only in this way can we offer the voters the possibility to decide in whose favor they should vote.

Romania: Chairman of Hungarian Union on Budapest Statement

LD1306184296 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1500 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania [Bela Marko] has termed as worrying a statement by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on 10 June. According to the statement, "Budapest does not intend to sacrifice the ethnic Hungarians living in the neighboring countries, nor does it wish to sacrifice the inhabitants of Hungary to the supposed interests of the Hungarians living beyond the border."

Bela Marko is of the view that this suggests that according to Laszlo Kovacs [foreign minister], the interests of Hungary and the ethnic Hungarians can be conflicting.

Romania: Commentary Views Social Shifts Among Electorate

AU1306150896 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 11 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Commentary by Silviu Brucan: "A New Parliamentary Majority Is Born"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The chaotic way in which they organized the 3 June local elections, on top of which came the Romanian computer and data processing analphabetism, generated numerous hasty commentaries, based mainly on impressions. The personal success of certain mayors (Simirad in Iasi, Funar in Cluj, Durbaca in Galati, Lungu in Braila, and so on) was mistakenly* *interpreted as expressing the strength, at the national level, of the political parties they represent. Partial and unofficial results were placed in the foreground and then manipulated to suit political interests. The massive and unexpected absenteeism, which will also be discussed in this article, enhanced the level of general confusion. However, it is only now, after the final results were published, that one can obtain a somewhat clearer image about the new balance of forces in Romanian politics.*

Let me begin by recalling that in the 1992 local elections the opposition won the confidence of the electorate in the large cities, the foremost of which was Bucharest, while the FSN [meanwhile defunct National Salvation Front], which in those days had not yet split, regained its leading place by obtaining the massive endorsement of the farmers, as well as the inhabitants of smaller towns. Nevertheless, while in 1992, as a result of the first steps taken toward market economy, the changes at the social level were still in an incipient phase, in 1996 the social landscape finds itself in a stage of profound changes. The industrial laborers, the favorite class of the communist regime, has lost its social prestige; its number dropped from 4 to 2.6 million; their salaries lag well behind the prices; and unemployment hangs above their heads like a Damocles sword, scaring and irritating them. This class faces a total ideological confusion, which is the best hotbed for manipulators and demagogic leaders. As a result of the Land Ownership Bill, the most profound social alteration has occurred among the villagers. Although not every farmer was given his land ownership documents, currently about 5 million of them have become land owners (40 percent of them live in urban areas,) and their social differentiation occurred depending on the size and character of the land they now possess. Finally, entirely new social forces emerged as well, livening up the market, influencing consumption and life style, and which participates in the elections for the very first time: this is the middle class, together with its superior layer, the billionaires.

Although social changes do not find direct and mechanical reflection in political life, these alterations made me anticipate that the 1996 legislative elections will result in a sizable shift toward the right in the Romanian political spectrum.

The first confirmation of my assessment is offered by the returns of the recent local elections, despite the fact that the priority issues at stake here pertained to urban or rural civilization problems, and were influenced by the human quality of the various mayors, rather than the ideological differences separating them. After counting the elected mayors some people even worked out a political hierarchy of the various parties, but such lists cannot be conclusive, as the electoral entities on which they rely are completely different—they include both large cities and tiny villages. The sole way in which one can have any idea about the new balance of forces among the various political parties is to compute the total number of county councilors elected throughout the country. Thus, for the first time ever, the CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania] ranks first (1,629,475 votes in favor, that is 19.58 percent o the votes,) followed by the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] (1,335,062 votes in favor, that is, 16.28 percent,) and the USD [Social Democratic Union], which thus becomes the third strongest political force (932,923 votes, that is, 11.21 percent.) On a secondary plane come: the PUNR [Romanian National Unity Party], with 5.47 percent of the votes, but which, despite all its efforts to expand beyond Transylvania, still remains a regional party. One of the surprises of the local elections was the leap forward made by the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] with its 5.03 percent of the votes, thanks to the electorate living in the large industrial towns, by which it emerged as the principal left-wing party in Romania. With its modest 4.04-percent proportion of the votes and without winning any mayoral office, the PRM [Greater Romania Party], headed by its Corneliu Vadim Tudor, appears like an overinflated balloon. The PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania] with 3.19 percent, the PAC [Civic Alliance Party] with 3.14 percent, and the PL '93 [Liberal Party '93] ought to feel enlightened by the PDSR's recent decision not to raise the threshold for Parliament above the 3-percent barrier. Furthermore one has to note that the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] can still count on its compact electorate (7.24 percent,) although for the first time ever its candidates had to run, and lost the race, against independent ethnic Hungarian candidates.

In brief, the old parliamentary arithmetic, which allowed for setting up the left-wing four-party ruling coalition [consisting of the PDSR, PUNR, PSM, and PRM,] was totally upset by the recent elections. As it does not add up to more than 30.82 percent of the votes, this majority has ceased to exist. Therefore the preconditions emerged for a center-right coalition government to be set up after the elections this fall.

Let us now examine the serious problem posed by absenteeism. In the night of 2-3 June Romanian democracy suffered a heart attack: no on knew for sure whether 51 percent of the electorate did go to vote, that is, whether the elections had been valid or not. It is true, similar drops in the turnout had been reported in other neighboring countries as well. In our case, however, such a sudden drop from the formerly usual 70-80 percent to a knife-edge 50-percent proportion came totally unexpected and therefore the public alarm sirens went off again for the first time after 1989. This alarm is perfectly justified, because if a similar thing happens again this fall, Romanian democracy might be in danger.

It is a fact that the problem of absenteeism has never been taken seriously either by the Power or by our civil society. In 1992 the Stolojan government was given as a principal task the organization of the elections. The then-prime minister, a politically noncommitted technical expert, used to hold regular news conferences on electoral issues, used to enjoy the confidence of all, and represented a moral-political authority. Everything ran smoothly, and the fact that the local elections were won by the opposition came as a supreme test. Now, in 1996, for the Vacaroiu government, which is under the permanent siege of problems it is unable to keep under control, the task of organizing the elections came as a supplementary curse, a burden that it is carrying with visible reluctance. Ignoring the rules of the democratic game, the government put Messrs. Hrebenciuc and Cosmanca in charge of organizing the ballot, two of the personalities who are most obsessed by the idea of having to see to it that the PDSR wins the elections. A classic contradiction case of the same person playing the game and also acting as umpire!

Judging from the official reactions that came to this new act defying public opinion, the power seems to be suffering from the Lapusneanu syndrome [Lapusneanu is a well-known figure of Romanian prose literature]: "Even if you do not want me—I want you!" Preelectoral public opinion polls, which in democratic countries are used to correct certain mistakes in the political bearing of the various parties, showed that 80-96 percent of the electorate rejects the policy promoted in vital domains by the Vacaroiu cabinet, but still granted credibility, to a 30-to-34-percent proportion, to the PDSR, thus keeping it in a leading position. Quite obviously, these people believed the PDSR was much better intended than the government in office. Under such circumstances political cleverness prompts the ruling party to dissociate itself from the performance of the government and operate programmatic alterations, very much like Boris Yeltsin does, quite successfully, in his presidential campaign. Well, what they did was just the opposite: in May 1996 the PDSR leadership decided to anoint Mr. Vacaroiu as a party member and even vice president of the PDSR. What a formidable acquisition!

No wonder that the people did everything to avoid going to vote! The sole problem is that this issue is too important to be left up to a single political party. Of course, Messrs. Hrebenciuc and Cosmanca have every right to be preoccupied by the interests of the PDSR, but a first measure to be taken by the rulers to regain at least some of the confidence of the electors would be the appointment of a politically noncommitted high public servant as head of the Central Technical Commission, to oversee the preparations for the coming elections. Romania cannot afford a second heart attack on the night of 3 November 1996 [parliamentary and presidential elections].

Federal

FRY: Croatian Foreign Minister To Visit by End of Jun

AU1306141696 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0951 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 13 Jun (BETA)—Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic is to visit Belgrade by the end of this month, Davor Vidis, spokesman to the Croatian Office in Belgrade, told BETA today.

He said that consular departments at the Office of the Republic of Croatia in Belgrade and the Bureau of the FRY in Zagreb should be opened by the end of this month.

Expert teams of the two countries' Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as customs offices are to discuss the above in Zagreb this month. Vidis said that "there is nothing new" regarding opening communications between Croatia and FRY.

FRY: Lilic Urges End to 'Animosity' Between 'Opponents'

AU1306202396 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Speech by FRY President Zoran Lilic to "generals, admirals, officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers, and civilian persons working for the Yugoslav Army" in honor of 16 June, Yugoslav Army Day, in Belgrade; date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The current social processes in the region of the former Yugoslavia and in our neighborhood testify to the accuracy of our conviction that peace is not only necessary, but realistically possible and achievable. The FRY's consistent support for the peaceful resolution of problems in the region has now been internationally acknowledged and is receiving undoubted recognition from an increasing number of countries.

The dramatic, and in many ways tragic, events caused by the civil war in a part of the former Yugoslavia have once again confirmed the historic truth ingrained in our collective memory. There are neither lasting animosity nor alliances but only lasting interests. That is why the peoples in the region must be ready to look after their interests, start living as neighbors with their recent opponents, overcome the historically inherited animosity, and concentrate on the future.

I am convinced that the Yugoslav Army, as a deterrent force against potential aggressors, will continue to contribute significantly to the peace process not only in the former Yugoslavia but also in the Balkans. I wish you, and all members of the Yugoslav Army good health, personal happiness, and much success. Long may you live!

FRY: Kontic, Zimbabwe's Mugabe Discuss Economic Cooperation

AU1306165996 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Dragan Caran report on statements by Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe in Belgrade on 13 June—recorded; Mugabe speaks in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Mugabe] Once again, we discussed the possibilities.... We discussed the possibilities of reactivating the cooperation that we had with your country and ways in which to improve the existing good relations. I have received new information about the situation in Yugoslavia, particularly regarding the economy. I informed my collocutor about the situation in Zimbabwe. We primarily focused on the situation following the suspension of sanctions, and Mr. Kontic told me that the greatest problem was what he calls the outer wall of sanctions [spoljni zid sankcija], a state of affairs that is hindering certain transactions and progress despite the lifting of the sanctions. Irrespective of this fact, certain countries and international organizations are behaving in the old way, which we consider to be unfair, particularly in view of the new circumstances following the suspension of sanctions. We believe that Yugoslavia must be a member of the international community, and that it should be granted all the rights and possibilities given to other countries in the United Nations, the IMF, the World Bank, and all other international organizations. Zimbabwe will certainly influence other countries to extend a helping hand to Yugoslavia. These are our principles, and we believe that Yugoslavia must have a status equal to all other countries in the international community.

[Caran] Prime Minister Kontic first expressed satisfaction that such a true friend of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dr. Robert Mugabe, was visiting the country.

[Kontic] Our talks primarily focused on furthering bilateral cooperation and the reintegration of Yugoslavia into the international community. As far as bilateral cooperation is concerned, we agreed certain concrete measures, the most important of which would be the reactivation of the mixed committee, or perhaps its establishment [as heard]; next, giving the status of most-privileged nation in mutual trade, coordination of interstate regulations, primarily an interstate agreement on trade and economic cooperation, an agreement on double taxation, and an interstate agreement on the protection of investments.

We particularly discussed higher forms of cooperation [as heard], long-term production cooperation, joint investments, companies, transfer of technology, and measures that will further the cooperation between the economies of our two countries. Finally, President Mugabe, [words indistinct] said that he personally, and Zimbabwe would support Yugoslavia's reintegration into international political, financial, and trade organizations which is extremely important to us.

I would like to take the occasion to once again express great satisfaction with this visit, his promises, and our expectations regarding Yugoslavia's speedy reintegration into the international community.

FRY: Cuba Ready To 'Activate' Relations With FRY

LD1006095796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0931 GMT 10 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 10 (TANJUG)—Cuban Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina said Cuba was 'ready to activate and strengthen bilateral relations with Yugoslavia (the F.R.Y.) on all levels,' noting that good intentions, mutual understanding and friendship existed between the two countries.

In an interview to the Belgrade political magazine MEDJUNARODNA POLITIKA Robaina said that the F.R.Y. could continue the significant trade that the former Yugoslavia conducted with Cuba in many spheres, including the continuation of interrupted projects.

'In early May 1992, the Cuban Government recognised the F.R.Y and expressed the desire to establish mutually useful economic, trade, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation,' Robaina said.

Speaking about the priorities of his country's foreign policy Robaina said that Cuba was oriented towards integration and cooperation with the world, and especially with Latin American countries, trying at the same time to expand relations with the European Union, other European countries, Canada and Japan.

He said Cuba urged the strengthening of cooperation with all third world countries within the non-aligned movement.

Noting that relations between Cuba and the U.S had been interrupted for 37 years, Robaina said that his country did not have the intention of creating unnecessary tensions in relations with the U.S.

Cuba will try to promote trade and cooperation between the two peoples and will be at the disposal of the American Government for talks on all questions on the basis of mutual respect.

FRY: Belgrade Adopts Bill on Relations With Romania

LD1306210496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1712 GMT 13 Jun 96

["Balpool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 13 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government on Thursday adopted a bill confirming the agreement on friendship, good-neighborliness, and cooperation between Yugoslavia and Romania, the Federal Secretariat of Information said.

This bill gives a formal and legal confirmation to the long-term friendship and good-neighbor relations, lasting joint interests, and results achieved in Yugoslav-Romanian relations, it affirms Yugoslavia's role in the Balkans and in Europe, and strengthens its international position, the statement said.

The Yugoslav Government also adopted a platform for the participation of a Yugoslav delegation at the conference on demographic trends in the Balkans, which will be held in the Greek town of Thessaloniki from June 26-29. The objective of the conference is to establish closer cooperation between demographs of the Balkans, irrespective of linguistic, ethnic, religious, and administrative and geographic differences.

The Yugoslav Government also established bases for the participation of a Yugoslav delegation at a meeting of the Regional Center for Environmental Protection for Central and Eastern Europe in the Hungarian town of Szentendre from June 17-19.

Serbia

Serbia: Deputies Consider Comment on Kosovo Secession

AU1406121196 Bad Vilbel BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jun 96 p 6

[Article by M.B.: "Despic 'Was Given a Sign' by Someone"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The policy of the possible secession of Kosovo is perhaps the only solution, since postponing a solution to the problem or adopting a radical solution would automatically lead to the same fate as in the Krajina or a serious defeat before the international community," said Desimir Tosic, deputy to the Federal parliament and one of the founders of the Democratic Center, in commenting on a statement issued by Aleksandar Despic, chairman of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Despic said that the secession of Kosovo was one way to solve the Kosovo issue.

Tosic believes that a small group of Academy members, to which Dobrica Cosic belongs, has had the idea about partitioning Kosovo for a long time but have not had the courage to make it public. Tosic added that the speech delivered by Aleksandar Despic shows that courage is slowly appearing, probably because "he was given a sign from outside."

Vladan Batic, vice chairman of the Democratic Party of Serbia and a deputy in the Serbian parliament, expressed his doubts about the positive effects of Despic's statement on the Serbian leadership.

"This regime only needs the opinion of the Serbian Academy of Sciences if it will help them stay in power," Batic said.

Ivan Vujacic, head of the Democratic Party Parliamentary Club, believes "the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts can make various proposals and express various ideas in connection with the Kosovo problem, but the attitude of the Democratic Party will remain unchanged: Kosovo is a part of Serbia."

Ivica Dacic: It is a Matter of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts

Asked to comment on the academician Despic's attitude, Ivica Dacic, spokesman for the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS], stated that the Socialists did not intend to interfere with the work of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.

"They are entitled to their official or private attitude, which we may—but are not obligated to—like." Regarding the SPS attitude toward this issue, "it has been public for a very long time," Dacic said.

Slobodan Vuksanovic, SPS spokesman and deputy to the Serbian parliament, thinks there will be more statements like the one issued by Despic "so long as the state remains silent."

"Neither Despic nor any other members of the Academy have said they support secession. They have not presented their attitude about Kosovo openly. For that reason, I do not care to comment on the matter. I think this was intended as a trial balloon to see how people respond to it," said Ivan Kovacevic, spokesman for the Serbian Renewal Movement.

Serbia: Academy Calls Despic Remarks on Kosovo Personal

AU1406122996 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jun 96 p 6

[Report by "A.Z.": "The Interpretation of the Office of the Secretary of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts: 'The Attitude of the President, not the Academy'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Whether the statement about Kosovo by Academy member Aleksandar Despic is the official attitude of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts has raised questions among the public.

The first comments by Academy members suggest that this is Despic's personal opinion and not be the official position of the Academy. This is the interpretation we got at the Office of the Secretary of the Academy. We were told that the speech by Aleksandar Despic was just one of the papers read at the conference.

"His analysis of the situation in Kosovo is one of the solutions offered for this exceptionally important national issue. Many other Academy members, however, have their own opinions about this problem. Once these have been compared and analyzed, the Academy will be able to define its official attitude. This will take time and serious scientific study and debate."

Serbia: Commentary Accuses Ambassador Galbraith of 'Hypocrisy'

AU1306194196 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jun 96 p 2

[Commentary by Milenko Predragovic: "A Crime Without a Punishment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith, after three years spent in Zagreb, is going home. Such assertions are coming from U.S. Embassy circles, while the news has been reported by all major world newspapers. Why did this diplomat, a novice in a state that was founded only recently, cause so much attention among the world public?

The last U.S. ambassador to former Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, who directly contributed to the breakdown of Yugoslavia, had a decisive influence on Galbraith's appointment as ambassador to Croatia. First, Galbraith is the son of the famous economist John Kenneth Galbraith, which secured a high position in the U.S. diplomatic hierarchy for the young diplomat. Second, the Americans always send novices to new and insecure states because then the administration can get rid of them at any time and very easily without any major consequences. Still, the situation with Galbraith is a little different, although his end could be seen as early as three years ago, when he first came to Zagreb.

In Zagreb the new ambassador became a kind of shadow governor. He was not only engaged in diplomacy, but also took part in the internal political affairs of Croatia. His first task was to arm the Croatian Army. Following his demands, heavy artillery began to arrive from German depots as well as Russian MiG-21bis aircraft. He exerted a decisive influence on Milan Kucan [president of Slovenia], so some arms arrived in Croatia from Slovenia as well.

Still, these were insignificant in view of the real needs and demands of the Croatian political establishment. Therefore, Galbraith became a frequent guest of the Iranian Embassy, which is said to be the European center of Muslim terrorism. In that embassy deals were struck on the import of arms from Iran, and even of C-300 anti-rocket [protivraketni] systems, which Iran had bought from Ukraine. Arms arrived in Croatia, and some went to the Croats, while the rest went to the Bosnian Muslims. In addition to arms, 8,700 Iranian fighters arrived in Bosnia from Iran via Croatia. They are still in Bosnia, of which both the Croatians and the Americans are aware. In these transactions, Galbraith also made a profit for himself, enough to last the rest of his life!

However, the U.S. ambassador to Zagreb got into a conflict with the head of the U.S. Embassy's intelligence service over the cooperation with Iran, which is a sworn enemy of U.S. interests. On the eve of Operation Storm, following a demand by the CIA, Galbraith went to Belgrade and arranged Milan Babic's approval of the Z-4 [Zagreb-4] plan. At the time, however, Galbraith had already been sacrificed to Tudjman and Operation Storm, which began with raids in 30 places even before the U.S. ambassador's return from Belgrade. One can reliably assert that Galbraith's trip to Belgrade was designed to reduce the Serb military alertness! Desiring to show himself as a neutral diplomat, on the third day of the military operations, Galbraith sat on a Serb refugee's tractor, trying to prevent the stoning of the column of Serb refugees.

That was a sign of hypocrisy. While he was sitting on the tractor, U.S. AWACS and pilotless aircraft were giving instructions to the Croatian military command!

Serbia: DSS's Despic Criticizes Situation in Kosovo

LD1206154096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1301 GMT 12 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 12 Jun (TANJUG)—Vojislav Kostunica, the president of the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS], said today that the elections in Bosnia would be "strictly controlled" and that it was the Europeans rather than the Americans who insisted on setting conditions for the elections.

Kostunica said at a news conference that the preelection situation in Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb Republic was characterized by the fluidity of the electorate, complicated elections rules, and attempts by international players to influence the outcome of the elections. [passage omitted]

Speaking about last week's statement by Aleksandar Despic, the president of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, about the situation in and the ways of resolving the issue of Kosovo-Metohija, Kostunica said that he "differs from others in the interpretation of what was said."

According to him, Despic criticized the situation in Kosovo-Metohija stressing that "the leaders at the time of Josip Broz [Tito] and after did nothing to resolve the problem" and drew attention to "what is likely to happen if nothing is done." [passage omitted]

Serbia: Increasing Strength of Police Analyzed

AU1206104696 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 31 May 96 pp 26-27

[Commentary by Miroslav Vujovic: "In Defense of the Leadership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] One state, two republics, three police forces. There would be nothing unusual about it and less fighting as though between cats and dogs if there were not the following problem in this Yugoslav "police reality." The federal police force exists only for formal reasons and the police forces of the two republics do not only have different names, but they also wear different uniforms and their leaders have different titles. Serbia has a "militia" [Milicija] and Montenegro has the police. The Serbian police—that is, its leaders—have recently been awarded the rank of general and soon after that all "the blue angels" received new uniforms. New uniforms had been introduced in Montenegro earlier. They resemble the uniforms of U.S. police in crime films, which is also true of their equipment. From electric batons to the most modern cars of the "Golf" type, 300 of which were bought recently to fill the motor pool from the budget of the Njegos state [Montenegrin poet] and a part of the Yugoslav federation.

In no democratic country is information about the size of the police force considered a secret, let alone a state secret, but their number is hidden from the Yugoslav population.

Federal Power

NIN has been informed by high-ranking police circles, however, that the importance, the power, and the influence of the federal Ministry of Internal Affairs has drastically fallen. Well informed people claim that it "effectively does not exist any longer," which can be illustrated by the information that "only about 500 people" are still employed by it, a number several times smaller than in 1991. Until 1991 the Ministry of Internal Affairs employed around 3,000 people. It is no secret for those who are acquainted with the situation in the ministry that in the (former) Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs the most delicate positions—excluding the ministerial posts, since they were occupied according to the rotation principle of the federal republics—were occupied by Slovenes and Croats. When Tito's Yugoslavia began to collapse, they returned to their republics, taking with them a large amount of the most confident information from the archives of the federal intelligence service. Well informed people claim that most of the very confidential documents ended up in Croatia and a considerable amount in Slovenia, too.

The situation with the Serbian and the Montenegrin "intelligence services" is completely different from what it was before the war, since the old federal intelligence service used to cover many "important facilities," taking care of officials and their villas in Topcider Brdo and Dedinje in Belgrade. Kardelj [Tito's ideologist] slept soundly in his house at Uzicka Street 1, in front of which a policeman from the federal service stood guard. The same is true of Josip Vrhovec and Fadilj Hodza, who—after the death of Comrade Beuc—lived in the residence he had occupied for several years. To what extent the federal institutions, that is the federal state, are important today can be seen from the fact that there are no policemen in front of the federal ministers' club at Tolstoy Street 2 any longer, although this is a club for members only. At the same time, Tolstoy and Uzicka Streets are full of blue police cars, since the highest-ranking representatives of the Serbian leadership live here.

The current young Montenegrin leadership, which established itself and obtained the image of being democratic after the events of Zuta Greda [scene of the so-called "antibureaucratic" demonstrations, which led to the installation of the new pro-Milosevic leadership], obviously sleeps safely in the villa at Uzicka Street 1 (where Edvard and Pepca Kardelj used to live), since they are taken care of by their own police force, in jackets that resemble crime films produced in the West. (They were admired by the Serbian police when they used to wear their old-fashioned plum-colored uniforms.)

Batons Instead of Gusles [Serbian stringed instrument]

Nobody knows how much the 300 new police cars, the modern uniforms, and equipment have cost the Montenegrin budget, but NIN has learned from the above sources that there are 10,000 active policemen in Montenegro and 10,000 more reservists. Compared to approximately 600,000 inhabitants (according to the 1991 census, Montenegro had 616,327 inhabitants), the number of 20,000 policemen does not only sound immense, but it also enjoys immense power. Does it not sound horrifying that every 30th Montenegrin has replaced his "gusle" with an electric baton? It has to be admitted, however, that the Montenegrin leadership has created the strong police force after Slobodan Milosevic's model, who started building up the police force before that and placing it under his command. That this is beyond doubt can be proven by the fact that the Serbian president conferred upon top police officers the rank of general on the occasion the National Holiday on 28 March (not on the occasion of the National Security Day, 13 May). (Police generals have not been copied in Montenegro so far, but "the pillar of the regime" is structured in the same way. On the other hand, Zoran Lilic, the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, has not enough federal policemen to promote.)

NIN has also learned that the Serbian police has somewhat more than 70,000 active members, and a further 50,000 "just in case." This powerful and technically well equipped police force of about 120,000 policemen, who are in charge of law and order and the regime, effectively take care of around 9.5 million inhabitants of Serbia. (According to the 1991 census, there were 9,721,177 people living in Serbia, but according to some sources this number has decreased by 300,000, who fled before the war or moved to neighboring republics.) The Serbian police are, according to NIN's sources, equipped with the most modern weapons more appropriate for the military than the police.

Why does the leadership need such a strong police force? Who can trust the electoral slogans about an "intense struggle against all aspects of crime" since it can be read in the newspaper every day that people are being killed, bombs are being planted under cars, that there are fights with weapons in school yards, etc.? Some analysts have come up with the interesting theory that the Serbian and Montenegrin police forces are there to neutralize the demilitarization of the Balkans (!), whose "unavoidable factor of stability" is Yugoslavia, whereas cynics comment that the number of policemen is increasing because "nobody can beat anyone, except the police." [Allusion to Milosevic's statement to the Kosovar Serbs that nobody will be allowed to beat the people.]

It remains to be seen how much of all this is true. The truth in this sphere has been coming out in installments for a very long time already.

Kosovo

Kosovo: Politician Urges U.S. To Hold Conference on Kosovo

AU1306192396 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 13 Jun 96

[Telephone report by Leke Musolli from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fact that the U.S. Information office was opened in Prishtina [Pristina] speaks of a continuous presence of the international factor in Kosova, and this is further testimony that, after Dayton, the international community will have the Kosova issue as its fundamental and permanent concern, Academician Mark Krasniqi, chairman of the Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosova [PShDKK], stressed. In favor of this, Krasniqi mentioned the numerous diplomatic activities by high-ranking European and U.S. officials, as well the talks they held with political parties and the Kosova leadership.

At the PShDKK Presidency meeting, Academician Krasniqi stressed that another important fact is that, even in Serbia, institutions have started to react differently on the Kosova issue in contrast to the previous militarist Serbian euphoria.

With his latest presentation on Kosova, Serbian Academy Chairman Despic made it clear that the Kosova issue cannot be resolved without the will of the Albanian people, which is an absolute majority on their centuries-long ethnic territories, Academician Krasniqi stressed, adding that the Serbian minority, particularly the Serbian extremists in Kosova, should understand the truth that the Kosova issue cannot be resolved in Serbia and without the Albanians. That is why we have asked the international community to expeditiously hold an international conference on Kosova, which will actualize the issues on the solution of the Kosova issue. The initiative for holding this international conference should be taken by the United States, Academician Krasniqi stressed, among other things.

Kosovo: LDK Official Comments on SANU Chairman's Remark

AU1306195596 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Jun 96 p 10

[Article by B.C. and V.D.: "Toward a Solution to the Kosovo Knot"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "The speech delivered by Aleksandar Despic, the chairman of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts [SANU], aroused great interest among the Kosovo Albanians," Fehmi Agani, vice chairman of the Democratic League of Kosovo [LDK], told NASA BORBA. "His thesis that the most-important strategic problem from the point of view of the future of the Serbian people, Serbia, and Yugoslavia—one that exerts pressure from both inside and outside—is the problem of Kosovo and that there is a need to objectively assess the dilemma with which Serbia is confronted regarding Kosovo and Albanians, is proof of the rationality that is characteristic of people who think, which the present official Serbia lacks," Agani said.

Agani said that also the statements issued by Mr. Despic aroused attention because he pointed out that the Kosovo problem is the number one problem for Serbia, that apartheid has ended even in Africa, and that the treatment of the Albanians as a national minority—even though it might have "a rational basis"—is senseless given the present demographic and social reality.

Agani also said that it was impossible at the moment to grasp all the implications of the statement about a possible peaceful and civilizational separation and disassociation from the Albanians. "This statement is interpreted by the Albanians as proof that the original nationalist aggression has been defeated. If Despic's speech is inspired by democracy, it almost coincides with the concept of an independent and open Kosovo that should be achieved peacefully," Agani concluded.

Kosovo: Media Debate Serb Academician's Remarks on Kosovo

AU1306183096 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 13 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The reopening of the file on Kosova by the Serbian Academy of Sciences in Belgrade continues to be the topic of concerns and discussions by political circles in Serbia, Kosova, and beyond. Here is a telephone report by Qani Mehmedi from Prishtina [Pristina] on what the Albanian mass media in Kosova write about this debate and behind-the-stage talks:

[Mehmedi] Kosova is once and for all lost for Serbia—this was the statement by the chairman of the Serbian

Academy of Sciences, which was received with surprise in Kosova. Meanwhile, the statement has set the souls of the Serbian public on fire and put the Kosova issue back into the limelight.

Immediately after this assessment was made during the Serbian Academy debate on Kosova, the Belgrade mass media quickly opened up their pages to the opinions of former communist leaders of Kosova, seeking to exclude the current Kosovar leadership from the dialogue.

Commenting on this turn in the opinion of the Serbian Academy head regarding a solution to the Kosova issue, the Albanian press in Prishtina writes that the Serbian Academy of Sciences took this step simply to appear more moderate to international public opinion, and at the same time to test the Serbian people themselves, whom the Academy had nourished for so long with chauvinism against Albanians and against Kosova.

In today's issue the newspaper BUJKU carries a commentary noting that the Serbian Academy of Sciences' discussion of the Kosova issue, which was more realistic this time than in any other debate ever held there, testifies to the international pressure under which official Belgrade finds itself regarding a solution to the Kosova issue. The paper stresses that on precisely on the day when the U.S. office was opened in Prishtina, after a meeting between French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Kohl, the news apparently spread that the Kosova issue will also be discussed at a meeting of the Contact Group on resolving the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, which is to be held next month. This news has by all means shocked the Serbian state leadership.

The remark by German diplomacy chief Klaus Kinkel blaming Serbia for the situation in Kosova, which is becoming increasingly dangerous and more militant, as well as the messages from Carl Bildt's adviser during his visit to Prishtina, were some of the more serious steps obliging Belgrade to take a new approach on Kosova.

Meanwhile BOTA SOT, the other Albanian daily which is published in the West, notes in a commentary that these new themes from a personality who represents the highest scientific institution in Serbia testifies that the process of Kosova's independence from Serbia has gone so far that it cannot be derailed with the use of military and police force against Albanians. That is why Belgrade is obliged to change its attitude toward Kosova and Albanians.

Kosovo: Bukoshi Interviewed on Hunger Strikers in Germany

AU1206174396 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 12 Jun 96 p 10

[Unattributed interview with Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the Republic of Kosova, by telephone; place and date not given: "Strikes and the Albanian Factor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It has been reported from Prishtina [Pristina] that Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the Republic of Kosova, gave an interview to the Kosovar press abroad. We publish below the questions and answers from this telephone interview:

[Interviewer] What can you tell us about the hunger strike of Albanians in several German cities?

[Bukoshi] I can say what we partially said in a communique that we were obliged to issue. We said in this communique that we respect the right of every individual and group to act politically to attain their political ends in the way they think best. I see no harm in this. However, as head of the government, I regret that our political forces in Kosova were not warned. The political effect might in that case have been greater, because strikes are being held not just for the German public. The strikes are being held with the primary aim of stimulating the Albanians themselves more, because the idea is current that a general apathy prevails.

[Interviewer] When you say that the political forces in Kosova should have been informed, was the reason for this because they might put pressure on you to unconditionally remove the strikers from part of the government's office?

[Bukoshi] No, the government has never been put under pressure by political forces in Kosova as you imagine. Absolutely not. But there were various other circumstances that obliged the government to orally contact the strikers and to ask them to continue the strike where they began it, and not in the government's office, because as you know the government is not recognized here in the West, has no governmental status, and so forth.

[Interviewer] How does the government comment on the fact that, at a time when a hunger strike is being held in Germany precisely because of Kosova's unfavorable position in relation to official circles in Germany, "representatives" of the Albanians talked to Kinkel in Belgrade in the capacity of members of the opposition and representatives of minorities in Serbia?

[Bukoshi] You said that the position of the Albanians is serious, and I say that it is serious beyond all measure. In this serious situation we must all do something together.

Of course, I am talking in the name of the government, in the sense that we must as far as possible coordinate our activities. I say as far as possible, so as not to be idealistic, and we have not exhausted the opportunities for coordination. We are obliged always to talk.

On the basis of information that I possess, the delegation that talked to Kinkel in Belgrade expressed its political position, and of course expressed dissatisfaction over the issue of Kosova. It said everything. I have no suspicions that the Kosova delegation went to make a kind of compromise.

[Interviewer] Mr. Bukoshi, Kinkel invited the delegation as representatives of the opposition in Serbia and as representatives of the Albanian minority in Kosova and the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. What do you have to say about the delegation going to talk as representatives of a minority? This is a key issue, because on one hand they exclaim to the Albanians that they represent the Republic of Kosova while on the other hand they accept an invitation to talks as members of a minority.

[Bukoshi] You must ask the delegation of Kosova that went to the talks. I do not have the right to judge whether they were right or not. However, as you know, Kinkel and the international community treat Kosova as a problem of minorities, and as a part of Serbia. It is not a solution to tell Kinkel not to call the Albanians a minority. It is the policy of Germany, the United States, Britain, and so forth to take this approach to the problem of Kosova. It is our task to impress it on people and to show that it is not a matter of a minority but of a divided nation. This is a question that we cannot solve in this manner. As for your specific question, it would be better for you to interview this delegation, and they could not doubt give you more detailed information. At this moment, I can only speculate, which is not helpful in these circumstances, when everything is delicate. I am not telling you politely to shut up, but we must be very careful in these very serious circumstances through which we are living. I would include in this context the question of our compatriots' hunger strike.

[Interviewer] How can you explain the Albanian media's silence over this strike, while these media are bursting with fourth- and fifth-rate news?

[Bukoshi] Look, that is something that cannot be entered into in depth during a short telephone call. I can see with great irritation that our media are not up to the task of portraying delicate situations. They are very partial and there is a great deal of room for improvement.

Kosovo: Pristina Vendors To End Strike If Serbs Show 'Goodwill'

AU1206141796 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Representatives of the Prishtina [Pristina] fresh produce vendors have said their strike, which started on 4 April because of exceedingly high taxes imposed on them by the Serbian regime, might end later this week.

If the Serb authorities abide by an agreement reached last Friday [7 June], some 1,000 vendors will resume work, the representatives of the strikers told BUJKU newspaper. They said according to the agreement the tax will be the average of the fees fellow vendors are charged in other places.

The Albanian vendors in Prishtina have claimed they have been grossly discriminated against by the Serbian regime. They had to pay several times higher fees than their Serb colleagues in Serbian marketplaces. Whether the marketplaces in Prishtina resumes work after more than two months depends on the "goodwill" of the Serb authorities. Given their notorious record of ploys and manipulations, nobody dares speculate.

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